Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc.

Justia.com Opinion Summary: Washington Shoe brought suit against A-Z for, among other things, copyright infringement. At issue was whether A-Z, an Arkansas retailer, was subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington. The district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that Washington Shoe presented evidence that A-Z engaged in intentional acts that willfully infringed its copyright, knowing that it would adversely impact Washington Shoe in the state of Washington, and knew or should have known both about the existence of the copyright and the forum. Thus, A-Z's intentional acts were expressly aimed at Washington Shoe in Washington and the harm was felt in Washington. The district court therefore erred in dismissing the action. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

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Court Description:

Copyright / Personal Jurisdiction. The panel reversed the dismissal of a copyright infringement action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Applying the State of Washington’s long-arm statute, which extends jurisdiction over a defendant to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, the panel held that an Arkansas retailer was subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington even though its only relevant contact with the state was a claim that it willfully violated a copyright held by a Washington corporation. The panel held that the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that the Arkansas retailer purposefully directed its activities at the forum state because it engaged in intentional acts expressly aimed at Washington, causing harm that it knew was likely to be suffered in that state. The panel concluded that the retailer’s alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright, and its knowledge of both the existence of the copyright and the forum of the copyright holder, was sufficient “individual targeting” to satisfy the “express aiming” requirement.

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FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT WASHINGTON SHOE COMPANY , a Washington corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee, v. A-Z SPORTING GOODS INC., an Arkansas corporation, DBA A-2-Z Wholesale.com, Defendant-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant. Nos. 11-35166 and 11-35206 D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01042RSL OPINION Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 11, 2012âSeattle, Washington Filed December 17, 2012 Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Jay S. Bybee, and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Bybee 2 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS SUMMARY* Copyright / Personal Jurisdiction The panel reversed the dismissal of a copyright infringement action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Applying the State of Washingtonâs long-arm statute, which extends jurisdiction over a defendant to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, the panel held that an Arkansas retailer was subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington even though its only relevant contact with the state was a claim that it willfully violated a copyright held by a Washington corporation. The panel held that the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that the Arkansas retailer purposefully directed its activities at the forum state because it engaged in intentional acts expressly aimed at Washington, causing harm that it knew was likely to be suffered in that state. The panel concluded that the retailerâs alleged infringement of the plaintiffâs copyright, and its knowledge of both the existence of the copyright and the forum of the copyright holder, was sufficient âindividual targetingâ to satisfy the âexpress aimingâ requirement. COUNSEL John W. Widell, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Timothy B. McCormack, Seattle, Washington, for AppellantâCrossAppellee. * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 3 Roger M. Townsend, Breskin, Johnson & Townsend PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for AppelleeâCross-Appellant. OPINION BYBEE, Circuit Judge: In this copyright infringement action, we address whether an Arkansas retailer is subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington when its only relevant contact with the state is a claim that it willfully violated a copyright held by a Washington corporation. The district court for the Western District of Washington dismissed Washington Shoe Companyâs (âWashington Shoeâ) action against A-Z Sporting Goods, Inc. (âA-Zâ) for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff-appellant Washington Shoe is a Washington corporation that has done business in the state of Washington for over 100 years. Washington Shoe, as its name suggests, manufactures a variety of foot apparel for men, women, and children. Defendant-appellee A-Z is an Arkansas corporation that operates a single retail store in Alma, Arkansas, where it sells goods related to hunting, fishing, and outdoor activities. According to A-Z, it does not sell products over the Internet and does not have an interactive website that allows customers to order its products, although a different A-Z entity, with some common management, does sell some products over eBay. 4 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS Between 2007 and 2009, A-Z purchased a number of items from Washington Shoe. Washington Shoe salesman Jesse James regularly visited the A-Z store in Arkansas to determine what additional orders A-Z needed. James provided A-Z with brochures and catalogs containing Washington Shoe products and copyright notifications. During one of his visits to A-Z, James noticed that âDitsy Dotsâ and âSpiderâ bootsâtwo of Washington Shoeâs popular childrenâs rain bootsâwere on display. James knew that A-Z had never purchased these particular styles from him. James purchased a pair of the suspicious boots and sent them to Washington Shoe, who confirmed that they were infringing copies. A-Z admits that the boots in dispute were purchased from China and not from Washington Shoe, but claims that the boots had no name on them or other indication that they were subject to copyright. On April 17, 2009, Washington Shoeâs counsel in Seattle sent A-Z a cease-and-desist letter notifying A-Z that its boot designs were copyrighted and that A-Zâs âinfringing boots are clearly illegal knock-offs.