DOUGAL SAMUELS V. PAM AHLIN, No. 19-17419 (9th Cir. 2021)

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED OCT 19 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DOUGAL SAMUELS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 19-17419 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00585-DAD-EPG MEMORANDUM* PAM AHLIN, Director, Coalinga State Hospital; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH; PETER BRESLER, Doctor; et al., Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 12, 2021** Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). California civil detainee Dougal Samuels appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm. The district court did not err by granting reconsideration and dismissing Samuels’s Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim on the basis of qualified immunity, because it would not have been clear to every reasonable official that detaining Samuels in the Central Valley, where Valley Fever was endemic, was unlawful under the circumstances. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (explaining two-part test for qualified immunity); Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 2019) (existing Valley Fever cases did not clearly establish a “right to be free from heightened exposure to Valley Fever spores”); Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” (citation omitted)). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 2 19-17419

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.