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Slip Op. 99-66
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
BEFORE: SENIOR JUDGE NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
PEER BEARING COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
L & S BEARING COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
THE TIMKEN COMPANY,
Defendant-Intervenor.
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Court No. 97-12-02123
Plaintiff Peer Bearing Company (âPeerâ) moves pursuant to Rule
56.2 of the Rules of this Court for judgment on the agency record
challenging the final determination of the Department of Commerce,
International Trade Administration (âCommerceâ), entitled Tapered
Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From
the Peopleâs Republic of China; Final Results of Antidumping
Administrative Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,276 (Nov. 17, 1997).
Specifically, Peer alleges that Commerce made certain clerical
errors in its calculation of labor rates and in its selection of
factors of production data.
Held: Plaintiffâs motion for judgment on the agency record is
granted in part and denied in part.
The case is remanded for
correction of clerical errors in Commerceâs calculations of labor
rates. Commerce is affirmed in all other respects.
[Plaintiffâs motion granted in part and denied in part.
remanded.]
Case
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 2
Dated: July 21, 1999
Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, PLLC (John M. Gurley,
Matthew J. McConkey and Jinhee K. Wilde) for plaintiff.
David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General; David M.
Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice (Michele D. Lynch); of counsel: Rina
Goldenberg, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel for Import
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, for defendant.
Stewart and Stewart (Terence P. Stewart, James R. Cannon, Jr.
and Amy S. Dwyer) for defendant-intervenor.
Cohen Darnell & Cohen, PLLC (Mark A. Cohen) for plaintiffintervenor.
OPINION
TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge:
This case involves the shipments of
tapered roller bearings (âTRBsâ) and parts thereof, finished and
unfinished, from the Peopleâs Republic of China (âPRCâ).
On July 9, 1997, the Department of Commerce, International
Trade
Administration
(âCommerceâ),
published
the
preliminary
results of its administrative review covering TRBs from the PRC.
See
Tapered
Unfinished,
Results
of
Roller
From
Bearings
the
and
Peopleâs
Antidumping
Parts
Republic
Administrative
Thereof,
of
Finished
China;
Review
and
Preliminary
and
Partial
Termination of Administrative Review (âPreliminary Resultsâ), 62
Fed. Reg. 36,764.
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 3
Plaintiff1 Peer Bearing Company (âPeerâ) moves pursuant to
Rule 56.2 of the Rules of this Court for judgment on the agency
record challenging Commerceâs final determination, entitled Tapered
Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From
the Peopleâs Republic of China; Final Results of Antidumping
Administrative Review, (âFinal Resultsâ) 62 Fed. Reg. 61,276 (Nov.
17, 1997).
Specifically, Peer alleges that Commerce made certain
clerical errors in its calculation and selection of labor rates and
factors of production data in the Final Results.2
Oral argument was held at the Court on February 26, 1999.
Discussion
This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(a)(2) (1994) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994).
The Court must uphold Commerceâs final determination unless it
is âunsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise
1
The Court granted L & S Bearing Companyâs Motion to Intervene
on February 27, 1998.
L & S Bearing Company did not file
additional papers.
2
The determination at issue covers the ninth period of review
from June 1, 1995 through May 31, 1996. Because Commerce initiated
this review after January 1, 1995, the applicable law in this case
is the antidumping code as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,108 Stat. 4809 (1994). See Torrington Co.
v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Court No. 97-12-02123
not
in
accordance
Page 4
with
law.â
19
U.S.C.
§
1516a(b)(1)(B).
Substantial evidence is âmore than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.â
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)).
weigh
the
âIt is not within the Courtâs domain either to
adequate
quality
or
quantity
of
the
evidence
for
sufficiency or to reject a finding on grounds of a differing
interpretation of the record.â Timken Co. v. United States, 12 CIT
955, 962, 699 F. Supp. 300, 306 (1988), affâd, 894 F.2d 385 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
Ministerial Errors
1.
Labor Rates
Because this case deals with bearings imported from the PRC,
a
nonmarket
economy,
and
because
no
other
usable
data
was
available, Commerce calculated normal value (âNVâ) based on factors
of production (âFOPâ) pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1994).
Peer challenges the labor rates used to calculate FOP for one
of its Chinese suppliers. In the Final Results, in calculating FOP
for NV, Commerce accidentally used an unskilled labor rate of 46.6
Rupees per hour and a skilled labor rate of 25.42 Rupees per hour
instead of the reverse.
