DAVID ESTRADA V. GRAY, No. 15-17230 (9th Cir. 2017)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 25 2017 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DAVID ESTRADA, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 15-17230 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00919-LJO-DLB MEMORANDUM* GIPSON; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Lawrence J. O'Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding Submitted January 18, 2017** Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. California state prisoner David Estrada appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Estrada’s failure to protect claim against defendants Espinosa, Gipson, Lambert, and Cavazos because Estrada failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants were deliberately indifferent to a threat to Estrada’s safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for establishing supervisory liability). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Estrada’s retaliation claim against defendants Espinosa and Gipson because Estrada failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants’ actions did not advance a legitimate correctional purpose. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth the elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, including Estrada’s reference to the district court’s discovery orders. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not consider Estrada’s arguments regarding the district court’s 2 15-17230 screening order. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (matters not properly raised before the district court are waived). AFFIRMED. 3 15-17230

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.