Elkem Metals Co. v. United States
This is a revision of a Previous Opinion originally issued on April 17, 2000
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SLIP OP . 03-66
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
BEFORE : RICHARD K. EATON , JUDGE
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PLAINTIFFS ,
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AND
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GLOBE METALLURGICAL, INC.,
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PLAINTIFF -INTERVENOR,
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V.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
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DEFENDANT,
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AND
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FERROATLANTICA DE VENEZUELA , GENERAL
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MOTORS CORP ., ASSOCIAÃÃO BRASILEIRA DOS
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PRODUCTORES DE FERROLIGAS E DE SILICO
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METALICO , ET AL., AND RONLY HOLDINGS, LTD ., :
ET AL.,
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DEFENDANT-INTERVENO RS. :
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ELKEM METALS CO ., AMERICAN ALLOYS, INC.,
APPLIED INDUST RIAL MATERIALS CORP ., AND
CC METALS & ALLOYS, INC.,
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
[United States International Trade Commissionâs determination on reconsideration, as modified
by first remand determination, remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.]
Dated: June 18, 2003
Piper Rudnick, LLP (William D. Kramer, Martin Schaefermeier), Eckert Seamans Cherin
& Mellott, LLC (Dale Hershey, Mary K. Austin), and Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP (John
W. Nields, Jr., Laura S. Shores) for Plaintiff Elkem Metals Company.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 2
Altheimer & Gray (Theodore J. Low) for Plaintiff Applied Industrial Materials
Corporation.
Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, PLLC (George R. Kucik, Eugene J. Meigher, Stephen
L. Gibson, Kate B. Briscoe), and Thelen Reid & Priest, LLP (Gerald Zingone) for Plaintiff CC
Metals & Alloys, Inc.
Dangel & Mattchen, LLP (Edward T. Dangel, III, Michael K. Mattchen) for PlaintiffIntervenor Globe Metallurgical, Inc.
Lyn M. Schlitt, General Counsel, United States International Trade Commission, James
M. Lyons, Deputy General Counsel, United States International Trade Commission (Marc A.
Bernstein) for Defendant.
Kaye Scholer Fierman Hays & Handler, LLP (Julie C. Mendoza, Donald B. Cameron, R.
Will Planert, Margaret Scicluna Rudin) for Defendant-Intervenor Ferroatlantica de Venezuela.
Hogan & Hartson, LLP (Mark S. McConnell) for Defendant-Intervenor General Motors
Corporation.
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP (Philippe M. Bruno, Kevin B. Bedell) for DefendantIntervenors Associação Brasileira dos Productores de Ferroligas e de Silicio Metalico,
Companhia Brasileira Carbureto de Calcio-CBCC, Companhia de Ferroligas de BahiaFERBASA; Nova Era Silicon S/A, Italmagnesio S/A-Industria e Comercio, Rima Industrial S/A,
and Companhia Ferroligas Minas Gerais-Minasligas.
Aitken Irvin Berlin & Vrooman, LLP (Bruce Aitken, Virginie Lecaillon) for
Defendant-Intervenors Ronly Holdings, Ltd., Cheliubinski Electrometalurgical Works, Kuznetsk
Ferroalloy Works, Stakhanov Ferroalloy Works, and Zaporozhye Ferroalloy Works.
OPINION AND ORDER
EATON, Judge: Before the court are the motions of plaintiffs Elkem Metals Company (âElkemâ),
American Alloys, Inc. (âAmerican Alloysâ),1 Applied Industrial Materials Corporation
1
American Alloys did not participate in the remand proceedings as it was in
liquidation. See Views of the Commission, Ferrosilicon From Braz., China, Kaz., Russ., Ukr.,
Ven., Invs. Nos. 303-TA-23, 731-TA-566â570, and 731-TA-641 (Final) (Reconsideration)
(continued...)
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 3
(âAIMCORâ), and CC Metals & Alloys, Inc. (âCCMAâ), and plaintiff-intervenor Globe
Metallurgical, Inc. (âGlobeâ) (collectively, âPlaintiffsâ), for judgment upon the agency record
pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2. Plaintiffs challenge the United States International Trade
Commissionâs (âITCâ) negative injury determination in Ferrosilicon From Braz., China, Kaz.,
Russ., Ukr., Ven., 64 Fed. Reg. 47,865 (ITC Sept. 1, 1999) (reconsideration determination). See
Views of the Commission, Ferrosilicon From Braz., China, Kaz., Russ., Ukr., Ven., Invs. Nos.
303-TA-23, 731-TA-566â570, and 731-TA-641 (Reconsideration), USITC Pub. 3218 (Aug.
1999), Pub. R. List 1, Doc. 558AR (âReconsideration Determinationâ). In Elkem Metals Co. v.
United States, 26 CIT __, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (2002) (âElkem IVâ), familiarity with which is
presumed, this court remanded the Reconsideration Determination with respect to certain
procedural issues.2 The ITCâs Reconsideration Determination, as modified on remand, is the
subject of this action. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). For the reasons set forth below, the court remands this matter for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
1
(...continued)
(Remand), USITC Pub. 3531 (Sept. 2002), Pub. R. List 1, Doc. 606R (âRemand Determinationâ)
at 4 n.15.
2
Prior to Elkem IV, this court issued three opinions that addressed various
procedural matters. See Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 255 (2000) (ordering the ITC
to submit certified copies of certain documents to the court for in camera review); Elkem Metals
Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 1395, 126 F. Supp. 2d 567 (2000) (granting in part and denying in
part Plaintiffsâ motion to compel production of certain sealed items in the record); Elkem Metals
Co. v. United States, 25 CIT __, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (2001) (denying Plaintiffsâ motion for
preliminary injunction).
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 4
BACKGROUND
In response to petitions filed on behalf of the domestic ferrosilicon industry in 1992 and
1993, the ITC instituted investigations of ferrosilicon from Brazil, Kazakhstan, the Peopleâs
Republic of China (âChinaâ), Russia, Ukraine, and Venezuela (âSubject Countriesâ). See
Reconsideration Determination at 12. The ITC selected the years 1989 through 1993 as the
period of investigation (âOriginal POIâ).3 See id. During its investigations, the ITC collected
data for those years by various means, including by issuance of questionnaires.
Between late 1989 and mid-1991 (âConspiracy Periodâ), a conspiracy to fix prices of
commodity ferrosilicon existed among three domestic ferrosilicon producers: (1) Elkem, (2)
American Alloys, and (3) SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc. (âSKWâ)4 (collectively, âConspiratorsâ).
