S. B. v. County of San Diego, No. 15-56848 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this CasePlaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging that a sheriff's deputy used excessive force when he shot and killed David Brown in his home. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to the deputy. The panel held that, although a reasonable juror could find a Fourth Amendment violation in this case, it was not clearly established at the time that using deadly force in this situation would constitute excessive force. In this case, the district court did not have the benefit of White v. Pauly, and the cases that plaintiffs cited to did not satisfy White's exacting standard; nor does this case involve an obvious or run-of-the-mill violation. Therefore, the deputy was immune from liability under section 1983 for his use of deadly force.
Court Description: Civil Rights. The panel reversed the district court’s order, on summary judgment, denying qualified immunity to a San Diego Sheriff’s deputy, and remanded, in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the deputy used excessive force when he shot and killed David Brown in his home. The panel agreed with the district court that, reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable juror could find that the deputy’s use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable, and therefore that he violated Brown’s Fourth Amendment right against excessive force. The panel disagreed, however, with the district court that it was clearly established on August 24, 2013, that using deadly force under the circumstances, even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, would constitute excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The panel held that the district court did not have the benefit of White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017), and the cases that plaintiffs cited did S.B. V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 3 not satisfy White’s exacting standard. Nor did the present case involve an “obvious” or “run-of-the-mill” violation of the Fourth Amendment under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989), and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). The panel therefore held that the deputy was immune from liability under section 1983 for his use of deadly force. Because this was an interlocutory appeal, the panel did not address plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful death under California law, but noted that its conclusion that deadly force was not objectively reasonable as a matter of law supported the district court’s denial of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ state law claim.
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