THOMAS HURST V. FALCON AIR EXPRESS, No. 14-16108 (9th Cir. 2016)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 25 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT THOMAS M. HURST, an individual, Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 14-16108 D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00256-SRB v. MEMORANDUM* FALCON AIR EXPRESS INCORPORATED, a Florida Corporation, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 12, 2016** San Francisco, California Before: NOONAN, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges. Thomas Hurst (“Hurst”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Falcon Air Enterprises, Inc. (“Falcon”) on all of Hurst’s claims. We affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1. The district court did not err in granting judgment in favor of Falcon on Hurst’s claim of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Hurst failed to raise a triable issue of fact that he is disabled due to his heart conditions or the side effects from his medications. Thus, he did not make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination. See Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999). 2. Nor did the district court err in granting judgment in favor of Falcon on Hurst’s claim of religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. As the district court noted, Falcon fully accommodated Hurst’s request not to work on Sundays. Hurst did not work a Sunday from the time he notified management of his religious beliefs until his termination. 3. Finally, the district court correctly rejected Hurst’s retaliation claim. Although Hurst was terminated only weeks after he filed his discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, there is no evidence that the managers responsible for firing Hurst were aware of his protected activity at the time they made their decision. Therefore, Hurst failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his termination was retaliatory. See Cohen v. Fred Meyer, 686 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1982). AFFIRMED. 2

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.