Reconsideration Determination at 10. The price-fixing conspiracy, however, was not brought to
the ITCâs attention during the Original POI. Id. at 11â12. Therefore, in 1993 and 1994, the ITC
issued final affirmative injury determinations with respect to the Subject Countries. See
Ferrosilicon From the P.R.C., 58 Fed. Reg. 13,503 (ITC Mar. 11, 1993) (final determination);
Ferrosilicon From Kaz. and Ukr., 58 Fed. Reg. 16,847 (ITC Mar. 31, 1993) (final determination);
Ferrosilicon From Russ. and Ven., 58 Fed. Reg. 34,064 (ITC June 23, 1993) (final
determination); Ferrosilicon From Braz., 59 Fed. Reg. 10,165 (ITC Mar. 3, 1994) (final
3
This court has held that the ITC may, in its discretion, determine the period of
investigation for its material injury analysis. See Metallverken Nederland B.V. v. United States,
13 CIT 1013, 1018, 728 F. Supp. 730, 735 (1989) (âThe Commission has discretion to determine
the appropriate periods of investigation.â) (citations omitted). No dispute exists with respect to
the duration of the Original POI or the propriety of the years selected.
4
SKW is the predecessor firm of CCMA. See Remand Determination at 5.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 5
determination). In 1995, Elkem and American Alloys pled guilty to charges that they had
conspired to fix prices of commodity ferrosilicon in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1990). See Pub. R. List 1, Doc. 325, Ex. 6 & 7 (plea agreements of Elkem and American
Alloys). In 1997, a jury convicted SKW and a corporate officer of SKW, Mr. Charles Zak, of
criminal charges related to the conspiracy. See United States v. SKW Metals & Alloys, Inc., 4 F.
Supp. 2d 166 (W.D.N.Y. 1997), affâd, remanded on other grounds, 195 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1999).
The ITC learned of the conspiracy only in 1998 when the Brazilian respondents in the
original investigation petitioned the ITC for a changed circumstances review of the final
affirmative injury determination relating to ferrosilicon from Brazil. See Ferrosilicon From
Braz., China, Kaz., Russ., Ukr., and Ven., 63 Fed. Reg. 27,747 (ITC May 20, 1998) (request for
comments regarding institution of changed circumstances revs.). On July 28, 1998, the ITC
instituted the requested changed circumstances review and, further, self-initiated changed
circumstances reviews of the other related final affirmative material injury determinationsâ i.e.,
those pertaining to China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Venezuela. See Ferrosilicon From
Braz., China, Kaz., Russ., Ukr., Ven., 63 Fed. Reg. 40,314 (ITC July 28, 1998) (notice of
institution of changed circumstances revs.). After receiving comments with respect to issues
concerning the conspiracy, the ITC suspended these changed circumstances reviews and gave
notice of its intention to initiate reconsideration proceedings. See Ferrosilicon From Braz.,
China, Kaz., Russ., Ukr., Ven., 64 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (ITC May 25, 1999) (notice of suspension of
changed circumstances revs. and institution of reconsideration proceedings) (âNoticeâ).
Subsequently, the ITC reversed and vacated its original affirmative injury determinations and
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 6
issued a negative injury determination with respect to the original investigations.
Reconsideration Determination at 1.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs brought this consolidated action alleging, among other things, that
the ITC lacked the authority to conduct a reconsideration. In Elkem IV, this court held that, while
the ITC was within its authority to reconsider its original final determinations, âit failed to adhere
to the procedures that it published [in the Notice] as those that would govern its Reconsideration
Proceedings,â and, thus, that the reconsideration proceedings were not in accordance with law.
Elkem IV, 26 CIT at __, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter
and ordered the ITC to conduct a hearing in conformity with the regulations referenced in the
Notice, and afford the parties âall of the other benefits of the âCommissionâs Rules of Practice
and Procedure, part 201, subparts A through E (19 CFR part 201), and part 207, subparts, A, C,
and D (19 CFR part 207)[]â Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,212, including adequate notice, prehearing briefing and post-hearing briefing.â Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.20(b), 207.22,
207.23(a), 207.24 (1999)). The court further ordered:
Finally, as to the ITCâs contention that it need not examine whether
the alleged price-fixing conspiracy actually distorted the domestic
ferrosilicon prices at issue in the original investigations, should
evidence with respect thereto be presented during the course of the
further proceedings on remand, the ITC shall consider such
evidence as it would consider any other evidence on the record.
Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1988)). By its Remand Determination, the ITC affirmed its
negative injury determination, which affirmance is now before the court.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 7
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a final determination in an antidumping or countervailing duty
investigation, â[t]he court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion
found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with law . . . .â 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
United States, 26 CIT __, __, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (2002) (âThe same standard of review
applies to the review of a remand determination as to the review of the original determination.â
(citations omitted)). âAs long as the agencyâs methodology and procedures are reasonable means
of effectuating the statutory purpose, and there is substantial evidence in the record supporting
the agencyâs conclusions, the court will not impose its own views as to the sufficiency of the
agencyâs investigation or question the agencyâs methodology.â Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v.
United States, 10 CIT 399, 404â05, 636 F. Supp. 961, 966 (1986), affâd, 810 F.2d 1137 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
In conducting its review of the ITCâs factual findings, â[t]he Courtâs function is not to reweigh the evidence but rather to ascertain whether there exists âsuch relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.ââ Chefline Corp. v. United
States, 26 CIT __, __, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305 (2002) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 810 F.2d
1137, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (âA court may âuphold [an agencyâs] decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agencyâs path may reasonably be discerned.ââ (bracketing in original) (internal
quotation and citation omitted)). â[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 8
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agencyâs finding from being supported by
substantial evidence.â Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Commân, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations
omitted).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, no party seriously disputes that the ITC complied with this courtâs
instructions in Elkem IV with respect to the procedures used in conducting its subsequent
proceedings.5 Plaintiffs do contend, however, that the negative determination reached by the ITC
on reconsideration, and affirmed on remand, is neither supported by substantial evidence nor in
accordance with law.
