United States v. Gonzalez-Valencia, No. 19-30222 (9th Cir. 2021)

Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment granting habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to William Noguera, who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in California state court. On appeal by the State and cross-appeal by Noguera, the panel reversed the judgment of the district court granting the habeas petition as to Noguera’s conviction, affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the petition as to Noguera’s death sentence, affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the petition on Noguera’s claims based on a financial-gain special circumstance, and remanded to the district court to enter an appropriate order. The district court granted habeas corpus relief on ten claims, including Noguera’s assertion of a right to conflict- free counsel, several other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and other claims that the district court considered “integrally related” to the conflict-free counsel claim. In Claim 1, Noguera asserted that a conflict arose from one of his two attorneys’ representation of Noguera’s mother in a divorce proceeding and from a fee arrangement in which she paid the attorney to represent Noguera and controlled the defense strategy. The panel held that, to the extent that this claim rested on successive presentation, the California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was not an UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-VALENCIA 3 unreasonable application of clearly established federal law because there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent applying the presumed-prejudice standard of Cuyler v. Sullivan to successive representation. As to the fee arrangement, the California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that petitioner did not demonstrate an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. The panel concluded that the State waived its procedural-bar argument as to Claim 1. The panel held that the California Supreme Court failed to reasonably apply clearly established federal law under Strickland v. Washington in rejecting Claim 10, Noguera’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase in his attorneys’ failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence pertaining to his background. The panel concluded that even if review of new exhibits presented with Noguera’s third state petition was procedurally barred, the panel would reach the same determination. The panel held that the California Supreme Court properly denied Noguera’s Claim 4, asserting that his attorneys were ineffective during the guilt phase of trial for failing to investigate and present mental health defenses, and Claims 6 and 7, asserting that the attorneys were ineffective at the guilt and penalty phases for failing to investigate and present evidence of a motive for murder other than financial gain. The panel reversed the district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief on Claim 14, asserting that counsel were ineffective by failing to participate in a pretrial meeting with the prosecution and by failing to argue for a lesser sentence during that proposed meeting, and Claim 84, asserting that 4 UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-VALENCIA Noguera’s appellate counsel and first post-conviction counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this issue. Having found a Sixth Amendment violated based on counsel’s failure to investigate mental health defenses at the penalty phase and granted relief on that claim, the panel concluded that it need not consider Noguera’s arguments that cumulative error affected the penalty phase. To the extent that Noguera argued that the trial errors alone, without regard to ineffective assistance of counsel, accumulated in a way that violated the constitution, the panel concluded that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of that claim was reasonable. The panel held that errors in the admission of limited hearsay evidence, an errant jury instruction, and improper statements by the prosecutor during the closing argument about Noguera’s possible motive did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The panel further concluded that any deficient performance by counsel at trial did not contribute to the prejudicial effect of the alleged trial errors. In sum the California Supreme Court reasonably rejected Noguera’s Claims 16, 40, and 61, asserting cumulative error. Turning to Noguera’s cross-appeal, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief on Claim 41, his constitutional challenge to California’s financial-gain special circumstance, asserting that the special circumstance was vague and overbroad both facially and as applied to his case and that the jury instructions regarding the special circumstance were inadequate. The panel concluded that it need not address procedural bar because the State waived its argument that portions of Claim 1 were procedurally barred; the panel would reach the UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-VALENCIA 5 same conclusion as to Claim 10 even without considering purportedly procedurally barred declarations; and the panel reversed for other reasons the district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief as to Claims 4, 6, 7, 14, 16, 40, 61, and 84, and affirmed the district court’s denial of relief as to Claim 41. The panel concluded that the district court’s grant of habeas relief without an evidentiary hearing on Claim 10 was not an abuse of its discretion. The panel held that Noguera was deprived of effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase by counsel’s unprofessional failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence pertaining to Noguera’s familial history and his mental health, and he showed Strickland prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Additionally, the panel concluded that the California Supreme Court’s denial of Noguera’s claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland and, thus, Noguera was entitled to relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act as to the capital sentence. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Chief Judge Thomas joined the majority opinion’s holding that defense counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance at the penalty phase of Noguera’s trial by failing to investigate and present evidence regarding Noguera’s mental health, family abuse, and substance use. He also joined the majority’s resolution of Claims 14, 16, 40, 61, and the cross- appeal. Chief Judge Thomas wrote separately because he concluded that counsel had an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance, and that counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance at the guilt phase of Noguera’s trial. Therefore, he would affirm the district court as to Claims 1, 4, 6, 7, and 10, and the district court’s judgment vacating the conviction. 6 UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-VALENCIA

This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on February 12, 2021.