TAMARA ROBERSON V. TACOMA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, No. 15-35394 (9th Cir. 2016)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED AUG 25 2016 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TAMARA TRICIA ROBERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 15-35394 D.C. No. 3:13-cv-05298-RBL MEMORANDUM* TACOMA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 16, 2016** Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. Tamara Tricia Roberson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her employment action alleging race-based discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Quillin v. Oregon, 127 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Roberson’s discrimination claim because Roberson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its reassignment of some of Roberson’s job duties and Roberson’s classification as an exempt, temporary employee were pretextual. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640-42 & n.5 (setting forth the burden shifting framework for Title VII employment discrimination claims). Summary judgment on Roberson’s retaliation claim was proper because Roberson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Roberson’s EEOC complaints were the “but-for cause” of defendant’s reassignment of some of her job duties and change in its appointment notification. See Westendorf v. W. Coast Contractors of Nev., Inc., 712 F.3d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, and explaining that plaintiff must show that protected conduct was a “but-for 2 15-35394 cause” of the adverse employment action). Even if Roberson established a prima facie case, Roberson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the reassignment of her job duties and appointment notification were pretextual. See Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[The] plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of showing defendant’s stated reasons to be merely pretextual, once defendant has given legitimate, non-retaliatory grounds for its actions.”). The district court properly dismissed Roberson’s claims under the FLSA because defendant is immune under the Eleventh Amendment. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999) (state immune under the Eleventh Amendment from claim brought under the FLSA). We reject as unsupported by the record Roberson’s contention that the district court did not address her state law misclassification argument. AFFIRMED. 3 15-35394
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