Burton v. Davis, No. 13-55328 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, sentenced to death for robbery and murder, seeks habeas corpus relief based on the California Supreme Court’s rejection of his claim of self-representation pursuant to Faretta v. California. The district court granted relief to petitioner and the State appealed. Because petitioner filed his federal habeas corpus petition before the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's effective date, the court applied the former version of 28 U.S.C. 2254 and pre-AEDPA law. The court concluded that the trial court’s repeated denials of petitioner's Faretta requests and the California Supreme Court’s decision affirming those denials were contrary to the court's decisions in Fritz v. Spalding and Armant v. Marquez. In this case, it was appropriate for the district court to determine the timeliness of petitioner's Faretta motions in the first instance because neither court made any finding that petitioner's requests were a mere delay tactic. The court further concluded that the district court did not have to refer to the California Supreme Court's finding because the California postconviction proceedings did not ask whether petitioner intended to delay, only whether petitioner's attorney thought that was petitioner's intent. The court agreed with petitioner that the district court was not required to presume that his requests were a mere delay tactic because, under section 2254(d)(1), the merits of that factual dispute were not resolved in the state postconviction hearing and, under section 2254(d)(2) and (d)(6), he was denied a full, fair, and adequate state court hearing on the issue. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner’s Faretta requests were made for legitimate, not purely dilatory, reasons. The court affirmed the judgment.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of California state prisoner Andre Burton’s pre-AEDPA habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and death sentence for robbery and murder, in a case in which Burton invoked his right to represent himself under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The panel held that the California courts’ decision to deny Burton his Faretta rights was not contrary to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, but that the trial judge’s denial of the requests on the sole ground that Burton was not ready for trial and would need a continuance, and the California Supreme Court’s affirmance of those denials, were contrary to this court’s decision in Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1982). The panel held that because neither the trial court nor the California Supreme Court made any finding that Burton’s requests were a mere delay tactic, it was appropriate for the district court to determine the timeliness of Burton’s Faretta motions in the first instance. The panel held that the district court was not required under former 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to defer to the California Supreme Court’s finding, seventeen years after its decision on Burton’s direct appeal, that Burton’s lawyer, Ronald Slick, had reason to believe that Burton asked to proceed pro se for the purpose of delaying BURTON V. DAVIS 3 trial, where the postconviction proceedings did not ask whether Burton intended to delay, only whether Slick thought that was Burton’s intent. The panel held that the district court erred when it treated the purpose-to-delay question as a mixed question of law and fact. But the panel held that the district court was not required to presume that Burton’s requests were a mere delay tactic because, under § 2254(d)(1), the merits of that factual dispute were not resolved in the state postconviction hearing and, under § 2254(d)(2) and (d)(6), Burton was denied a full, fair, and adequate state court hearing on the issue. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Burton’s Faretta requests were made for legitimate, not purely dilatory, reasons; and therefore affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the requests were timely as a matter of law. Dissenting, Judge O’Scannlain wrote that the California courts did determine the merits of Burton’s purpose in seeking to represent himself, so § 2254(d)(1) provides no basis for withholding deference; and that the California courts did afford Burton a full, fair, and adequate hearing in determining his purpose in seeking self-representation, so the presumption of correctness should apply. 4 BURTON V. DAVIS
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