NANCY LANOVAZ V. TWININGS NORTH AMERICA, INC, No. 16-16628 (9th Cir. 2018)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED JUN 6 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NANCY LANOVAZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, No. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 16-16628 D.C. No. 5:12-cv-02646-RMW Plaintiff-Appellant, MEMORANDUM* v. TWININGS NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding Submission Deferred October 18, 2017 Submitted June 4, 2018** San Francisco, California Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and RICE,*** Chief District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Thomas O. Rice, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. Nancy Lanovaz appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Twinings of North America, Inc. on her claims for injunctive relief. The district court concluded that Lanovaz lacked Article III standing to seek an injunction that would prohibit Twinings from using labels that Lanovaz alleged were misleading in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), False Advertising Law (“FAL”), and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). We affirm. Though “a previously deceived plaintiff” suing under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA “may have standing to seek injunctive relief,” the plaintiff must still show “that she faces an imminent or actual threat of future harm caused by [the defendant’s] allegedly false advertising.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (holding that a future injury must be “actual or imminent” for a plaintiff to have Article III standing for injunctive relief). The plaintiff must also demonstrate that there is “a sufficient likelihood that [she] will again be wronged in a similar way.” City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); Kimberly-Clark, 889 F.3d at 967. Lanovaz has failed to show that her future harm is “actual or imminent,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, or that there is a “sufficient likelihood” that she will “again be wronged in a similar way,” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. At her deposition, Lanovaz 2 stated that she would not purchase Twinings products again, even if the company removed the allegedly misleading labels. Though Lanovaz argues that her suit should survive summary judgment because she stated in an interrogatory response that she would “consider buying” Twinings products in the future, we disagree. A “profession of an inten[t] . . . is simply not enough” to satisfy Article III. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (first alteration in original). A “‘some day’ intention[]— without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do[es] not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that” Article III requires. Id. Lanovaz’s statement that she would “consider buying” Twinings products does not satisfy this standard. Moreover, the wrong Lanovaz alleged was her purchase of Twinings products with misleading labels. As she does not intend to purchase Twinings products in the future, it is unlikely that she will “again be wronged in a similar way.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. AFFIRMED. 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
