WILLIAM BERNAL, ET AL V. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ET AL, No. 22-15690 (9th Cir. 2023)
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Sacramento County Sheriffs’ Deputies encountered Celia and William Bernal (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) at their home during the Deputies’ investigation into allegations that Plaintiffs’ son planned a shooting at his school that day. During the interaction, the Deputies held Celia’s arms and used a twistlock to prevent her from leaving. The Deputies also pointed a firearm at William, forcibly restrained him, and put him in handcuffs. The district court held that the Deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment by detaining Plaintiffs even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The district court further found that the Deputies did not use excessive force during Plaintiffs’ detention and, even if they had, qualified immunity applied.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Deputies in Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 action. The panel first considered whether the initial seizure of Plaintiffs was reasonable. Because Plaintiffs were detained but not arrested, the reasonableness of their detention depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. The panel held that the Deputies had limited authority to briefly detain and question Plaintiffs about Ryan’s location due primarily to the exigencies inherent in preventing an imminent school shooting. Further, on balance, the panel concluded that the Deputies’ use of force against Celia was reasonable under the circumstances. The panel concluded that the district court erred in finding that the Deputies’ use of force against William was not excessive. The intrusion on William’s liberty was too great in the context of detaining a non-suspect witness.
Court Description: Civil Rights The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Sacramento County Sheriffs’ Deputies in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action that presents the question of whether and to what extent law enforcement may detain people who are not suspected of engaging in criminal activity but who have information essential to preventing a threatened school shooting. * The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. The Deputies encountered Celia and William Bernal (collectively “the Bernals”) at their home during the Deputies’ investigation into allegations that the Bernals’ son Ryan planned a shooting at his school that day. During the interaction, the Deputies held Celia’s arms and used a twist- lock to prevent her from leaving. The Deputies also pointed a firearm at William, forcibly restrained him, and put him in handcuffs.
The district court held that the Deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment by detaining the Bernals even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The district court further found that the Deputies did not use excessive force during the Bernals’ detention and, even if they had, qualified immunity applied.
Tha panel first considered whether the initial seizure of the Bernals was reasonable. Because the Bernals were detained but not arrested, the reasonableness of their detention depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. To justify the suspicionless seizure of a material witness, there must be exigencies requiring immediate action, the gravity of the public interest must be great, and the detention must be minimally intrusive. Applying these principles, the panel held that the Deputies had limited authority to briefly detain and question the Bernals about Ryan’s location due primarily to the exigencies inherent in preventing an imminent school shooting. This holding was predicated on two key facts: first, the Deputies knew the Bernals had information crucial to stopping a potential mass shooting— the suspected shooter’s location; and second, there was an ongoing emergency threatening numerous lives which required immediate action. The panel further held that it need not set a definitive rule for the maximum length a non- suspect witness detention may last because the detention here lasted approximately twenty minutes, far less than previous detentions that the court has considered. The Deputies’ continued detention of Celia after she informed the Deputies she did not want to speak with them did not exceed this boundary. William’s initial detention was likewise permissible, up to a point.
The panel next considered the Bernals’ Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force. The district court found the amount of force used against both Celia and William reasonable under the circumstances. The panel concluded that the district court was correct in its analysis regarding Celia but erred as to William.
First, as to Celia, the panel held that the nature and quality of the Deputies’ intrusion was slight because the Deputies utilized a minimal amount of force on Celia. Moreover, the Deputies utilized warnings and less intrusive means before resorting to physical coercion. Weighing the Deputies’ minimal use of force against the government’s interests, the panel applied the factors outlined in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Factors considered in analyzing the government’s interest include: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to escape. The panel weighed the first Graham factor slightly in favor of the Deputies because, by disregarding the Deputies’ commands, Celia prolonged a dire emergency situation. The panel weighed the second and most important Graham factor in favor of Celia because merely being behind the wheel of an operational vehicle does not automatically create a safety hazard; any threat to officer safety was minimal and quickly mitigated. The panel weighed the third Graham factor in favor of the Deputies because Celia was uncooperative, and refused to comply with the Deputies’ requests to exit the vehicle. Only then did the Deputies restrain her, using holds on both her arms. The panel held that this type of minimal force was reasonable to prevent continued resistance or flight. On balance, the panel concluded that the Deputies’ use of force against Celia was reasonable under the circumstances.
Next, the panel concluded that the district court erred in finding that the Deputies’ use of force against William was not excessive. The intrusion on William’s liberty was too great in the context of detaining a non-suspect witness. According to William, the Deputies pointed a gun at him, kicked his legs apart, turned his head beyond its natural range of motion, kicked his knees to force his legs to buckle, smashed his head into the hood of the car, and tightly handcuffed him, resulting in a great deal of pain. Applying the Graham factors, the first Graham factor weighed in favor of Deputies, but only slightly. The Deputies did not suspect William of committing a crime when they first arrived at the Bernals’ home, and asserted they had probable cause to arrest William when he physically resisted their attempts to detain him. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Bernals, the panel found a triable issue of fact regarding whether the Deputies’ commands to William were lawful because verbally challenging and recording officers are not illegal actions, and thus commands to cease such actions are not lawful orders. Nevertheless, the unfolding emergency of a threatened school shooting must be taken into account. The second and most important Graham factor weighed in favor of William because a genuine dispute of material fact remained as to whether William reached into an unsearched bag, and the undisputed facts reflected that the Deputies knew William was unarmed, undermining their claim that they feared for their safety. On the third Graham factor, to the extent William actively resisted the Deputies’ attempts to restrain him, this factor weighed only slightly in favor of the Deputies. Weighing all relevant factors, the panel found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Deputies by disregarding genuine disputes of material fact. The panel also found that the Deputies used excessive force when they violently detained William despite knowing he was unarmed and posed no reasonable threat to officer safety.
Having found that the Deputies violated William’s Fourth Amendment rights, the panel considered whether the Deputies were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. The panel concluded that the Deputies violated clearly established law whether they accepted the Bernals’ or the Deputies’ account of events. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Bernals, William never reached into his bag, and instead yelled at the Deputies to stop assaulting his wife and attempted to record the Deputies. Williams’ recording of the incident and his verbally challenging of the police were not only legal actions but were protected by the First Amendment. Even if the Deputies’ account of events is taken as true, the Deputies were on notice that merely reaching into an unsearched bag, without more, could not reasonably lead to an inference that William was armed such that the use of force was justified. Finally, once it became apparent that William held a cell phone, and not a weapon, the officers were on notice they could not violently restrain him.
Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Celia and reversed as to William. Because the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on William’s Fourth Amendment claims, it reinstated William’s pendent state law claims.
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