Crittenden v. Chappell, No. 13-17327 (9th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CasePetitioner was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. Petitioner's first habeas petition, arguing that the prosecutor excluded an African-American prospective juror on account of her race, was denied by the district court, but this court remanded in light of Cook v. LaMarque, which clarified that a peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause if it is “motivated in substantial part” by race “regardless of whether the strike would have issued if race had played no role.” On remand, the district court found that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race and granted petitioner habeas relief. On appeal, the state raised several challenges. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that Cook merely clarified the standard of proof for Batson claims, but it did not set forth a new rule for purposes of Teague v. Lane; the California Supreme Court’s decision is not owed deference under the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254, because it was contrary to clearly established federal law, and the presumption of correctness afforded to the state trial court’s factual findings is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence; the district court was not required to conduct its own evidentiary hearing, because it did not reject the magistrate judge’s credibility determination; and the district court’s finding that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race was not clearly erroneous
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment granting California state prisoner Steven Crittenden’s habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and death sentence for two murders in a case in which Crittenden, who is African- American, argued that the prosecutor excluded an African- American prospective juror on account of her race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The district court found the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race, and granted the petition, after this court remanded in light of Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2010), which clarified that a peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause if it is motivated in substantial part by race regardless of whether the strike would have issued if race had played no role. The panel rejected the state’s contention that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibits the retroactive application of the standard articulated in Cook. The panel explained that Cook merely clarified the standard of proof for Batson claims; it did not set forth a new rule for purposes of Teague. CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 3 The panel reaffirmed that the California Supreme Court’s decision is not owed deference under AEDPA, because it was contrary to clearly established federal law, and the presumption of correctness afforded to the state trial court’s factual findings is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The panel held that the district court was not required to conduct its own evidentiary hearing, because it did not reject the magistrate judge’s credibility determination. The panel held that the district court’s finding that the prosecutor was substantially motivated by race was not clearly erroneous. Judge McKeown dissented. She joined the majority as to the Teague analysis and as to lack of deference to the California Supreme Court. She parted ways with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that the prosecutor’s challenge to the single black juror was substantially motivated by race. She would have deferred to the State trial court’s fact-bound determination at Batson step one. She also would have applied de novo review to the district court’s determination at Batson step three because the panel shared the district court’s task of reviewing a cold record. 4 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL
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