Jackson v. City & Ctny. of San Francisco

Justia.com Opinion Summary: Plaintiff appealed the district court's order denying her motion for preliminary injunction of San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10(g) on the ground that both infringed upon her Second Amendment rights. The court concluded that section 4512, which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container when not carried on the person, burdens the rights protected by the Second Amendment because storage regulations such as section 4512 are not part of a long historical "tradition of proscription;" section 4512 is not a substantial burden on the Second Amendment; and, applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that section 4512 is substantially related to the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. The court also concluded that section 613.10(g), which prohibits the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, regulates conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment because restrictions on ammunition may burden the core Second Amendment right to self-defense and the record contained no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise. Determining that plaintiff had standing to challenge section 613.10(g), the court concluded that section 613.10(g) is a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the legality of ammunition, and section 613.10(g) thus satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff would not succeed on the merits of her claims and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction.

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Civil Rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin two San Francisco firearm and ammunition  regulations  in  an  action  alleging  that  the regulations were impermissible violations of the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. The  panel  held  that  the  first  regulation,  San  Francisco Police Code section 4512(a), (c)(1), which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container at home or disabled with a trigger  lock  when  not  carried  on  the  person,  burdened  the rights  protected  by  the  Second  Amendment  because  such storage regulations were not part of a long historical tradition of  proscription.    Nevertheless,  the  panel  determined  that section  4512  was  not  a  substantial  burden  on  the  Second Amendment  right  itself  because  it  did  not  prevent  an individual from possessing a firearm in the home.  Applying intermediate scrutiny, the panel held that San Francisco had shown  that  section  4512’s  requirement  that  persons  store handguns in a locked storage container or with a trigger lock when not carried on the person was substantially related to     JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 3 the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. The panel held that the second regulation, San Francisco Police  Code  section  613.10(g),  which  prohibits  the  sale  of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, may burden the  core  Second  Amendment  right  of  self-defense  and  the record contained no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise.  The panel therefore held that section 613.10(g) regulated  conduct  within  the  scope  of  the  Second Amendment.  Applying intermediate scrutiny, the panel held that  San  Francisco  carried  its  burden  of  establishing  that section 613.10(g) was a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the lethality of ammunition. The panel held that because San Francisco’s regulations did not destroy the Second Amendment right, and survived intermediate  scrutiny,  the  district  court  did  not  abuse  its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs would not succeed on the merits of their claims.

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ESPANOLA JACKSON; PAUL COLVIN; THOMAS BOYER; LARRY BARSETTI; DAVID GOLDEN; NOEMI MARGARET ROBINSON; NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.; SAN FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 12-17803 D.C. No. 3:09-cv-02143RS OPINION v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; EDWIN M. LEE, Mayor for the City and County of San Francisco; GREG SUHR, San Francisco Police Chief, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 7, 2013âSan Francisco, California Filed March 25, 2014 2 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Milan D. Smith, Jr., and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Ikuta SUMMARY* Civil Rights The panel affirmed the district courtâs denial of plaintiffsâ motion to preliminarily enjoin two San Francisco firearm and ammunition regulations in an action alleging that the regulations were impermissible violations of the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment. The panel held that the first regulation, San Francisco Police Code section 4512(a), (c)(1), which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container at home or disabled with a trigger lock when not carried on the person, burdened the rights protected by the Second Amendment because such storage regulations were not part of a long historical tradition of proscription. Nevertheless, the panel determined that section 4512 was not a substantial burden on the Second Amendment right itself because it did not prevent an individual from possessing a firearm in the home. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the panel held that San Francisco had shown that section 4512âs requirement that persons store handguns in a locked storage container or with a trigger lock when not carried on the person was substantially related to * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 3 the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. The panel held that the second regulation, San Francisco Police Code section 613.10(g), which prohibits the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, may burden the core Second Amendment right of self-defense and the record contained no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise. The panel therefore held that section 613.10(g) regulated conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the panel held that San Francisco carried its burden of establishing that section 613.10(g) was a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the lethality of ammunition. The panel held that because San Franciscoâs regulations did not destroy the Second Amendment right, and survived intermediate scrutiny, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs would not succeed on the merits of their claims. COUNSEL C.D. Michel (argued), Michel & Associates, P.C., Long Beach, California for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney; Wayne Snodgrass and Christine Van Aken (argued), Deputy City Attorneys, San Francisco, California for Defendants-Appellees. Richard E. Gardiner, Fairfax, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae The Law Enforcement Alliance of America. 