Escobar Santos v. Garland, No. 17-72334 (9th Cir. 2021)
Annotate this CaseThe Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner's forgery conviction under California law constitutes an aggravated felony. The panel held that petitioner's forgery conviction under section 470a of the California Penal Code categorically constitutes an aggravated felony offense relating to forgery under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R), thus rendering him ineligible for voluntary departure. In this case, the panel applied the categorical approach and compared the elements of section 470a with the generic, common law definition of forgery. The panel disagreed that photocopying a driver's license with the intent "to facilitate the commission of any forgery" falls outside the generic definition of forgery. The panel looked to Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2008), as a helpful comparison. The panel explained that a person who takes the affirmative step to photocopy a genuine document with the intent to deceive has made a false instrument—an action that falls squarely within the generic definition of forgery. Therefore, section 470a is categorically an offense relating to forgery under section 101(a)(43)(R).
Court Description: Immigration. Denying Jose Jairo Escobar Santos’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that Escobar’s forgery conviction under section 470a of the California Penal Code categorically constitutes an aggravated felony offense relating to forgery under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), thus rendering him ineligible for voluntary departure. Section 470a penalizes “[e]very person who alters, falsifies, forges, duplicates or in any manner reproduces or counterfeits any driver’s license or identification card issued by a governmental agency with the intent that such driver’s license or identification card be used to facilitate the commission of any forgery.” Escobar argued that section 470a’s first element sweeps more broadly than the generic definition of forgery because the proscribed conduct encompasses mere duplication or any manner of reproduction, and thus a person could be liable for photocopying a genuine driver’s license with the requisite intent. The panel disagreed that photocopying a driver’s license with the intent to facilitate the commission of any forgery falls outside the generic definition of forgery. As a helpful comparison, the panel looked to Vizcarra- Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2008), in which the ESCOBAR SANTOS V. GARLAND 3 court addressed California Penal Code section 475(c), which proscribes possession of any completed check, money order, traveler’s check, warrant or county order, whether real or fictitious, with the intent to utter or pass or facilitate the utterance or passage of the same, in order to defraud any person. The panel observed that in Vizcarra-Ayala, the court determined that an essential element of the generic offense of forgery is the false making or alteration of a document, such that the document is not what it purports to be, and that Vizcarra-Ayala held that section 475(c) encompassed broader conduct than the generic definition of forgery because it criminalized the possession or use of genuine instruments with the intent to defraud but not to forge. The panel observed that in Vizcarra-Ayala, the court identified several instances in which California used section 475(c) to prosecute such conduct. The panel pointed out several marked differences between section 475(c) and section 470a, including that section 470a: (1) plainly does not criminalize “possession”; (2) does not include section 475(c)’s reference to “real or fictitious” instruments; and (3) does not contemplate prosecution for conduct akin to attempting to cash a genuine, unaltered check––by for example, representing another person’s genuine driver’s license as one’s own. Moreover, the panel noted that unlike in Vizcarra-Ayala, Escobar did not identify, and the panel could not locate, any cases in which California had prosecuted individuals under section 470a for conduct involving genuine documents. The panel further noted that California punishes the duplication or reproduction of such identification only when it is “used to facilitate the commission of any forgery.” 4 ESCOBAR SANTOS V. GARLAND The panel noted that Escobar had not identified any evidence that California uses a broader definition of “forgery” than the generic understanding, and thus by definition, section 470a requires proof of a false writing capable of procuring fraud. The panel wrote that a person who takes the affirmative step to photocopy a genuine document with the intent to deceive has made a false instrument––an action that falls squarely within the generic definition of forgery. Dissenting, District Judge Whaley noted that in Vizcarra- Ayala, this court held that forgery requires a lie about the document itself, and that the lie must relate to the genuineness of the document. Because CPC section 470a penalizes duplicating identification cards that are not falsely made, Judge Whaley concluded that the statute sweeps more broadly than the federal common law definition of forgery. In addition, Judge Whaley identified at least one case in which California successfully prosecuted someone where the identification card appeared to be genuine, and thus wrote that there is a realistic probability that California would apply CPC section 470a to conduct outside the common law definition of forgery. Even were he to apply the modified categorical approach, Judge Whaley wrote that his conclusion would remain unchanged because there was no indication from the administrative record, and the government did not contend otherwise, that Escobar’s conviction was indisputably for forgery—as opposed to non-forgery— conduct. ESCOBAR SANTOS V. GARLAND 5
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