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 5
Commerce agrees that its inadvertent reversal of the skilled
and
unskilled
labor
rates
in
its
calculations
constitutes
ministerial error and requests a remand to correct it.
Mem. Oppân to Mot. J. Agency R. at 2, 6.
a remand.
a
Commerceâs
Timken does not object to
Timkenâs Mem. Oppân to Mot. J. Agency R. at 6.
The Court has often remanded in cases such as these to correct
ministerial errors of this type.
See Federal-Mogul Corp. v.
United States, 18 CIT 1168, 1172, 872 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (1994).
Consequently, the Court grants Commerceâs request for a remand to
correct the inadvertent reversal of the labor rates in its FOP
calculations and to adjust the dumping margins accordingly.
2.
Factors of Production Data for Bearing Part
On May 13, 1997, Commerce sent a questionnaire to Peer and
Chin Jun Industrial Ltd. (âChin Junâ), an affiliate of Peerâs,
requesting FOP data from all suppliers for the bearings under
review.
Peerâs response, received on June 4, 1997, provided the
following information:
Peer/Chin Jun has attempted to obtain factors of
production FOP data for all of its suppliers. However,
Peer/Chin Jun does not control the Chinese suppliers and
must not be held responsible for their failure to supply
FOP data.
However, many of Peerâs suppliers have
supplied similar information as respondents in this
review. To the extent factors data is available from
these respondents, then it should be used. We are
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 6
incorporating by reference the factor information
supplied by various respondents. A listing of model and
the corresponding supplier is listed in Exhibit 1. . . .
[A]lso enclosed at Exhibit 1 is a list of models produced
by other factories which can be used as FOP for Chin
Jun/Peer models for which FOP data is not available.
See Response of Peer to Commerceâs Supplemental Questionnaire, Pub.
Doc. No. 205, Def.âs App., Ex. 4.
Attached to Peerâs submission was a letter from counsel for
other respondents who also used Peer/Chin Junâs suppliers.
authorized
Commerce
to
use
the
cooperating
respondentsâ
Peer
FOP
information to calculate the production costs for Peer/Chin Jun
during the relevant POR.
Both parties used data from an agreed
upon factory supplier3 as an analog for Peerâs product model.
See
Peerâs Comments Regarding Commerceâs Final Calculations, at 2
(Public Version), Peerâs Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Agency R., Attachment
1 (Nov. 25, 1997).
Peer submitted a chart to Commerce to identify which model
numbers already on file with Commerce correspond to Peerâs models
for purposes of determining FOP.
Peer noted that FOP data for
models LM67010 and LM 67048 could be found in the set LM67048/10.
Peerâs listing also noted that the set contained FOP information
3
The name of the relevant supplier used by Peer and Commerce
for FOP data is part of the Confidential Record.
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 7
for both the cup and the cone.4
Commerce used the factors for the
set to determine the FOP data of part LM67048.
See id.
Peer argues that to determine the FOP for LM67048, Commerce
needed only to deduct the factors of LM67010 from the total factors
for the set LM67048/10.
Commerce did not perform this additional
calculation, but instead used the FOP of the set as the FOP for
Peerâs single bearing part LM67048.
See id.
Only after the publication of the Final Results, in a letter
dated November 25, 1997, did Peer inform Commerce for the first
time that Commerce erroneously used the FOP for the set LM67048/10
instead of the FOP for the individual parts LM67048 and LM67010.
See id.
Commerce refused to consider this information after the
publication of the Final Results.
Peer now argues that its simple instruction on its submission
to Commerce indicating that a set contains FOP data for both a cup
and cone clearly indicated that Commerce had to subtract the FOP of
part LM 67010 from the set of LM67048/10 to obtain the FOP for part
LM67048.
4
Essentially, Peer argues that Commerce misunderstood its
A TRB consists of a cone (inner race), cage (roller
retainers), and a roller in one assembled unit, and the cup (outer
race), which is the outer ring on which the rollers turn. See Peer
Bearing Co. v. United States, 22 CIT __, __, 12 F. Supp. 2d. 445,
454 n.8 (1998). In this case, LM67048 and LM670410 are the cup and
cone comprising the LM67048/10 set.
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 8
instruction and misapplied the substitute FOP data in determining
NV.
Commerce responds that it used the information as submitted by
Peer in its chart of corresponding model matches and that its
deliberate
use
of
this
information
is
not
a
clerical
error.
Commerce further contends that it used the same information in the
Preliminary Results and in the Final Results and that Peer is
barred at this time from raising this issue because Peer failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. §
2637.