4 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO Anthony T. Caso, John C. Eastman, and Karen J. Lugo, Orange, California, for Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence. David B. Kopel, Denver, Colorado; Dan M. Peterson, Dan M. Peterson PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Amici Curiae California Rifle and Pistol Association Foundation and Independence Institute. Don B. Kates, Battle Ground, Washington, for Amicus Curiae FFLGuard LLC and Gun Owners of California, Inc. Paul Flum and Anand Viswanathan, San Francisco, California, for Amicus Curiae Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence and Major Cities Chiefs Association; Jonathan Lowy, Washington D.C., for Amicus Curiae Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence. Brent P. Ray and Casey R. Frank, Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus Curiae Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence. JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 5 OPINION IKUTA, Circuit Judge: I This appeal raises the question whether two of San Franciscoâs firearm and ammunition regulations, which limit but do not destroy Second Amendment rights, are constitutional. We conclude that both regulations withstand constitutional scrutiny, and affirm the district courtâs denial of Jacksonâs motion for preliminary injunction. II San Francisco Police Code section 4512 provides that â[n]o person shall keep a handgun within a residence owned or controlled by that person unlessâ (1) âthe handgun is stored in a locked container or disabled with a trigger lock that has been approved by the California Department of Justice,â or (2) â[t]he handgun is carried on the person of an individual over the age of 18.â1 S.F., Cal., Police Code art. 45, § 4512(a), (c)(1). Violations of section 4512 are punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and up to six months in prison. Id. § 4512(e). San Francisco Police Code section 613.10(g) prohibits the sale of ammunition that (1) has âno sporting purpose,â (2) is âdesigned to expand upon impact and utilize the jacket, shot or materials embedded within the jacket or shot to project or disperse barbs or other objects that are intended to increase 1 Section 4512 also contains an exception for a handgun âunder the control of a peace officer.â 6 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO the damage to a human body or other target,â or (3) is âdesigned to fragment upon impact.â S.F., Cal., Police Code art. 9, § 613.10(g). Bullets that expand or fragment upon impact are generally referred to as âhollow-pointâ ammunition. On May 15, 2009, Espanola Jackson, Paul Colvin, Thomas Boyer, Larry Barsetti, David Golden, Noemi Margaret Robinson, the National Rifle Association, and the San Francisco Veteran Police Officers Association brought suit against the City and County of San Francisco, and other defendants, to challenge the validity of Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10(g) as impermissible violations of the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment.2 The individual plaintiffs are handgun owners and citizens of San Francisco âwho presently intend to keep their handguns within the home in a manner ready for immediate use to protect themselves and their families.â The organizations have brought this suit on behalf of their members, who have an interest in keeping handguns within their home for selfdefense. On August 30, 2012, Jackson moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied that motion on November 26, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on December 21, 2012. III Jackson challenges the district courtâs order denying her motion for preliminary injunction of sections 4512 and 2 We refer to plaintiffs collectively as âJackson.â We refer to the defendants as âSan Francisco.â JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 7 613.10(g) on the ground that both infringe upon her Second Amendment rights. To obtain a preliminary injunction, Jackson must establish that (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Am. Trucking Assâns v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). A denial of preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bullock, 698 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 2012). However, â[t]he district courtâs interpretation of the underlying legal principles . . . is subject to de novo review.â Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003). IV We turn first to the question whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Jackson did not carry her burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits of her challenge to sections 4512 and 613.10(g). We begin with the text of the Second Amendment: âA well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.â U.S. Const. amend. II. Our analysis of this text starts with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the Supreme Court considered whether the District of Columbiaâs regulations, which barred the possession of handguns both inside and outside the home, and required other firearms to be kept âunloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device,â violated the plaintiffâs Second Amendment rights. 554 U.S. 8 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO at 575. After undertaking a lengthy analysis of the original public meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court concluded that it confers âan individual right to keep and bear arms.â Id. at 595. Guided by the same historical inquiry, the Court emphasized that âthe inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right.â Id. at 628. Therefore, prohibiting the possession of handguns was unconstitutional. Id. at 628â29. Similarly, the District of Columbiaâs requirement that âfirearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all timesâ made âit impossible for citizens to use [firearms] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and [was] hence unconstitutional.