Lone Star Sec. & Video v. City of Los Angeles, No. 14-55014 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CaseIn these consolidated appeals, appellants challenged the constitutionality of five city ordinances that regulate mobile billboards. One of the ordinances limits the type of sign that may be affixed to motor vehicles parked or left standing on public streets; the other ordinances prohibit non-motorized, “mobile billboard advertising displays” within city limits. Unlike the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the mobile billboard ordinances in this case do not single out a specific subject matter for differential treatment, nor is any kind of mobile billboard exempted from regulation based on its content. The court explained that an officer seeking to enforce the non-motorized billboard ordinances must decide only whether an offending vehicle constitutes a prohibited “advertising display” because its primary purpose is to display messages, as opposed to transporting passengers or carrying cargo. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court appropriately found the ordinances to be content neutral. The court also concluded that none of the ordinances are substantially broader than necessary to accomplish the cities' goals of eliminating visual blight and promoting the safe and convenient flow of traffic. Furthermore, the mobile billboard ordinances leave open adequate alternative opportunities for advertising. Because the mobile billboard ordinances are content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve the government's significant aesthetic and safety interests, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication, the court affirmed the judgment.
Court Description: Constitutional Law. Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant municipalities, the panel held that five city ordinances regulating mobile billboards withstood First Amendment scrutiny as content-neutral, reasonable, time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. One of the ordinances limited the type of sign that could be affixed to motor vehicles parked or left standing on public streets, and the others prohibited non-motorized, “mobile billboard advertising displays” within city limits. Distinguishing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), the panel held that the ordinances were content neutral. The panel concluded that the word “advertising” did not render the ordinances content based on their face, and the ordinances regulated the manner, not the content, of affected speech. The panel held that the ordinances were narrowly LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3 tailored to significant government interests in traffic control, public safety, and aesthetics. In addition, the ordinances left open adequate alternative opportunities for advertising. Concurring in the majority’s opinion, Judge Owens wrote that the Supreme Court should take a second look at Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), because if “aesthetics” are to play a part in speech restriction, then they should apply equally to all unattractive signs or decals.
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