5
CCMA alleges that the remand proceedings were conducted in a manner that
violated its procedural due process rights because of certain alleged defects in the notice provided
in Ferrosilicon From Braz., China, Kaz., Russ., Ukr., Ven., 67 Fed. Reg. 18,633 (ITC Apr. 16,
2002) (notice of institution and scheduling of remand proceedings). CCMA argues that the cases
cited by this court in Elkem IV as authority for the ITCâs power to reconsider its original
determinations âall stand for the proposition that allegations of misconduct serious enough to
warrant reconsideration are also serious enough to trigger constitutional due process protections
for the parties charged with wrongdoing,â which, CCMA alleges, include specific notice of the
charges against it and an opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. See Pub. Comments of
CCMA on ITCâs Remand Determinations (âCCMA Commentsâ) at 28. CCMA cites, as an
example, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), which this court
quoted in its discussion of Alberta Gas Chemicals, Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.
1981), a case relied upon as support for the proposition that federal agencies have the authority to
reconsider their final determinations. Elkem IV, 26 CIT at __, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 n.6.
CCMA does not contend that it did not receive notice that issues related to its alleged misconduct
in the original investigations would be addressed, nor does it contend it was not afforded an
opportunity to be heard on these issues. âIt is well settled that procedural due process guarantees
do not require full-blown, trial type proceedings in all administrative determinations.â PPG
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 183, 189, 708 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (1989) (citing Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)). As such, and because ITC complied with this courtâs
instructions on remand, the conduct of those proceedings is sustained.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
I.
PAGE 9
Best Information Available6
A.
The ITCâs finding that the Conspiratorsâ failure to reveal the existence of the
price-fixing conspiracy âsignificantly impededâ the ITCâs original investigations
and thus justified the use of best information available is in accordance with law
On reconsideration, the ITC found that, by failing to reveal the existence of an agreement
to create a floor price for domestic ferrosilicon, i.e., the price-fixing conspiracy, during the
original investigations, certain domestic producers had made misrepresentations and omitted
information that âaffected central issues in the original investigations pertaining to the relevant
conditions of competition in the domestic industry, pricing of the like product, and factors that
affected pricing of the like product.â Reconsideration Determination at 20.7 The
Reconsideration Determination sets out these misrepresentations and omissions. See id. at
13â19. For example, one questionnaire asked the domestic producers to ââdescribe the quoting
process for [their] contracts or agreements for ferrosilicon,ââ and to ââ[i]nclude factors
6
As the petitions in the original investigations were filed before January 1, 1995,
the amendments made by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (âURAAâ) were not applicable to
the original determinations. See Torrington Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1995). Thus, on reconsideration the pre-URAA version of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) continued to
apply.
7
In the Reconsideration Determination, the ITC found that Elkem, American
Alloys, SKW, AIMCOR, and Globe engaged in serious misconduct that called into question the
veracity and reliability of the pricing information contained in the petitions, testimony, and
questionnaire responses submitted on behalf of the domestic industry in the original
investigations. See Reconsideration Determination at 9â10, 23. In the Remand Determination,
the ITC adopted âall findings [it] made in the [Reconsideration Determination] with respect to
party misconduct, except for findings pertaining to AIMCOR and Globe,â Remand
Determination at 6, which companies it determined âwere not culpable of material
misrepresentations or omissions during the original [ITC] investigations . . . .â Id. at 10. No
party disputes the ITCâs finding exonerating AIMCOR and Globe; thus, it is sustained. The
court cannot agree with CCMAâs contention, however, that the ITCâs finding that CCMA
engaged in misconduct is not supported by substantial record evidence, see CCMA Comments at
20, in light of the discussion infra that it âsignificantly impededâ the ITCâs investigation.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 10
considered in determining [their] initial quotes and explain any trends in [their] quotes during the
period January 1989 â March 1992 . . . .ââ Id. at 17 & n.51 (quoting June 1992 ITC Producersâ
Questionnaire, Question V.C.1); see, e.g., Non-Pub. R. List 2, Doc. 9 at 38. Another
questionnaire asked the following question: ââTo avoid losing sales to competitors selling
ferrosilicon imported from (the subject countries) during any of the (POI) did your firm â
[r]educe prices . . . or [r]oll back announced price increases?ââ Id. at 18 & n.52 (quoting
Question V-E; Question V-C); see, e.g., Non-Pub. R. List 2, Doc. 7 at 45. In their responses, the
Conspirators did not reveal the existence of an agreement to create a floor price, but rather
indicated that prices were set by market forces. Reconsideration Determination at 11â12; id. at 3
(âU.S. producers that participated in the investigations actively advocated that the U.S.
ferrosilicon market was driven by unfettered price competition.â). In this way, the ITC found
that âthe producers concealed, if not manipulated, a competitive issue relevant to the
Commissionâs evaluation of the meaning and significance of the observed market data.â Id. at
19. Thus, the ITC concluded that â[b]y such conduct, these producers significantly impeded,
undermined, and compromised the integrity of the Commissionâs investigationsâ and invoked its
authority to use âbest information otherwise availableâ (âBIAâ), pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §
1677e(c) (1988). Id. at 21.
The statute governing the ITCâs reconsideration authorized the ITC, under certain
circumstances, to use BIA:
In making [its] determinations under this subtitle, . . . the
Commission shall, whenever a party or any other person refuses or
is unable to produce information requested in a timely manner and
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 11
in the form required, or otherwise significantly impedes an
investigation, use the best information otherwise available.
19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). It has been held that the use of BIA may be warranted where âanswers to
questions do not fully or accurately supply the information requested,â Olympic Adhesives, Inc. v.
United States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990),8 or where a party refuses to timely produce
requested information and thereby significantly impedes the investigation. See Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 1024, 1031â32, 833 F. Supp. 919, 926 (1993); Chung Ling
Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 843, 847, 805 F. Supp. 56, 62 (1992) (âChung Ling IIâ) (applying
19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1982) and citing Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1560
(Fed. Cir. 1984)) (âThere can be no question that the Commission is allowed to â indeed must â
use BIA âunder the circumstances enumerated in the statute.ââ (emphasis in original)); Ceramica
Regiomontana, 10 CIT at 406, 636 F. Supp. at 967 (sustaining use of BIA, pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677e(b) (1982), in countervailing duty investigation where questionnaire responses found to
be âinaccurate in significant and material respectsâ). âThe courtâs role is not to determine
whether the information chosen was the âbestâ actually available,â but rather whether the
agencyâs choice is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. Manifattura
Emmepi S.p.A. v. United States, 16 CIT 619, 623, 799 F. Supp. 110, 114 (1992) (citations
omitted); see also Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 23 CIT
148, 158, 40 F. Supp. 2d 466, 476 (1999) (noting agencyâs âbroad discretion in determining what
information to use once it establishes that the application of BIA is appropriate.â (citations
8
The Olympic Adhesives court applied 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1982), which was
redesignated as 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) in 1988, upon enactment of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 1331(1) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677e).