â Id. at 630.3 Heller did not purport to âclarify the entire fieldâ of Second Amendment jurisprudence and does not provide explicit guidance on the constitutionality of regulations which are less restrictive than the near-total ban at issue in that case. Id. at 635. But Hellerâs method of analysis suggests a broad framework for addressing Second Amendment challenges. First, Heller determined whether the possession of operable weapons in the home fell within âthe historical understanding of the scope of the [Second Amendment] right.â Id. at 625. In conducting this analysis, Heller indicated that the Second Amendment does not preclude certain âlongstanding prohibitionsâ and âpresumptively lawful regulatory measures,â such as âprohibitions on carrying concealed weapons,â âprohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,â âlaws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 3 McDonald v. City of Chicago held that the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller is fully applicable to the States. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 9 buildings,â âlaws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,â and prohibitions on âthe carrying of âdangerous and unusual weapons,ââ referring to weapons that were not âin common use at the timeâ of the enactment of the Second Amendment. Id. at 626â27, 627 n.26 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Next, after determining that the possession of operable weapons fell within the scope of the Second Amendment, Heller considered the appropriate level of scrutiny for the challenged regulation. In light of the severity of the restriction posed by the D.C. regulation, Heller determined that it was unconstitutional â[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.â Id. at 628. As Heller made clear, ââ[a] statute which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional.ââ Id. at 629 (quoting State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616â17 (1840)). While Heller did not specify the appropriate level of scrutiny for Second Amendment claims, it nevertheless confirmed that rational basis review is not appropriate, explaining that â[i]f all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.â Id. at 628 n.27. Like the majority of our sister circuits, we have discerned from Hellerâs approach a two-step Second Amendment inquiry. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136â37 (9th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). The two-step inquiry we have adopted â(1) asks whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment 10 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO and (2) if so, directs courts to apply an appropriate level of scrutiny.â Id. at 1136 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)). As other circuits have recognized, this inquiry bears strong analogies to the Supreme Courtâs free-speech caselaw. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702â03, 706 (7th Cir. 2011) (âBoth Heller and McDonald suggest that First Amendment analogies are more appropriate, and on the strength of that suggestion, we and other circuits have already begun to adapt First Amendment doctrine to the Second Amendment context.â (internal citation omitted)). In the first step, we ask âwhether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment,â Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136, based on a âhistorical understanding of the scope of the [Second Amendment] right,â Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, or whether the challenged law falls within a âwell-defined and narrowly limitedâ category of prohibitions âthat have been historically unprotected,â Brown v. Entmât Merchants Assân, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 2734 (2011). To determine whether a challenged law falls outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment, we ask whether the regulation is one of the âpresumptively lawful regulatory measuresâ identified in Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, or whether the record includes persuasive historical evidence establishing that the regulation at issue imposes prohibitions that fall outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment, Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137. See also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (noting that only âthe few historic and traditional categories [of conduct] long familiar to the barâ fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection (internal quotations omitted)). JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 11 If a prohibition falls within the historical scope of the Second Amendment, we must then proceed to the second step of the Second Amendment inquiry to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136. When ascertaining the appropriate level of scrutiny, âjust as in the First Amendment context,â we consider: â(1) âhow close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment rightâ and (2) âthe severity of the lawâs burden on the right.ââ Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703). In analyzing the first prong of the second step, the extent to which the law burdens the core of the Second Amendment right, we rely on Hellerâs holding that the Second Amendment has âthe core lawful purpose of self-defense,â 554 U.S. at 630, and that âwhatever else it leaves to future evaluation, [the Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.â Id. at 635; see also Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (stating that a core right under the Second Amendment is âthe right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and homeâ). In analyzing the second prong of the second step, the extent to which a challenged prohibition burdens the Second Amendment right, we are likewise guided by First Amendment principles. Cf. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 706â07. As we explained in Chovan, laws which regulate only the âmanner in which persons may exercise their Second Amendment rightsâ are less burdensome than those which bar firearm possession completely. 735 F.3d at 1138; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that laws that place âreasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speechâ and that âleave open alternative 12 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO channels for communication of information,â pose less of a burden on the First Amendment right and are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny). Similarly, firearm regulations which leave open alternative channels for self-defense are less likely to place a severe burden on the Second Amendment right than those which do not. Cf. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a regulation which âleaves a person free to possess any otherwise lawful firearm he choosesâso long as it bears its original serial numberâ). A law that imposes such a severe restriction on the core right of self-defense that it âamounts to a destruction of the [Second Amendment] right,â is unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (internal quotations omitted). By contrast, if a challenged law does not implicate a core Second Amendment right, or does not place a substantial burden on the Second Amendment right, we may apply intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138â39; cf. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (â[A] regulation that imposes a substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment must have a strong justification, whereas a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should be proportionately easier to justify.â). V We now apply these principles to the facts of this case. We begin by addressing Jacksonâs facial and as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of section 4512, which requires handguns to be stored in a locked container when not carried on the person. JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 13 A As a threshold issue, San Francisco argues that Jackson may not bring a facial challenge to section 4512. San Francisco contends that Jackson conceded that locked storage is appropriate in some circumstances, such as when it is foreseeable that a child would otherwise gain possession of a firearm. Therefore, San Francisco claims that section 4512 has a âplainly legitimate sweep,â and a facial challenge is inappropriate. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (quoting Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739â40 & n.7 (1997)). San Franciscoâs argument reflects a misunderstanding of the Supreme Courtâs jurisprudence. Facial challenges are disfavored for two reasons. First, when considering âcomplex and comprehensive legislation,â we may not âresolve questions of constitutionality with respect to each potential situation that might develop,â especially when the moving party does not demonstrate that the legislation âwould be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases.â Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167â68 (2007) (internal quotation omitted). Second, facial challenges âoften rest on speculation.â Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450. Consequently, âthey raise the risk of premature interpretations of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records,â and âthreaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution.â Id. at 450â51. Jacksonâs facial challenge to section 4512 raises neither concern. First, section 4512 is not an example of âcomplex and comprehensive legislationâ which may be constitutional 14 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO in a broad swath of cases. Either it is a permissible burden on the Second Amendment right to âkeep and bear armsâ or it is not. Second, unlike the voting scheme at issue in Washington State Grange, the constitutionality of section 4512 does not turn on how San Francisco chooses to enforce it. The statute constitutes a flat prohibition on keeping unsecured handguns in the home. On its face, it does not give courts the opportunity to construe the prohibition narrowly or accord the prohibition âa limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions.â Id. at 450. B We next apply the two-step inquiry to determine whether section 4512 is constitutional. We consider whether section 4512 burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment. If so, we then determine an appropriate level of scrutiny. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136. First, we ask whether section 4512 regulates conduct âhistorically understood to be protectedâ by the Second Amendment âright to keep and bear arms.â Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136, 1137. In analyzing the scope of the Second Amendment, we begin with the list of âpresumptively lawfulâ regulations provided by Heller. See 554 U.S. at 626â27; see also Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137. Section 4512 resembles none of them, because it regulates conduct at home, not in âsensitive placesâ; applies to all residents of San Francisco, not just âfelons or the mentally illâ; has no impact on the âcommercial sale of arms,â and it regulates handguns, which Heller itself established were not âdangerous and unusual.â 554 U.S. at 626â27. JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 15 Nor does section 4512 resemble the prohibitions discussed in âhistorical evidence in the record before us.â Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137 (internal citation omitted). Heller discusses two founding-era laws which regulated the storage of firearms and gunpowder. See 554 U.S. at 631â32. First, it notes a 1783 Massachusetts law that prohibited residents of Boston from taking loaded firearms into âany Dwelling House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop or other Building.â Id. at 631 (quoting Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. 13, 1783 Mass. Acts p. 218.) Heller indicated that this statute should be construed narrowly in light of its context, âwhich makes clear that the purpose of the prohibition was to eliminate the danger to firefighters posed by the âdepositing of loaded Armsâ in buildings.â 554 U.S. at 631. Heller also concluded that the Massachusetts law was an outlier that contradicted âthe overwhelming weight of other evidence regarding the right to keep and bear arms for defense of the home.â Id. at 632. With respect to âgunpowder-storage laws,â Heller noted they âdid not clearly prohibit loaded weapons, but required only that excess gunpowder be kept in a special container or on the top floor of the home.â Id. Because Heller rejected the probative value of this evidence, these historical precedents do not establish that San Franciscoâs requirement is historically longstanding. The other historical evidence in the record does not establish that prohibitions such as those in section 4512 fall outside the scope of âthe Second Amendment, as historically understood.â Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137. San Francisco and its amici note that many states regulated the storage of gunpowder in the founding era, see, e.g., Act of June 28, 1762, 1762â1765 R.I. Acts & Resolves 132 (mandating that large quantities of gunpowder be stored in a powder house); 1784 N.Y. Laws 627 (requiring gunpowder to be stored in 16 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO appropriate containers), and also point to reconstruction-era state court decisions upholding gunpowder-storage regulations as lawful applications of the stateâs police powers, see, e.g., Williams v. City Council of Augusta, 4 Ga. 509, 511â12 (1848); Foote v. Fire Depât of the City of New York., 5 Hill 99, 100 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). But, as noted by Heller, such laws are best described as âfire-safetyâ regulations. 554 U.S. at 632. The fact that states historically imposed modest restrictions on the storage of gunpowder, a dangerous and highly flammable substance, does not raise the inference that the Second Amendment is inapplicable to regulations imposing restrictions on the storage of handguns. Because storage regulations such as section 4512 are not part of a long historical âtradition of proscription,â Entmât Merchants Assân, 131 S. Ct. at 2734, we conclude that section 4512 burdens rights protected by the Second Amendment, see Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137. C Having determined that section 4512 regulates conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment, we now turn to the second step of the inquiry: deciding what level of heightened scrutiny to apply to the ordinance. The level of scrutiny depends upon â(1) how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity of the lawâs burden on the right.â Id. at 1138 (internal quotations omitted). We first consider whether the conduct regulated by section 4512 is close to the core of the Second Amendment. On its face, section 4512 implicates the core because it applies to law-abiding citizens, and imposes restrictions on JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 17 the use of handguns within the home. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (emphasizing âthe right of law-abiding responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and homeâ). Section 4512 requires San Franciscans to choose, while in their homes, between carrying a handgun on their person and storing it in a locked container or with a trigger lock. S.F., Cal., Police Code art. 45, § 4512(a), (c)(1). As Jackson argues, there are times when carrying a weapon on the person is extremely impractical, such as when sleeping or bathing. Therefore, as a practical matter, section 4512 sometimes requires that handguns be kept in locked storage or disabled with a trigger lock. Having to retrieve handguns from locked containers or removing trigger locks makes it more difficult âfor citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of selfdefenseâ in the home. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. Section 4512 therefore burdens the core of the Second Amendment right. This is not the end of our inquiry, however. We next look to the severity of section 4512âs burden on the Second Amendment right. Section 4512 does not impose the sort of severe burden imposed by the handgun ban at issue in Heller that rendered it unconstitutional. Id. Unlike the challenged regulation in Heller, id. at 629, section 4512 does not substantially prevent law-abiding citizens from using firearms to defend themselves in the home. Rather, section 4512 regulates how San Franciscans must store their handguns when not carrying them on their persons. This indirectly burdens the ability to use a handgun, because it requires retrieving a weapon from a locked safe or removing a trigger lock. But because it burdens only the âmanner in which persons may exercise their Second Amendment rights,â Chovan 735 F.3d at 1138, the regulation more closely resembles a content-neutral speech restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner of speech. The record 18 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO indicates that a modern gun safe may be opened quickly. Thus, even when a handgun is secured, it may be readily accessed in case of an emergency. Further, section 4512 leaves open alternative channels for self-defense in the home, because San Franciscans are not required to secure their handguns while carrying them on their person. Provided San Franciscans comply with the storage requirements, they are free to use handguns to defend their home while carrying them on their person. Thus, Section 4512 does not impose the sort of severe burden that requires the higher level of scrutiny applied by other courts in this context. In Moore v. Madigan, for instance, the government was obliged to meet a higher level of scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny to justify a âblanket prohibitionâ on carrying an operable gun in public. 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012). By contrast, section 4512 does not constitute a complete ban, either on its face or in practice, on the exercise of a law-abiding individualâs right to self defense. Nor does section 4512 burden Second Amendment rights to the same degree as a Chicago ordinance prohibiting firing ranges in the city, which the Seventh Circuit analyzed under âa more rigorous showingâ than intermediate scrutiny, âif not quite âstrict scrutiny.ââ Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the âban is not merely regulatory; it prohibits the law-abiding, responsible citizens of Chicago from engaging in target practice in the controlled environment of a firing range,â and was therefore âa serious encroachment on the right to maintain proficiency in firearm use, an important corollary to the meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for self-defense.â Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 4512 does not impose such a serious encroachment on the core right; rather, it is more similar to the registration requirements upheld in Heller JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 19 II. In that case, the D.C. Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to evaluate registration requirements, including mandatory firearm training and instruction, which âmake it considerably more difficult for a person lawfully to acquire and keep a firearm, including a handgun, for the purpose of self-defense in the home . . . .â 670 F.3d at 1255. