FREDRIC SANAI V., No. 14-35039 (9th Cir. 2016)
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FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FREDRIC SANAI, No. 14-35039 Plaintiff - Appellant. D.C. No. 2:13-rd-00076-MJP MEMORANDUM* Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Marsha J. Pechman, Senior District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 7, 2016** Seattle, Washington Before: PAEZ, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. Appellant Fredric Sanai seeks reversal of the district court’s imposition of reciprocal discipline, following his unanimous disbarment by the Washington Supreme Court. We affirm. “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Final judgment was * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). entered in Sanai’s case on July 30, 2013. His notice of appeal was filed January 16, 2014. Moreover, Sanai’s Rule 59 motion, filed September 5, 2013, was filed “later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b),(e). On this basis, some of our precedent holds that the district court was “without jurisdiction to consider” the untimely Rule 59 motion, Tillman v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Ewa Apartments, 234 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000), despite the district court’s attempt to toll “the 28-day filing period mandated by FRCP 59(e) . . . for 9 days.” Developments since Tillman suggest that the district court may have had the ability to toll the deadline for filing a Rule 59 motion because Rule 59 is a courtpromulgated rule untethered to a statutory timeline. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210–11; Vaught v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp. Health Plan, 546 F.3d 620, 626 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, because of the non-adversarial nature of this appeal, we decline to consider whether our pre-Bowles precedents are still good law. Ultimately, it makes no difference to the outcome of Sanai’s appeal: he loses either because the district court lacked jurisdiction or because Rules 6(b)(2) and Rule 59, working as “claims-processing rules,” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210, denied the 2 district court the discretion to entertain a late Rule 59 motion,1 Carter v. United States, 973 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he district court has no discretion to consider a late rule 59 [motion].”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court must not extend the time to act under Rule[] [59(e)].”); Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1978) (“Rule 6(b) prohibits enlargement of the time period prescribed in [Rule 59(e)].”). The judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 Moreover, even if we reached the merits of the Rule 59 motion, we would affirm the district court. 3
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