USA V. VERONICA RAMIREZ, No. 11-50521 (9th Cir. 2013)

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FILED DEC 13 2013 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-50521 D.C. No. 8:10-cr-00034-DOC-2 v. MEMORANDUM* VERONICA ANA MARIA RAMIREZ, AKA Veronica Martinez, AKA Veronica Ana Ramirez, AKA Veronica Maria Ramirez, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted December 2, 2013 Pasadena, California Before: SCHROEDER, CLIFTON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 1. The district court did not plainly err in imposing the standard third-party notification condition of supervised release. The Sentencing Guidelines include the challenged third-party notification condition as a standard condition in * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. Page 2 of 2 § 5D1.3(c), rather than in the sections dealing with special occupational restrictions. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 5D1.3(e), 5F1.5 (2011). No Ninth Circuit precedent holds that imposition of the challenged condition amounts to an occupational restriction. Ramirez relies on United States v. Britt, 332 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003), but that case dealt with a special condition that directly and expressly limit[ed] the terms of the defendant s employment at the time it was imposed. In addition, other circuits addressing the challenge raised by Ramirez appear to have split. Compare United States v. Souser, 405 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005), with United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997). Under these circumstances, any error could not have been plain or obvious. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855 56 (9th Cir. 1996). 2. The parties agree that, pursuant to the terms of Ramirez s plea agreement, the district court should have dismissed count 1. We remand for that limited purpose. AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part for the limited purpose of dismissing count 1.

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