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that ânone of the Districtâs registration requirements prevents an individual from possessing a firearm in his home or elsewhere, whether for self-defense or hunting, or any other lawful purpose,â and therefore intermediate scrutiny was appropriate. Id. at 1257â58 (emphasis added). Likewise, section 4512 does not prevent an individual from possessing a firearm in the home. Accordingly, we conclude section 4512 is not a substantial burden on the Second Amendment right itself. Even though section 4512 implicates the core of the Second Amendment right, because it does not impose a substantial burden on conduct protected by the Second Amendment, we apply intermediate scrutiny. Cf. id. D Having determined the applicable standard of review, we must now determine whether section 4512 withstands intermediate scrutiny. â[C]ourts have used various terminology to describe the intermediate scrutiny standard.â Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139; compare Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (holding that âa regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the governmentâs legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so,â) with Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) 20 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO (requiring âthe government goal to be substantial, and the cost to be carefully calculated,â and holding that âsince the State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, it must affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we requireâ (internal citation omitted)). But âall forms of the standard require (1) the governmentâs stated objective to be significant, substantial, or important; and (2) a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective.â Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139. In analyzing the first prong of intermediate scrutiny review, whether the governmentâs stated objective is significant, substantial, or important, we must first define the governmentâs objective. Cf. id. According to San Francisco, the governmental objective in enacting section 4512 was to reduce the number of gun-related injuries and deaths from having an unlocked handgun in the home. See S.F., Cal., Police Code art. 45, § 4511(1)â(4). In considering a cityâs justifications for its ordinance, we do not impose âan unnecessarily rigid burden of proof . . . so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.â City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50â52 (1986). Here, as the legislative findings explain, â[h]aving a loaded or unlocked gun in the home is associated with an increased risk of gun-related injury and death.â Id. § 4511(2). San Francisco relied on evidence that â[g]uns kept in the home are most often used in suicides and against family and friends rather than in self-defense,â and that children are particularly at risk of injury and death. Id. § 4511(3)â(4). San Francisco therefore sought to âreduce[] the risk of firearm injury and deathâ in the home through the use of trigger locks or lock boxes under section 4512. Id. § 4511(5). âIt is self-evident,â Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139, that public safety is an important JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 21 government interest. See, e.g., Natâl Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670â71, 677 (1989) (holding that governmentâs compelling interest in public safety justifies drug testing of border agents who carry firearms); Madsen v. Womenâs Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (âThe State also has a strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order . . . .â). Accordingly, San Francisco has carried its burden of demonstrating that its locked-storage law serves a significant government interest by reducing the number of gun-related injuries and deaths from having an unlocked handgun in the home. We next turn to the question whether section 4512 is substantially related to San Franciscoâs important interest. In considering the question of fit, we review the legislative history of the enactment as well as studies in the record or cited in pertinent case law, Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1140, giving the city âa reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems,â City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 52 (internal quotations omitted). In the legislative findings accompanying section 4512, San Francisco concluded that firearm injuries are the third-leading cause of death in San Francisco, and that having unlocked firearms in the home increases the risk of gun-related injury, especially to children. See S.F., Cal., Police Code art. 45, § 4511(1)(e), (2)â(3). The record contains ample evidence that storing handguns in a locked container reduces the risk of both accidental and intentional handgun-related deaths, including suicide. Based on the evidence that locking firearms increases safety in a number of different respects, San Francisco has drawn a reasonable inference that mandating that guns be kept locked when not being carried will increase public safety and reduce firearm casualties. This evidence supports San Franciscoâs position that section 4512 is 22 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO substantially related to its objective to reduce the risk of firearm injury and death in the home. Jackson contends that section 4512 is over-inclusive because it applies even when the risk of unauthorized access by children or others is low, such as when a handgun owner lives alone. We reject this argument, because San Francisco has asserted important interests that are broader than preventing children or unauthorized users from using the firearms, including an interest in preventing firearms from being stolen and in reducing the number of handgun-related suicides and deadly domestic violence incidents. See id. § 4511(2)(d), (4). Intermediate scrutiny does not require that section 4512 be the least restrictive means of reducing handgun-related deaths. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. Moreover, the burden imposed by the legislation is not substantial. San Francisco relied on evidence showing that section 4512 imposes only a minimal burden on the right to self-defense in the home because it causes a delay of only a few seconds while the firearm is unlocked or retrieved from storage. Because the ordinance imposes only a minimal burden on the right to self-defense and San Franciscoâs interest encompasses more than just preventing minors from gaining access to firearms, the ordinance is appropriately tailored to fit San Franciscoâs interest. Accordingly, San Francisco has shown that section 4512âs requirement that persons store handguns in a locked storage container or with a trigger lock when not carried on the person is substantially related to the important government interest of reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries. Jackson is thus not likely to succeed on the merits, and we therefore affirm the district courtâs denial of Jacksonâs motion for preliminary injunction. Because we decide on this JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 23 basis, we need not reach Jacksonâs arguments that she established the remaining prongs of the preliminary injunction standard. See Am. Trucking Assâns, 559 F.3d at 1052. VI We now turn to the constitutionality of section 613.10(g), which prohibits the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco. A As a threshold issue, San Francisco contends that Jackson lacks standing to challenge section 613.10(g). To satisfy Article III standing, a plaintiff must show: â(1) an âinjury in factâ that is âconcrete and particularizedâ and âactual or imminent,â not âconjectural or hypotheticalâ; (2) a âcausal connection between the injuryâ and the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that it is âlikely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.ââ Multistar Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Depât of Transp., 707 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560â61 (1992)). An injury in fact is an âinvasion of a legally protected interest.â Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. San Francisco asserts that Jackson has not suffered an injury in fact because she could easily obtain hollow-point ammunition outside San Francisco. But the injury Jackson alleges is not the inconvenience of leaving San Francisco; rather, she alleges that the Second Amendment provides her with a âlegally protected interest,â id., to purchase hollowpoint ammunition, and that but for section 613.10(g), she 24 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO would do so within San Francisco. That Jackson may easily purchase ammunition elsewhere is irrelevant. âIn the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court long ago made it clear that one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. The same principle applies here.â Ezell, 651 F.3d at 697 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, section 613.10(g) constitutes an injury in fact to Jackson, and she has standing to challenge it. B Applying the two-step analysis outlined above, we first ask whether a prohibition on the sale of hollow-point ammunition regulates conduct âhistorically understood to be protectedâ by the Second Amendment âright to keep and bear arms.â Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136â37. The Second Amendment protects âarms,â âweapons,â and âfirearmsâ; it does not explicitly protect ammunition. Nevertheless, without bullets, the right to bear arms would be meaningless. A regulation eliminating a personâs ability to obtain or use ammunition could thereby make it impossible to use firearms for their core purpose. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (holding that âthe Districtâs requirement (as applied to respondentâs handgun) that firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times . . . makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutionalâ). Thus âthe right to possess firearms for protection implies a corresponding rightâ to obtain the bullets necessary to use them. Cf. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 704 (holding that the right to possess firearms implied a corresponding right to have access to firing ranges JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 25 in order to train to be proficient with such firearms). Indeed, Heller did not differentiate between regulations governing ammunition and regulations governing the firearms themselves. See 554 U.S. at 632. Rather, the Court considered the burden certain gunpowder-storage laws imposed on the Second Amendment right, and determined that they did not burden âthe right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns.â Id. This observation would make little sense if regulations on gunpowder and ammunition fell outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment. Conducting our historical review, we conclude that prohibitions on the sale of ammunition do not fall outside âthe historical understanding of the scope of the [Second Amendment] right.â Id. at 625. Heller does not include ammunition regulations in the list of âpresumptively lawfulâ regulations. See id. at 626â27, 627 n.26. Nor has San Francisco pointed to historical prohibitions discussed in case law or other âhistorical evidence in the record before usâ indicating that restrictions on ammunition fall outside of the historical scope of the Second Amendment. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137 (internal quotation omitted). Because restrictions on ammunition may burden the core Second Amendment right of self-defense and the record contains no persuasive historical evidence suggesting otherwise, section 613.10(g) regulates conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment. C We next turn to the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the challenged regulation. We consider how close section 26 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 613.10(g) is to the core of the Second Amendment right, and the severity of its burden on that right. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. We first consider how close San Franciscoâs ban on the sale of hollow-point bullets comes to the core of the Second Amendment right. Jackson contends that hollow-point bullets are far better for self-defense than fully jacketed ammunition because they have greater stopping power and are less likely to overpenetrate or ricochet. Barring their sale, she argues, therefore imposes a substantial burden on the right of selfdefense. We disagree. There is no evidence in the record indicating that ordinary bullets are ineffective for selfdefense. Moreover, section 613.10(g) prohibits only the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco, not the use or possession of such bullets. Such a sales prohibition burdens the core right of keeping firearms for self-defense only indirectly, because Jackson is not precluded from using the hollow-point bullets in her home if she purchases such ammunition outside of San Franciscoâs jurisdiction. Nor does section 613.10(g) place a substantial burden on the Second Amendment right. A ban on the sale of certain types of ammunition does not prevent the use of handguns or other weapons in self-defense. The regulation in this case limits only the manner in which a person may exercise Second Amendment rights by making it more difficult to purchase certain types of ammunition. This is akin to a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, such as a regulation which prevents a person from owning a firearm with an obliterated serial number while not barring the possession of an otherwise lawful firearm. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97. Further, section 613.10(g) leaves open alternative channels for self-defense in the home. Jackson JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 27 may either use fully-jacketed bullets for self-defense or obtain hollow-point bullets outside of San Franciscoâs jurisdiction. Because section 613.10(g) neither regulates conduct at the core of the Second Amendment right nor burdens that right severely, we review it under intermediate scrutiny. D In considering whether section 613.10(g) withstands intermediate scrutiny, we must first define the governmental interest served by section 613.10(g), and determine whether it is substantial. Again, we review the legislative history of the enactment as well as studies in the record or cited in pertinent case law. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139. In the legislative findings accompanying section 613.10(g), San Francisco states that it âhas a legitimate, important and compelling government interest in reducing the likelihood that shooting victims in San Francisco will die of their injuries by reducing the lethality of the ammunition sold and used in the City and County of San Francisco.â S.F., Cal., Police Code art. 9, § 613.9.5(6). It is self-evident that San Franciscoâs interest in reducing the fatality of shootings is substantial. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139. We next consider the fit between section 613.10(g) and this interest to determine whether section 613.10 is substantially related to San Franciscoâs important interest of reducing the lethality of ammunition. See id. at 1140. Legislative findings explain San Franciscoâs reasons for adopting the approach in section 613.10(g). Section 613.9.5(2) states that hollow-point bullets are âdesigned to tear larger wounds in the body by flattening and increasing in 28 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO diameter on impact,â and that â[t]hese design features increase the likelihood that the bullet will hit a major artery or organ.â Therefore, San Francisco concluded that hollowpoint bullets are âmore likely to cause severe injury and death than is conventional ammunition that does not flatten or fragment upon impact.â Id. Jackson generally argues that these legislative findings rely on bad science and erroneous assumptions. More specifically, she challenges San Franciscoâs conclusion that hollow-point ammunition is more lethal than other bullets. She bases this argument on an American Bar Association publication, which states that âmedical examiners have been unable to show any difference in lethality between hollow-point and traditional round-nosed lead bullets.â Lisa Steel, Ballistics, in Science for Laywers 11 (ABA Sec. of Sci. & Tech. Law) (Eric York Drogin ed., 2008). We are not persuaded by Jacksonâs arguments. The Supreme Court has held that a municipality may rely on any evidence âreasonably believed to be relevantâ to substantiate its important interest in regulating speech. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 51â52. Of course, âthe municipalityâs evidence must fairly support the municipalityâs rationale for its ordinance,â City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (plurality), and courts should not credit facially implausible legislative findings. In this case, San Franciscoâs evidence more than âfairly supportsâ its conclusion that hollow-point bullets are more lethal than other types of ammunition. At most, Jacksonâs evidence suggests that the lethality of hollow-point bullets is an open question, which is insufficient to discredit San Franciscoâs reasonable conclusions. Section 613.10(g) is a reasonable fit for achieving its objective of reducing the lethality of JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 29 ammunition because it targets only that class of bullet which exacerbates lethal firearm-related injuries. Jackson contends that San Francisco could have adopted less burdensome means of restricting hollow-point ammunition, for example by prohibiting the possession of hollow-point bullets in public, but allowing their purchase for home defense. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-3(f), (g). Even if this is correct, intermediate scrutiny does not require the least restrictive means of furthering a given end. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. City of Renton emphasizes that a âcity must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.â 475 U.S. at 52 (internal quotation omitted). We also doubt that the laws to which Jackson points are indeed less burdensome than section 613.10(g). Because section 613.10(g) affects only the sale of hollow-point ammunition, San Franciscans are free to use and possess hollow-point bullets within city limits. Under Jacksonâs âless burdensomeâ alternatives, individuals would face criminal prosecution for possessing such ammunition outside the home. Given the availability of alternative means for procuring hollow-point ammunition, section 613.10(g) imposes only modest burdens on the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, we conclude that San Francisco carried its burden of establishing that section 613.10(g) is a reasonable fit to achieve its goal of reducing the lethality of ammunition, and section 613.10(g) thus satisfies intermediate scrutiny. We therefore conclude that Jackson has not carried her burden of showing she is likely to succeed on the merits. Accordingly, we need not reach the remaining preliminary injunction factors. See Am. Trucking Assâns, 559 F.3d at 1052. 30 JACKSON V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO VII We recognize the significance of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. â[I]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.â McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3042. But we also recognize that the Second Amendment right, like the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, may be subjected to governmental restrictions which survive the appropriate level of scrutiny. Because San Franciscoâs regulations do not destroy the Second Amendment right, and survive intermediate scrutiny, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Jackson would not succeed on the merits of her claims. We therefore affirm the district courtâs denial of Jacksonâs motion for preliminary injunction. AFFIRMED.