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 12
omitted)). As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated:
Noncooperation by parties or other persons may . . . be penalized,
at least in the eyes of those parties or persons, by the ITCâs
mandatory use of whatever other best information it may have
available. In short, one may view the best information rule . . . as
an investigative tool, which that agency may wield as an informal
club over recalcitrant parties or persons whose failure to cooperate
may work against their best interest.
Atl. Sugar, 744 F.2d at 1560. An agencyâs authority to use BIA, however, is not unlimited. See
Olympic Adhesives, 899 F.2d at 1572 (quoting Atl. Sugar, 744 F.2d at 1560) (â[T]he ITA has not
been given power that can be âwieldedâ arbitrarily as an âinformal club.ââ); Novachem, Inc. v.
United States, 16 CIT 782, 785, 797 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (1992) (citing Olympic Adhesives, 899
F.2d at 1574) (â[T]he best information available statute requires noncompliance with an
information request before [the agency] may resort to the best information available.â); see also
Manifattura Emmepi, 16 CIT at 624, 799 F. Supp. at 115 (â[An agencyâs] authority to select best
information otherwise available is subject to a rational relationship between data chosen and the
matter to which they are to apply.â).
There is little doubt that the use of BIA was warranted under the circumstances presented
here. No credible argument can be made that the ITC questionnaires were answered truthfully
and responsively. It is uncontested that the questionnaires distributed to the domestic producers
requested information pertaining to the way in which domestic prices for ferrosilicon were
determined.9 None of the Conspirators revealed the agreement to create a floor price in their
9
Indeed, Elkem, through its counsel, conceded the questionnaire responses were
deficient:
(continued...)
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 13
questionnaire responses. Rather, âthe Commission was told repeatedly that prices in the
ferrosilicon market were established solely on the basis of marketplace competition.â Remand
Determination at 5. In light of the importance of the price effects element of the ITCâs material
injury analysis in the original investigations and âthe price-sensitive nature of competition among
ferrosilicon suppliersâ the ITC found to exist in the original investigations, see Reconsideration
9
(...continued)
[Elkem] . . . [doesnât] contest . . . that the fact of the antitrust
violations should have been disclosed to this Commission in its
original decision. We think that the Commission should have been
given an opportunity to address all of the issues we talked about
today back then.
Remand Tr., Pub. R. List 1, Doc. 578R at 49:22â25, 50:1â2 (Mr. John W. Nields, Jr.). At oral
argument, the following exchange occurred between the court and counsel for Elkem:
Court:
[I]s it, in fact, the case that during the course of the initial investigation . . .
representations were made that the prices were determined by market forces?
Mr. Nields:
I believe representations generally of that nature were made.
Oral Argument Tr. at 20:6â11. Counsel for CCMA, however, made the remarkable argument
that his client answered the questionnaires truthfully:
[O]ur view is we didnât omit anything. We told it like we saw it.
There was competition in the marketplace. I donât think anybody
listening to the record in this case could come away believing that
there was not strong competition, at least between the imports and
the domestics, and also among the domestics.
Id. at 60:4â10 (Mr. Stephen L. Gibson). Counsel for CCMA stated his clientâs position as
follows: âOur position is that whatever meetings there were did not rise to the level of a pricefixing conspiracy, and that the thing was doomed to failure.â Id. at 58:16â18. The court finds
CCMAâs position difficult to credit. CCMAâs predecessor, SKW, was, in fact, a member of the
price-fixing conspiracy and was convicted of conspiring to fix prices. It is undisputed that SKW
did not disclose the conspiracy to the ITC. At the time SKW answered the questionnaire it was
engaged in a conspiracy the purpose of which was to distort competition in the sale of its
product. That the conspiracy may not have worked precisely as planned does not make CCMAâs
answers truthful.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 14
Determination at 28 (internal quotation omitted), the ITC reasonably concluded that the failure of
the Conspirators to divulge the existence of the price-fixing conspiracy âsignificantly impededâ
its investigation within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). See Chung Ling II, 16 CIT at 847,
805 F. Supp. at 62; Olympic Adhesives, Inc., 899 F.2d at 1572 (resort to BIA justified where
âanswers to questions do not fully or accurately supply the information requested . . . .â). Indeed,
it is difficult to think of a situation where the use of the âinformal club,â Atl. Sugar, 744 F.2d at
1560, of BIA might be more warranted. Thus, the court finds that the ITC properly exercised its
authority to use BIA, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c).
B.
The ITCâs findings, using best information available, are supported by substantial
evidence on the record
The question remains whether the ITCâs findings, reached through the use of BIA, are
supported by substantial evidence. Because of the failure to disclose the price-fixing conspiracy,
the ITC determined that it could not rely on the pricing information submitted by the domestic
producers, and, thus used âfacts otherwise availableâ in making the following findings.10 See
Reconsideration Determination at 31. First, the ITC found that â[f]errosilicon prices reached a
peak in 1989 when demand was exceptionally high.â Id. Second, it found â[d]emand declined
significantly from 1990 to 1991 due to a recession that reduced demand for the products in which
ferrosilicon was used as an input; consequently, prices fell as well, although only to historically
average levels.â Id. The ITC thus concluded that these facts âindicate[d] that a reason for the
price depression was the business cycle for ferrosilicon,â rather than underselling by subject
10
While the ITC used the more modern term âfacts otherwise availableâ in the
Reconsideration Determination, it undoubtably meant BIA.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 15
imports. Id.
In the Remand Determination the ITC affirmed these findings, observing that âdeclines in
ferrosilicon prices from 1989 to 1991 largely parallel changes in demandâ and that âin 1992,
when demand increased somewhat, there were also price increases for some domestically
produced ferrosilicon products.â Remand Determination at 26. The ITC supplemented this
demand analysis with an examination of U.S. apparent consumption, which has two components:
imports and U.S. producersâ shipments. See Rebuttal Comments of ITC Supp. Remand
Determination (âRebuttal Commentsâ) at 29 n.13. It determined that consumption âdeclined by
5.1 percent from 1989 to 1990 and by 12.4 percent from 1990 to 1991,â and that despite
increases in consumption between 1991 and 1992 the evidence showed that âthe 1992 apparent
consumption quantity was still below that of 1989 or 1990.â Id. at 25â26. The ITC continued:
In instances of falling demand, we would generally expect prices to
decline. This is particularly true in light of the difficulty in
modulating ferrosilicon production to reflect changes in demand.
