MOHAMMED JEWEL V. LORETTA E. LYNCH, No. 12-71832 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 03 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOHAMMED JEWEL, No. 12-71832 Petitioner, Agency No. A070-947-513 v. MEMORANDUM* LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 1, 2016** Pasadena, California Before: O’SCANNLAIN, RAWLINSON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. Mohammad Jewel, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, petitions for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on changed country conditions. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Jewel first argues that the BIA did not give adequate weight to his declarations, which were not sworn or otherwise made under penalty of perjury. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by giving Jewel’s declarations “minimal evidentiary weight” because the BIA was not required to give any weight to unsworn declarations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (“The motion to reopen . . . shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (same); United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]ffidavits . . . are signed under oath . . . .”) (citing Affidavit, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (defining “affidavit” as a “sworn” declaration of facts)); see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 142–43 (1981) (error to require a hearing on a motion to reopen where “[n]one of the allegations was sworn”). Jewel next argues that the BIA mistakenly concluded that his claims of changed circumstances were subject to a time limitation. The BIA’s referring to the motion to reopen as “untimely” simply reflected the fact that the motion was filed more than ninety days “after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly considered whether Jewel had shown changed circumstances in Bangladesh. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In concluding that Jewel failed to show materially changed circumstances, the BIA did not abuse its discretion. 2 DENIED. 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
