JOHN LUCAS V. DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, No. 18-17420 (9th Cir. 2019)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED NOV 26 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOHN LUCAS, No. Plaintiff-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 18-17420 D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00654-DAD-JLT v. MEMORANDUM* DONNY YOUNGBLOOD; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 18, 2019** Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. John Lucas appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The district court properly dismissed Lucas’s action because Lucas failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (18 U.S.C. § 242 is a “criminal statute[] that do[es] not give rise to civil liability”); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Neither a municipality nor a supervisor . . . can be held liable under § 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation has occurred.”); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (elements of an equal protection “class of one” claim); Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 1999) (the California Penal Code “sections do not create enforceable individual rights”); see also Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim). The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Lucas’s first amended complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court may dismiss without leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Contrary to Lucas’s contention, the district court did not grant defendants’ motion for a protective order. We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 2 18-17420 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”). AFFIRMED. 3 18-17420
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