Ferrosilicon is produced in furnaces that must be continuously run
and cannot be easily and quickly be switched to or from production
of other products.
Id. at 26. To substantiate its conclusions the ITC cited: (1) Economic Memorandum EC-Q-025
(Mar. 9, 1993), Non-Pub. R. List 2, Doc. 755R (âEconomic Memorandumâ); (2) the staff report
prepared in connection with the ITCâs final determination in Ferrosilicon From the P.R.C., Inv.
No. 731-TA-567 (Final), USITC Pub. 2606 (Mar. 1993), Pub. R. List 1, Doc. 374 (âChina Staff
Reportâ); and (3) data contained in the staff report prepared on remand. See Staff Report,
Ferrosilicon From Braz., China, Kaz., Russ., Ukr., Ven., Invs. Nos. 303-TA-23, 731-TA-
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PAGE 16
566â570, and 731-TA-641 (Final) (Reconsideration) (Remand), Non-Pub. R. List 2, Doc. 797R
(âRemand Staff Reportâ).
Elkem challenges the ITCâs analysis of demand trends, in particular taking issue with the
ITCâs calculation of U.S. apparent consumption figures on remand. Elkem asserts that the ITC
âreworked its old dataâ to show âa decline in consumption from 1989 to 1990 . . . by including
categories of apparent consumption in the 1989 apparent consumption number that were not
included in the apparent consumption numbers for 1990 through 1992.â Pub. Comments of
Elkem on ITC Remand Determination (âElkem Commentsâ) at 13 (emphasis in original). In
doing so, Elkem alleges, the ITC increased the 1989 number and created the âmisleading
impression that demand declined from 1989 to 1990 when in fact it increased.â Id. Elkem also
argues that the 1989 U.S. apparent consumption figure includes U.S. shipment volumes for ten
U.S. producers, while the apparent consumption figures for 1990, 1991, and 1992 include only
seven U.S. producersâ shipment volumes. Id. at 14.
The ITC responds to these arguments as follows. First, it asserts that the data Elkem
contends more accurately reflect U.S. apparent consumption during the 1989 to 1991 period, in
fact, confirm the ITCâs finding that âthere was a sharp decline in U.S. apparent consumptionâ
during that period. Rebuttal Comments at 28 (citing Elkem Comments, Non-Pub. Ex. E).
Second, the ITC asserts that Elkem did not raise any concerns about the accuracy of the 1990 and
1991 apparent consumption data on remand, even though such data were made available to
Elkem and were subject to comment. Id. at 28â29. Finally, the ITC explains that, in any event, it
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 17
used data from the February 1993 staff report to calculate 1989 U.S. apparent consumption
because the October 1993 staff report, from which the data for 1990, 1991, and 1992 were taken,
did not contain data for 1989.11 Id. at 29 n.13. The ITC does not dispute that the February 1993
and October 1993 Staff Reports calculate import volume based on different dataâthe February
report used questionnaire data collected from Plaintiffs in calculating import volume, and the
October report used official import statistics. Id. The ITC contends that the 1989 data were
properly recalculated using these official import statistics. In addition, the ITC explains that it
used shipment data for three U.S. producers in 1989 that it did not use for subsequent years
because those producers ceased production in 1989. Id. (citing October 1993 Staff Report at 27
n.53).
The court finds that the ITCâs BIA record evidence reasonably supports its findings with
respect to pricing. Data compiled from domestic producersâ questionnaire responses in the
original investigation of ferrosilicon from China revealed that the domestic industry experienced
a decline in demand from 1989 to 1991. As summarized in the China Staff Report:
The demand for ferrosilicon is directly tied to the steel and foundry
industries. Although the United States is the third largest steel
producer in the world, weak demand from the construction,
automotive, and appliance sectors contributed to a decline in steel
11
The February 1993 staff report was prepared in connection with the final
investigation concerning ferrosilicon from China, which data were incorporated into the final
staff report in Ferrosilicon From Braz., Egypt, Kaz., P.R.C., Russ., Ukr., and Ven., Invs. Nos.
303-TA-23 (Final), 731-TA-566â570 (Final), and 731-TA-641â642 (Prelim.) (Feb. 17, 1993),
Non-Pub. R. List 2, Doc. 774R (âFebruary 1993 Staff Reportâ). See Remand Staff Report at II-2
n.6. The October 1993 staff report related to the final investigation of ferrosilicon from Brazil
and Egypt. See Staff Report, Ferrosilicon From Braz. and Egypt, 731-TA-641â642 (Final) (Oct.
7, 1993), Non-Pub. R. List 2, Doc. 769R (âOctober 1993 Staff Reportâ).
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PAGE 18
output from 1989 to 1991. The steel industry had experienced high
growth in 1988, but production decreased in 1989 as the rate of
general economic growth slowed.
China Staff Report at I-13; Remand Determination at 25 & n.80. Moreover, as would be
expected in an environment of declining demand and more or less consistent supply, the data
show that from 1989 to 1991, prices for ferrosilicon fluctuated and generally decreased. As
summarized in the Remand Staff Report:
Quarterly prices of the domestic and applicable subject imported
ferrosilicon fluctuated but generally fell from period highs during
the first half of 1989 through much of the remaining period, before
generally showing a tendency to turn up somewhat during AprilSeptember 1992. . . . Weakened U.S. iron and steel production in
1990 and a decline in 1991 led to weakened and then reduced U.S.
demand for ferrosilicon, which, in turn, likely contributed to
further declines in U.S. ferrosilicon prices during 1990 and 1991.
Remand Staff Report at III-7, -22. In addition, the record evidence confirms that the domestic
industry experienced an overall decline in apparent consumption. The China Staff Report
summarized the data on apparent consumption as follows:
Total U.S. consumption, by quantity, decreased by 13.0 percent
from 1989 to 1991, but increased 25.7 percent between the interim
periods. In terms of value, total reported U.S. consumption fell by
31.9 percent from 1989 to 1991, but rose by 11.5 percent from
January-September 1991 to January-September 1992. . . .
[A]pparent consumption (by quantity) decreased 12.1 percent from
1989 to 1991, but rose 10.8 percent between the interim periods.
China Staff Report at I-13 & tbl. 1 (compiled from questionnaire responses and official statistics
of the United States Department of Commerce). The court has also reviewed the confidential
Economic Memorandum and finds that it supports the notion that it is difficult to switch from
ferrosilicon production to production of other products or vice versa. See Economic
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PAGE 19
Memorandum at 23. Thus, the court finds that the requisite ârational relationship between data
chosen and the matter to which they are to applyâ exists. See Manifattura Emmepi, 16 CIT at
624, 799 F. Supp. at 115.
