United States v. Gonzalez-Monterroso, No. 12-10158 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CaseDefendant pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry. Defendant had a prior state court conviction for attempted rape in the fourth degree under Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 531-532, 770. At issue was whether Delaware's criminal attempt statutes constituted a federal generic attempt crime for purposes of imposing an enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. Because Delaware's statutory definition of "substantial step" was materially different from and encompassed more conduct that the federal generic definition, the Delaware attempt statute criminalized more conduct than the federal generic attempt offense. Therefore, defendant's prior state conviction for an attempt offense did not qualify as a federal generic attempt under the Taylor categorical approach. In light of this statutory definition, the court concluded that the district court erred in imposing the enhancement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, concluding that it need not address defendant's remaining arguments.
Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel reversed the district court’s determination that the defendant’s prior Delaware conviction for attempted rape in the fourth degree was a “crime of violence” warranting a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), and remanded for resentencing. The panel held that because Delaware’s statutory definition of “substantial step” is materially different from and encompasses more conduct than the federal generic definition, the Delaware attempt statute criminalizes more conduct than the federal generic attempt definition, and the defendant’s prior state conviction therefore does not qualify as a federal generic attempt offense under the Taylor categorical approach. The panel held that the modified categorical approach is not available because whatever the underlying facts or the evidence presented, the defendant would not have been convicted of an offense with the same elements as an attempted crime of violence. Concurring, Judge Wallace wrote that because the defendant’s underlying offense does not meet the generic definitions proposed by the government, the panel should reverse the sentence without determining whether the defendant committed the elements of the generic definition of attempt, which requires answering a question reserved by the Supreme Court.
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