Jones v. Taylor, No. 13-36202 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, convicted of unlawful sexual penetration for the sexual abuse of his sister, brought a federal habeas petition seeking relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence after three witnesses recanted their testimonies. The three witnesses are the victim, petitioner's father, and petitioner's other sister. The district court granted relief. The court concluded that, even if the court accepted that the three witnesses testified truthfully based on their memory at the time of the evidentiary hearing, their recantations are insufficient to demonstrate that petitioner is actually innocent under the standard applied in House v. Bell, Jackson v. Calderon, and Carriger v. Stewart. The court could not say that in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court held that petitioner had not made the extraordinarily high and truly persuasive showing required for habeas relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence. The court reversed the judgment of the district court.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel reversed the district court’s judgment granting a habeas corpus petition based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence in a case in which Scott Jones was convicted of unlawful sexual penetration for the sexual abuse of his sister, S.J. Jones’ conviction was based primarily on S.J.’s testimony that Jones inserted his finger inside her vagina on multiple occasions, as well as testimony by S.J.’s and Jones’ father, Ken Jones, and sister, Jennifer Pond, that Jones admitted to penetrating S.J. Jones brought his freestanding claim of factual innocence based on the recantations of all three witnesses. The panel chose to review de novo the district court’s conclusion that Jones is actually innocent, based on the panel’s holistic assessment of the evidence adduced at the hearings before the district court and at trial and the likely effect all this evidence would have on reasonable jurors in order to clarify how district courts should evaluate actual innocence claims. The panel did not resolve whether a freestanding actual innocence claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding in the non-capital context because, even assuming that such a claim is cognizable, the panel concluded that Jones has not made a sufficient showing to merit relief. The panel explained that as a general matter, recantation testimony is properly viewed with great suspicion. The panel did not rely on the district court’s findings that S.J. and Ken Jones were credible because the panel was uncertain about the basis for some of the district court’s conclusions and unpersuaded that every reasonable juror would credit the recantations as the district court did. The panel explained that even if it accepts that the three witnesses testified truthfully based on their memory at the time of the evidentiary hearing, their recantations are insufficient to demonstrate that Jones is factually innocent, where neither Ken Jones nor Jennifer Pond witnessed the abuse, and where the panel could not say that every juror would credit S.J.’s recantation testimony over her trial testimony and the descriptions of the abuse she gave in her 2000 and 2002 interviews. The panel explained that evidence that merely undercuts trial testimony or casts doubt on the petitioner’s guilt, but does not affirmatively prove innocence, is insufficient to merit relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence. The panel concluded that Jones has not made the extraordinarily high and truly persuasive showing required for habeas relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.