Hardy v. Chappell, No. 13-56289 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder to collect life insurance proceeds, challenged the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief. While the California Supreme Court concluded that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to investigate and present evidence that Calvin Boyd, a key prosecution witness at petitioner's trial, was likely the actual killer, the state court determined that petitioner was not prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington because there was substantial evidence to convict him under an aid-and-abet or conspiracy theory. The court concluded that the petition satisfies the “contrary to” clause of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) because the California Supreme Court employed a standard of review which was significantly harsher than the clearly established test from Strickland. Because the state court used the wrong standard, the court need not defer to that decision. Under de novo review, the court concluded that petitioner was clearly prejudiced in the guilt phase by counsel's deficient performance. Had counsel properly investigated and presented evidence that Boyd actually committed the murders, there is a substantial probability the jury would have come to a different conclusion. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to habeas relief because the California Supreme Court applied a standard contrary to clearly established law and because his attorney’s deficient performance was prejudicial at the guilt phase. Assuming, however, that the California Supreme Court did correctly conceptualize and apply the Strickland prejudice standard but simply camouflaged that understanding with a different - and incorrect - phrasing of the legal standard, the court still concluded that its application was unreasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant habeas relief.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel reversed the district court’s judgment denying California state prisoner James Edward Hardy’s habeas corpus petition challenging his convictions for two counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder to collect life insurance proceeds, in a case in which the California Supreme Court concluded that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington by failing to investigate and present evidence that Calvin Boyd, a prosecution witness, was likely the actual killer; and (2) Hardy suffered no prejudice from the deficient performance because there was substantial evidence to convict him under an aid-and-abet or conspiracy theory. The panel held that to the extent that the California Supreme Court found the Strickland prejudice prong was not met because substantial evidence remained to convict Hardy under a different theory, it applied a standard contrary to clearly established law. The panel explained that under Strickland, the standard is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors by counsel, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Because the state court used the wrong standard, the panel did not need to defer under AEDPA to the state court’s decision, and analyzed Hardy’s constitutional claim de novo. HARDY V. CHAPPELL 3 The panel held that under de novo review, Hardy was clearly prejudiced in the guilt phase by trial counsel’s deficient performance. The panel wrote that had counsel properly investigated and presented evidence that Boyd—the state’s key witness—actually committed the murders, there is a substantial probability the jury would have come to a different conclusion. The panel held that assuming that the California Supreme Court did correctly conceptualize and apply the Strickland prejudice standard but simply camouflaged that understanding with a different—and incorrect—phrasing of the legal standard, its application of the prejudice prong was objectively unreasonable. The panel wrote that Hardy is entitled to relief based on the severity of trial counsel’s deficiency, the vital role Boyd’s testimony played in securing Hardy’s convictions, the lapses of the prosecution, and the dearth of other evidence inculpating Hardy. The panel remanded with instructions to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that the majority manufactures a legal standard that the state supreme court never utilized and refuses to recognize the reasonableness of the alternative bases of guilt identified by that court; and that the majority’s rationale and conclusion are contrary to AEDPA and to the Supreme Court’s opinions interpreting the AEDPA standard of review. 4 HARDY V. CHAPPELL
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on January 27, 2017.
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