JOHNNY ANDOE V. JOE BIDEN, No. 19-35082 (9th Cir. 2019)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED DEC 16 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOHNNY R. ANDOE, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 19-35082 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00395-BLW v. MEMORANDUM* JOE BIDEN; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 11, 2019** Before: WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges. Johnny R. Andoe, an Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), challenging the constitutionality of various federal and state laws. We have jurisdiction under * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Andoe’s action because Andoe failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2003) (to state a Bivens claim for relief, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendants, while acting under color of federal law, deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional right); see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . .”); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[F]elons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms [under the Second Amendment]”.). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 2 19-35082 All pending motions are denied. AFFIRMED. 3 19-35082

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