In addition, the court finds Elkemâs attempts to undermine the ITCâs calculation of
apparent consumption for 1989 unavailing. While Elkem alleges that the ITC improperly
included categories of apparent consumption in its computation of the 1989 figure, both the
ITCâs data and Elkemâs proposed âcorrectedâ data indicate a general decline in U.S. apparent
consumption from 1989 to 1991. See Elkem Comments, Non-Pub. Ex. E. The ITC reasonably
relied on the February 1993 Staff Report for 1989 data as the October 1993 Staff Report did not
include data for 1989. Finally, it was reasonable for the ITC to use official import statistics for
1989 in computing U.S. apparent consumption for that year, where such statistical information
was also relied upon in calculating U.S. apparent consumption for subsequent years. Using this
data is surely within the ITCâs discretion considering the ITCâs justified use of BIA. While the
ITC acknowledges that â[t]he 1989 data presented in [the February 1993 Staff Report] differ
marginallyâ from data contained in its Remand Staff Report, the difference is not sufficiently
great to find the conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence. See Remand Staff Report at
II-2 n.6; Chefline Corp., 26 CIT at __, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. While Elkem offers different
interpretations of the evidence than those made by the ITC, âthe possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agencyâs finding
from being supported by substantial evidence.â Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620 (citations omitted).
Thus, the ITCâs use of BIA is lawful and its findings based thereon are supported by substantial
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 20
evidence on the record.
II.
Adverse Inferences
A.
The ITCâs authority to make adverse inferences under pre-URAA law
Under the relevant pre-URAA regulation, the ITC had the authority to make adverse
inferences, where warranted: â[W]henever a party . . . refuses or is unable to produce information
requested in a timely manner and in the form required, or otherwise significantly impedes an
investigation, the Commission may use the best information otherwise available in making its
determination; . . . [and] make inferences adverse to such personâs position . . . .â 19 C.F.R. §
207.8 (1992), (1993)12; Chung Ling Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 636, 640, 805 F. Supp. 45, 49
(1992) (âChung Ling Iâ) (noting that âlack of cooperation in responding to the questionnaires is a
sound basis for drawing an adverse inference against the domestic industry.â). In Alberta Pork
Producersâ Marketing Board v. United States, 11 CIT 563, 669 F. Supp. 445 (1987), the court
held that âthe Commission has discretion in deciding whether or not to draw an adverse inference
with respect to injury based upon a partyâs failure to participate in the administrative proceeding,
but the decision in either event must be based upon a sound rationale.â Alberta Pork, 11 CIT at
580, 669 F. Supp. at 459. The adverse inference rule was summarized as follows: ââ[W]hen a
party has relevant evidence within his control which he fails to produce, that failure gives rise to
an inference that the evidence is unfavorable to [that party].ââ Id. (quoting Intâl Union (UAW) v.
NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). In Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d
12
The court notes that 19 C.F.R. § 207.8 (1992) and 19 C.F.R. § 207.8 (1993), the
regulations in force at the time the ITC made its final determinations with respect to ferrosilicon
imports from the Subject Countries, contain identical language.
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PAGE 21
1185, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the
presumption that âthe highest prior margin was the best information of current marginsâ was a
permissible interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1190. In
upholding this presumption, the court cited the rationale underlying the adverse inference rule,
i.e., that the presumption âreflects a common sense inference that the highest prior margin is the
most probative evidence of current margins because, if it were not so, the importer, knowing of
the rule, would have produced current information showing the margin to be less.â Id. (emphasis
in original).
B.
The adverse inference that the price-fixing conspiracy affected prices during the
Conspiracy Period is in accordance with law and supported by substantial
evidence
As with BIA, here, the determinative factor in deciding if the ITC was justified in making
an adverse inference with respect to the effect of the price-fixing conspiracy is whether the
Conspirators significantly impeded the investigation. See 19 C.F.R. § 207.8. Thus, in keeping
with its finding with respect to BIA that the Conspirators significantly impeded its investigation
by withholding information essential to its material injury analysis, the ITC made the adverse
inference that âthe underselling and lost sales were a function of the domestic industryâs own
actions â namely attempts to establish minimum prices.â Reconsideration Determination at 31.
In other words, on reconsideration the ITC made the adverse inference that the price-fixing
conspiracy affected domestic prices while the conspiracy was in effect.
On remand, the ITC affirmed its finding that the conspiracy affected prices during the
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PAGE 22
Conspiracy Period. In doing so, however, the ITC did not rely on adverse inferences alone.
Rather, in support of this finding, the ITC cited data contained in the Remand Staff Report with
respect to the frequency of underselling before, during, and after the Conspiracy Period. See
Remand Determination at 18 & nn.57â58 (citing Remand Staff Report tbls. III-1â6, -7aâc, -8aâc,
-9aâb). Analyzing these data, the ITC found that for the Conspirators the frequency of
underselling was âsignificantly higher during the conspiracy period than during the preceding or
following period,â id. at 18:
For the three conspirators, the frequency of underselling based on
delivered prices was 80 percent (24 of 30 comparisons) during the
conspiracy period (the fourth quarter of 1989 through the second
quarter of 1991) and 61.8 percent (21 of 34 comparisons) during
the non-conspiracy period. . . . We emphasize that this analysis is
not an underselling analysis conducted pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §
1677(7)(C)(ii)(II) (1988). Instead, our purpose is to examine all
available data in the record as to whether the price fixing
conspiracy actually affected prices for domestically produced
ferrosilicon, in response to the CIT opinion directing these remand
proceedings.
Id. 18 n.57 (citing Remand Staff Report tbls. III-1â6, -7aâc, -8aâc, -9aâb). The ITC found that
the higher incidence of underselling during the Conspiracy Period was âconsistent with the
theory that the conspiracy would tend to inflate the conspiratorsâ prices as compared to the fair
price that would have otherwise been established in the U.S. market during the time of the
conspiracy.â Id. at 18.
In accordance with the courtâs instruction in Elkem IV, on remand, the ITC also
considered evidence submitted by Elkem and CCMA with respect to the issue of whether the
conspiracy affected prices during the Original POI. In doing so, the ITC rejected, as unprobative,
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PAGE 23
an economic report prepared by Dr. Joseph P. Kalt13 and certain results from the civil and
criminal antitrust cases. Remand Determination at 15, 16; Pub. Prehearing Br. of Elkem, Pub. R.
