EUGENE DAVIS V. HDSP, No. 15-17083 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED OCT 18 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT EUGENE DAVIS, No. Petitioner-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 15-17083 D.C. No. 2:05-cv-01179-KJD-NJK v. HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, Warden, MEMORANDUM* Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 16, 2017** San Francisco, California Before: TALLMAN and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and EZRA,*** District Judge. Nevada state prisoner Eugene Davis appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first degree * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. kidnapping and attempted murder. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm. 1. The district court properly held that none of Davis’ ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims met the “substantial” standard required to excuse procedural default. See Martinez v. Ryan, 556 U.S. 1, 16 (2012). While Davis’ trial and appellate counsel’s representation was far from ideal, their conduct fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106 (2011); Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238, 1251 (9th Cir. 2015). Davis cannot overcome the high bar established in Strickland and the district court properly denied relief. 2. The Nevada Supreme Court reasonably determined that even though defense counsel at trial engaged in little, if any, investigation, his representation of Davis was not ineffective. We apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments” regarding the scope of investigation and presume “that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than sheer neglect.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Harrington, 562 U.S. at 109. Under the doubly deferential standard of AEDPA and Strickland, we cannot conclude that the state courts were objectively unreasonable in rejecting the contention that Davis’ counsel was ineffective in his investigation of the case. 2 AFFIRMED. 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