See Commerceâs Mem. Oppân to Mot. J. Agency R. at 7-14.
As a preliminary matter, the Court is not convinced that
Commerce committed any error at all.
At oral argument, Commerce
asserted that it will often use data for bearing sets to determine
the FOP for a bearing part in lieu of better information.
If Peer
did not approve of Commerceâs use of the data it submitted, Peer
should have raised the issue to Commerce during the administrative
proceedings.
Commerce could have then determined not to use the
information submitted by Peer at all, and to resort to best
information available. The Court cannot simply bypass this process
and remand for Commerce to use a particular value for FOP when
Commerce was not given the opportunity to expound and justify its
reasoning for using the FOP of an entire set in its calculations.
Court No. 97-12-02123
Further,
a
Page 9
âministerial
errorâ
includes
clerical errors
resulting from inaccurate copying, duplication, or the like, and
any other type of unintentional error which the administering
authority considers ministerial.
C.F.R. § 351.224(f) (1998).
19 U.S.C. § 1675(h)(1994); 19
Peer presents substantive arguments
for an alternative method of interpreting the data it submitted.
The Courtâs consideration of Peerâs arguments at this late juncture
is outside the scope of permissible corrections of ministerial
errors.
See Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. United States, 21 CIT __,
__, 955 F. Supp. 1466, 1475 (1997) (holding that plaintiffâs
submissions after the final determination contesting selection of
surrogate values do not identify clerical or ministerial errors,
but rather contain new information and therefore cannot be included
in the record or considered by the Court).
Moreover, the allegation of faulty judgment inherently falls
outside the purview of a ministerial error.
See NTN Bearing Corp.
v. United States, 74 F.3d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(âClerical
errors are by their nature not errors in judgment but merely
inadvertencies.â);
ministerial error).
see
also
19
C.F.R.
§
351.224(f)
(defining
Commerceâs alleged inability to understand
Peerâs directions would constitute an error in its âjudgment.â
the use of the FOP of a set was an error in Commerceâs
If
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 10
interpretation of Peerâs poorly drafted instructions, this would be
an interpretative error, not an error in âarithmetic function,â
âclerical
error
resulting
from
inaccurate
copyingâ
See 19 C.F.R. § 353.224(f).
âunintentional error.â
or
an
Peer is
therefore not challenging a calculation which could be classified
as a ministerial error.
Further, Peer did not raise the error at
the earliest reasonable opportunity.
Under these circumstances,
the Court will not order a remand for the correction of these
alleged errors.
Notably, Commerce has broad discretion to determine what
constitutes a ministerial error. See Cemex, S.A. v. United States,
19 CIT 587, 593 (1995) (âCommerce is given fairly broad discretion
to determine which types of unintentional error to regard as
ministerial.â).
The Court deems it significant that Commerce
denies committing any error in this case.
However, even if there
were a clerical error, Peer is time-barred from raising it now.
âThe exhaustion doctrine reflects a respect for values of
judicial economy and administrative autonomy.â
Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 22 CIT __,__, 15 F. Supp. 2d 807,
820
n.6
(1998)
(internal
quotations
omitted)(citing
Al
Tech
Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 11 CIT 372, 377, 661 F.
Supp. 1206, 1210 (1987)).
Judicial economy, fairness to the
Court No. 97-12-02123
parties
and
resolution
the
of
need
these
Page 11
to
fulfill
trade
Congressâ
matters
intent
requires
that
of
prompt
errors
of
methodology, data selection and calculation be raised at the
outset, unless some extraordinary factor supports relief at a later
date.
See IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1062 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
There are no such extraordinary factors here.
See,
e.g., Peer Bearing, 22 CIT at __, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 452-53 (finding
that Commerceâs use of an antidumping duty rate invalidated by
Court order was an error warranting judicial review despite the
lack of exhaustion) (citing Mitsui & Co. v. United States, 18 CIT
185, 194 (1994)); see also NTN, 74 F.3d at 1208 (court granted
remand
for
clerical
error
discovered
after
preliminary
determination because preliminary determinations are inherently
subject to change).
â[A] remand requires a showing that the failure to raise an
issue was not the result of a lack of due diligence on the part of
the claimant.â
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 22 CIT __,
__, 27 F. Supp. 2d 201, 206 (1998) (citing ILWU Local 142 v.
Donovan, 12 CIT 87, 91, 678 F. Supp. 307, 310 (1988)).