List 1, Doc. 569R, Ex. 1, Aff. of Joseph P. Kalt (âKalt Reportâ).
Elkem and CCMA object to the ITCâs finding that the conspiracy affected prices during
the Conspiracy Period. Elkem asserts that adverse inferences âmay not be used[] to reach an
incorrect factual determination . . . .â Elkemâs Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Agency R. (âElkem Mem.â)
at 25. Elkem contends that âthe record as a whole left no room for doubt that the dumped
imports were a cause of grievous injury to the domestic ferrosilicon industry.â Id. at 27. In this
connection, Elkem claims that the ITC improperly rejected the Kalt Report on remand and the
results of the trial courts in the antitrust litigations. According to Elkem, such evidence
illustrates that the conspiracy was âlargely ineffectiveâ and undermines the ITCâs finding that the
conspiracy affected domestic prices. Elkem Comments at 16. Thus, Elkem argues that the ITCâs
use of adverse inferences to find that the conspiracy affected prices during the Conspiracy Period
is neither supported by substantial record evidence nor in accordance with law.
The ITC insists that the adverse inference it chose was based on a sound rationale. First,
it maintains that under the circumstances âit was reasonable for the ITC to disregard entirely the
pricing information that the domestic producers submitted [during the Original POI] and rely on
13
At the time Dr. Kalt authored his report, he served as the Ford Foundation
Professor of International Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, and a senior economist at Lexecon, Inc., an economics consulting firm. See
Kalt Report at 1.
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PAGE 24
adverse inferencesâ on reconsideration. ITCâs Mem. Oppân Pls.â Mot. J. Agency R. at 23.
Moreover, the ITC argues that it properly rejected the Kalt Report and the findings from the
antitrust litigations. With respect to the Kalt Report, the ITC points out that it âexpressly stated
[in the Remand Determination] that Dr. Kaltâs market structure analysis could not be reconciled
with information in the record indicating that the domestic industryâs loss of market share was
attributable solely to three conspirators and to small producers that ceased production in 1989.â
Rebuttal Comments at 20 (citing Remand Determination at 25 n.76). In addition, the ITC
disputes the probative value of District Judge William M. Skretnyâs finding, which was made for
the purpose of sentencing, that prices of commodity ferrosilicon were not affected except during
eleven weeks of the Conspiracy Period. The ITC argues that â[t]his was not, as plaintiffs
maintain, a finding that the conspiracy was ineffective during the remaining period â only a
conclusion that the government had not satisfied its burden to prove the effects of the
conspiracy.â Id. at 17. The ITC disputes the probative value of the civil litigation verdict that
certain specialty steel producers had not suffered damages as a result of American Alloysâs
participation in the price-fixing conspiracy on the grounds that â[t]he verdict did not pertain to all
ferrosilicon purchasers . . . [n]or did it encompass all the conspirators . . . .â Id. Thus, the ITC
contends that âthe litigation results selected by plaintiffs establish merely that CCMA/SKW and
American Alloys had each obtained a favorable verdict in one respective piece of litigation.â Id.
at 18.
The court finds the ITCâs use of adverse inferences, for the Conspiracy Period, to be in
accordance with law. As discussed supra, the ITC properly determined that Conspiratorsâ failure
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 25
to reveal the price-fixing conspiracy significantly impeded the investigation. This failure serves
as a basis for the use of BIA, and as a valid justification for the taking of adverse inferences.
Chung Ling I, 16 CIT at 640, 805 F. Supp. at 49. In addition, the adverse inference taken here,
i.e., that the underselling and negative price effects experienced by the domestic industry were a
product of the domestic producersâ own actions, conforms with the rationale behind the adverse
inference ruleâââwhen a party has relevant evidence within his control which he fails to
produce, that failure gives rise to an inference that the evidence is unfavorable to [that party].ââ
Alberta Pork, 11 CIT at 580, 669 F. Supp. at 459 (internal quotation omitted); see also Rhone
Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1190â91 (âThe agencyâs approach fairly places the burden of production on
the importer, which has in its possession the information capable of rebutting the agencyâs
inference.â).14
In addition, the court finds that the ITCâs underselling finding is supported by substantial
evidence on the record. The ITC compared the prices of domestic ferrosilicon charged by the
Conspirators with the prices of imported ferrosilicon and observed that during the Conspiracy
Period, imports of ferrosilicon undersold the domestic product more frequently than in the
months preceding and following the conspiracy. See Remand Determination at 18â19 (citing
14
Moreover, the court finds unconvincing Elkemâs argument that adverse inferences
cannot be used where the relevant information sought was later produced and present before the
agency. See Elkem Mem. at 27â28. Here the court is reviewing a determination reached on
reconsideration, not a new proceeding. That the Conspirators complied with the ITCâs requests
for information concerning the price-fixing conspiracy in the context of the reconsideration does
not cure their earlier failures, and the ITCâs continued use of adverse inferences remains proper.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (response to information request must be timely). This is particularly
the case in the circumstances present here, where the nature of the information withheld went to
the heart of the ITCâs analysis in the original final determinations.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 26
Remand Staff Report tbls. III-1â6, -7aâc, -8aâc, -9aâb). While it may be the case that certain
information on the record could be interpreted to reach a conclusion different than the one
reached by the ITC, the court will nevertheless uphold the agencyâs determination if it is
substantiated by âsuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.â Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 229; see also Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620
(â[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
an administrative agencyâs finding from being supported by substantial evidence.â (citations
omitted)). The court finds that the evidence cited by the ITC fairly supports its conclusions with
respect to the effect of the conspiracy during the Conspiracy Period based on these comparisons.
The evidence submitted on remand by Plaintiffs does not compel a different finding.
Turning to the Kalt Report, the court notes that in conducting his analysis, Dr. Kalt examined the
same record evidence that the ITC did in the course of its investigation, although he came to
different conclusions. See Kalt Report at 4 (indicating that Dr. Kalt âhad access to all of the
record evidence now before the ITC, including from its original investigations, its changed
circumstances reviews, its reconsideration proceedings in 1999, and the materials from the
antitrust litigation that have been brought into the record evidence of the ITC.â). Dr. Kalt did not
dispute the accuracy of the ITCâs data concerning price. See id. at 28. Rather, he interpreted the
data differently than did the ITC.
