DARREN HILL V. COUNTY OF BENEWAH, No. 20-35302 (9th Cir. 2021)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED APR 15 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DARREN HILL, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 20-35302 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00320-DCN MEMORANDUM* COUNTY OF BENEWAH, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho David C. Nye, Chief District Judge, Presiding Submitted April 12, 2021** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, FITZWATER, District Judge.*** Plaintiff Darren Hill (“Hill”) appeals from the district court’s order granting * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013). 1. Hill argues that there is a genuine dispute of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment. Specifically, he contends that defendant Rodney Bryan Dickenson II (“Dickenson”)’s later deposition testimony that he intended to search only Hill’s trailer which was at 2313 Ora Avenue is inconsistent with his prior testimony that Hill lived at 2317 Ora Avenue, when speaking to the judge in seeking the warrant.2 Hill’s argument is unavailing. The district court acknowledged that Dickenson “incorrectly described the trailer as being located at 2317 Ora [Avenue]” in his testimony to the judge and “assume[d], for purposes of summary judgment, that the address for Hill’s trailer [was] 2313 Ora [and that t]he search warrant also inaccurately implied Hill’s residence was gray.” The district court explained, “the technical failure of the warrant to designate ‘2313’ as the search target [was] not grounds for finding a Fourth Amendment violation. Whatever the warrant lacked in accuracy as to the street address and color of the 1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we restate only those necessary to explain our decision. 2 Hill’s brief discusses only his illegal search claim. Thus, all other claims may be deemed waived. See Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1980). 2 property to be searched, it accurately and with particularity targeted Darren Hill’s trailer.” Indeed, the warrant explicitly authorized a search of any trailers at 2317 Ora Avenue, and it is undisputed that Hill’s trailer was on that property. Thus, Hill fails to raise a triable illegal search claim. 2. The district court also correctly observed that “numerous courts throughout the country have held that search warrants with material inaccuracies do not violate the Fourth Amendment where, as here, the place to be searched is still described with sufficient particularity.” See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508, 1510–11 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding warrant sufficiently described the house to be searched even though the house number was wrong); United States v. Garza, 980 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding warrant valid because of “accurate physical description of the location to be searched” even though the street number was one digit off). Thus, because Defendants did not violate clearly established law, they are also entitled to qualified immunity. AFFIRMED. 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