Peer does
not dispute that the alleged error was present in the margin
calculations in the Preliminary Results of this review.
Peer
therefore failed to exercise due diligence and cannot raise, at
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 12
this point in time, allegations of ministerial errors which were
discoverable in the calculations of the preliminary results.
This
is especially true when the gravamen of the dispute is whether a
ministerial error occurred in the first place.
It is not clear to the Court why the use of the FOP data of
the set became obvious to Peer only after the Final Results were
published, if, as Peer claims, the same error had been made in the
Preliminary Results and if it were so egregious that it raised the
margin by more than 100 percent.
What is clear to the Court,
however, is that it was the job of Peerâs counsel to review
Commerceâs
Results.
calculations
upon
publication
of
the
Preliminary
According to counsel for Peer, âa large part of the
dumping margin . . . was caused by dumping margins attributable to
Model LM67010â and that model was âone of the most prevalent
model[s] soldâ by respondent.
Peerâs Mot. J. Agency R. at 4, 5.
With that information, the Court is all the more perplexed at
counselâs failure to discover the error in question in a timely
fashion.
Failure to review the calculations because it had âno time to
carefully considerâ the Preliminary Results, as Peerâs counsel
argued to the Court, is no excuse for Peerâs failure to discover
and raise the possibility of error as early in the administrative
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 13
process as possible and thereby to exhaust its administrative
remedies, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d).
However, in this
case, Commerce, too, may have been remiss in its duty.
The
instruction included in Peerâs submission should have alerted
Commerce to the need, at the very least, to request further
clarification of the âsetâ versus âindividual productâ issue.
Diligence
is
administrative
incumbent
upon
proceeding
or
all
parties
litigation.
involved
Nonetheless,
in
an
unlike
ministerial errors, there is no way for the Court to determine with
accuracy whether Commerce made an inadvertent error in inputting
the data or whether Commerceâs selection of the setâs data to
calculate the FOP was an error at all.
In fact, Commerce does not admit to committing any error,
ministerial or substantive.
Rather, Commerce insists that it
deliberately and reasonably applied the information as submitted by
Peer.5
In any event, this dispute should have been developed
further, or at least raised, at the administrative level.
The
doctrine of administrative exhaustion prevents the development and,
hence the litigation, of these types of issues before this Court.
5
At oral argument, counsel for the government asserted that
Commerce could have reasonably interpreted Peerâs notation to mean
that Peer was aware it was submitting FOP data for an entire set to
be used for a bearing part.
The Court does not find this
interpretation to be unreasonable.
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 14
In the current case, Peer/Chin Jun did not raise the set/part
dispute until after the issuance of the Final Results.
As stated
in Aramide Maatschappij V.o.F. v. United States, 19 CIT 1094, 901
F. Supp. 353 (1995), the critical issue in determining whether the
plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, is whether
the plaintiff was on ânotice of Commerceâs intended computation.â
Aramide, 19 CIT at 1097, 901 F. Supp. at 357.
Similar
to
Aramide,
the
Commerceâs intended computation.
plaintiffs
were
on
notice
of
In the preliminary determination
calculation worksheets, Commerce used the FOP of the model set for
the individual parts LM67048 and LM67010.
Jun
should
have
reviewed
Preliminary Results.
Commerceâs
In addition, Peer/Chin
calculations
after
the
Had Peerâs counsel done so, they would have
noticed that Commerce used the factor of a set for the individual
parts LM67048 and LM67010.
The need for judicial economy and administrative autonomy
requires the Court to adhere to Commerceâs Final Results.
âThere
can be no doubt that Congress intended final determinations to be
precisely that.
Indeed, if determinations were constantly subject
to amendment, it would be difficult to answer the question as to
when a final determination would ever be made.â Sugiyama Chain Co.
v. United States, 16 CIT 526, 533, 797 F. Supp. 989, 995 (1992)
Court No. 97-12-02123
Page 15
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Koyo Seiko Co. v. United
States, 14 CIT 680, 682, 746 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (1990) (quoting,
in turn, Badger-Powhatan, Div. of Figgie Intâl v. United States, 10
CIT 241, 245, 633 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (1986)).
Since Peer could
have raised these issues regarding the calculation of FOP during
the course of the administrative proceedings, the Court declines to
review Peerâs position.
Conclusion
The Court remands so that Commerce may correct the inadvertent
reversal of labor rates in its FOP calculations.
Commerce is
affirmed in all other respects.
_________________________
NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
SENIOR JUDGE
Dated: July 21, 1999
New York, New York