Three examples suffice to make this point. First, the ITC and Dr. Kalt arrived at different
conclusions concerning the relative positions of power occupied by the Conspirators and
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 27
nonconspirators. The ITC concluded that the Conspirators âcollectively represented a significant
majority of U.S. production throughout the original periods of investigationâ such that they
occupied a âdominant position in the domestic industryâ and that âfactors that affected their
prices [i.e. the price-fixing agreement,] would affect prices of the industry as a whole, including
those of the nonconspirators . . . .â15 Remand Determination at 10, 19. Dr. Kalt, in contrast,
concluded that
[d]ozens of sellers of ferrosilicon, not the least of these being the
many producers and brokers of imported ferrosilicon, were outside
of the price floor agreement of certain U.S. producers. These nonparticipant sellers demonstrably competed vigorously to sell in the
U.S. marketplace. Moreover, they demonstrably were able to vary
their supplies in response to more or less attractive prices. Such
conditions rendered the price agreement by three U.S. ferrosilicon
producers to set floor prices ineffective.
Kalt Report at 5. Dr. Kaltâs conclusion, however, appears to make the ITCâs point, i.e., that the
Conspiratorsâ attempts to keep the price of ferrosilicon up allowed foreign producers to undersell
them.
Second, Dr. Kalt and the ITC reached different conclusions with respect to the effect of
the Conspiratorsâ behavior on the domestic market. The ITC not only emphasized in the Remand
Determination that the mere existence of the conspiracy was sufficient to justify the use of
adverse inferences regarding the conditions of competition in the industry, but also performed its
15
In addition, the ITC concluded on remand that its finding exonerating AIMCOR
and Globe âdoes not undercut the findings the Commission made in its 1999 opinion concerning
either the pervasiveness or the significance of the misrepresentations and omissions that domestic
ferrosilicon producers made during the original investigationsâ because âthey both were
relatively small producersâ compared with the Conspirators. Remand Determination at 10.
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 28
demand and underselling analyses discussed supra. Remand Determination at 14. In contrast, a
large portion of the Kalt Report is devoted to demonstrating that the conspiracy was not
âsuccessfulâ in maintaining the price floor.16 It is worth noting, however, that for the price-fixing
conspiracy to have provided foreign competitors with a price advantage, it is not necessary for it
to have been âsuccessfulâ in maintaining the price floor, but only that it kept some domestic
producersâ prices higher than they would have otherwise been. This conclusion appears to have
been fully justified by the ITCâs analysis. In addition, this is, in part, the conclusion reached by
Judge Skretny who found that the conspiracy was effective during a portion of the time it was in
effect. See Non-Pub. R. List 2, Doc. 776R, Fig. 13a.
Third, with respect to the record evidence concerning an observed decrease in demand
and a correlative drop in prices during the Original POI, as noted in the BIA discussion supra,
the ITC came to the conclusion that âa reason for the price depression was the business cycle for
ferrosilicon.â Reconsideration Determination at 31. Dr. Kalt disagreed with the suggestion that
âdeclining domestic and import prices can[] be attributable solely to demand conditions.â Kalt
Report at 29 (emphasis added). Rather, he concluded that
16
See Kalt Report at 6 (âA successful price fixing agreement would not fix prices at
less than costs, and any upward pressure on prices that such an agreement might be asserted to
have had would mean, if anything, that absent the agreement, domestic producersâ prices would
have been even further below cost than actually observed.â); id. at 13 (âSuccess in raising prices
through price fixing, for example, would not explain domestic producers finding it necessary to
sell at prices below costs in order to meet competition from rising imports. Such financial
conditions would still provide a sound basis for concluding that imports were materially injuring
the domestic industry.â); id. (âIt is recognized in economics that agreeing to fix prices and
succeeding are not the same.â) (emphasis in original); id. at 14 (â[T]hese imports overwhelmed
the prospect of successfully establishing price floors.â); id. at 22 (âIt is clear, however, that there
is no pattern of prices successfully being maintained at a common floor.â).
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 29
[i]t follows from the basic economics of supply and demand that,
for any given demand conditions, had low-priced imports not been
so abundantly supplied to the U.S. market, prices would have been
higher in that market and such material injury to domestic
producers as below-cost selling would have been mitigated.
Id. That the ITC and Dr. Kalt reached different conclusions with respect to the significance of
the effect of declining demand on prices does not prevent the court from sustaining the ITCâs
finding, so long as it is supported by substantial record evidence.
This court finds that the Conspiratorsâ misconduct was sufficient to justify the ITCâs
findings with respect to the effect of the conspiracy on prices during the Conspiracy Period, and
that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the inferences made were used to reach conclusions
that were, in fact, untrue. It is well settled that âthe possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agencyâs finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.â Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620. As the accuracy of the pricing
data is not in dispute, Elkem and CCMA have done no more than urge a different interpretation
of the evidence from that expressed by the ITC. The record, however, reasonably supports the
conclusions drawn by the ITC with respect to underselling and the overall decline in prices
during the Original POI. With respect to the ITCâs rejection of selected antitrust litigation results
and findings and Elkemâs and CCMAâs claims that the ITC was somehow bound by such
findings, the ITC is charged by Congress to administer the trade laws, and make its own findings,
by means of its own investigations with respect to material injury. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§
1673d(b) (âThe Commission shall make a final determination of whether . . . an industry in the
United States . . . is materially injured, or . . . is threatened with material injury, or . . . the
CONSOL. COURT NO . 99-10-00628
PAGE 30
establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports [of
subject merchandise].â); see also Chung Ling II, 16 CIT at 849, 805 F. Supp. at 63 (â[I]n an
injury investigation by the Commission domestic producers have no burden of proof . . . but their
cooperation in fully responding to questionnaires is essential for the Commission âto gather the
data needed for an accurate determination.ââ) (internal citation and quotation omitted). It is clear
from the Remand Determination that the ITC complied with the courtâs instructions that âshould
evidence with respect [to whether the conspiracy actually affected prices] be presented during the
course of the further proceedings on remand, the ITC shall consider such evidence as it would
consider any other evidence on the record.â Elkem IV, 26 CIT at __, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
The ITC examined the Kalt Report but did not find it probative. Remand Determination at 16
(âWe have examined Dr. Kaltâs analysis carefully and find that it lacks probative value for
purposes of these proceedings.â). In the end, the Report is evidence, but not conclusive evidence.
Thus, as the ITCâs use of adverse inferences has been justified by the Conspiratorsâ behavior, and
the Plaintiffs having failed to demonstrate that the findings based on these inferences are
factually incorrect, these findings are sustained.
C.
The ITCâs use of an adverse inference for the time period outside the Conspiracy
Period is not supported by substantial evidence on the record
On rema