â He demanded that all sales of the infringing boots stop and asked for an accounting of past sales. On May 6, 2009, counsel sent a follow-up letter, again warning A-Z that it was violating Washington Shoeâs copyright and might be liable for actual and statutory damages. He requested written assurance that A-Z had ceased importing or selling the infringing rain boots. After receiving these letters, A-Z removed the offending boots from its store, but sold its remaining inventory to a thrift store, whose representative traveled to Arkansas to purchase the boots. WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 5 Washington Shoe filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging copyright infringement, trade dress infringement, and unfair competition. A-Z moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, on forum non conveniens grounds. After initial briefing, the district court allowed jurisdictional discovery to test A-Zâs claim that it âhas never sold any goods, of any kind, to any person, business or entity in the State of Washington.â The court initially denied A-Zâs motion to dismiss, relying on our decision in Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon (âBrayton Purcell Iâ), 575 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009). That decision was withdrawn and superceded by Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon (âBrayton Purcell IIâ), 606 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010), prompting the district court to issue an order to show cause, and eventually to grant A-Zâs motion to dismiss. Because of the confusion generated by the different Brayton Purcell opinions, the district court denied A-Zâs request for attorneysâ fees under Washington Revised Code § 4.28.185(5). Washington Shoe appeals the dismissal, and A-Z crossappeals the denial of attorneysâ fees. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A district courtâs determination of whether personal jurisdiction may be properly exercised is a question of law that we review de novo. See Brayton Purcell II, 606 F.3d at 1127. Although the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a âprima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.â Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 6 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff, in this case, Washington Shoe. See id. Because there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction in this case, we apply the law of the state of Washington. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004); Panavision Intâl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). Washingtonâs long-arm statute extends jurisdiction over a defendant to the fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.185; Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 783 P.2d 78, 82 (Wash. 1989). The relevant question, therefore, is whether the requirements of due process are satisfied by the exercise of personal jurisdiction over A-Z in Washington. B. Due Process Due process requires that to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the defendant âhave certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend âtraditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.ââ Intâl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). We employ a three-part test to determine if a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to be subject to specific personal jurisdiction1: (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum 1 There is no basis for asserting general jurisdiction over A-Z in W ashington. WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 7 or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendantâs forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. Brayton Purcell II, 606 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Washington Shoe bears the burden of establishing the district courtâs jurisdiction over A-Z, it must satisfy the first two prongs. If it does so, then A-Z must come forward with a ââcompelling caseâ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.â CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)). Only the first prong is at issue in this case. The plaintiff may satisfy this prong by demonstrating that the defendant either purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, or purposefully directed its activities at the forum. We have explained that although we have sometimes used these two terms in shorthand fashion as a single concept, they âare, in fact, two distinct concepts.â Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. We have further explained that â[a] purposeful availment analysis is most often used in 8 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS suits sounding in contract.â Id.; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473, 475â76; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). By contrast, â[i]n tort cases, we typically inquire whether a defendant âpurposefully direct[s] his activitiesâ at the forum state, applying an âeffectsâ test that focuses on the forum in which the defendantâs actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum.â Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).2 The âpurposeful directionâ or âeffectsâ test is based on Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). It ârequires that the defendant . . . have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.â Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1228 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who engages in an intentional act that causes 2 A plurality of the Supreme Court recently questioned whether our rough division between contract and tort is sound, and applied âa purposeful availment (rather than a purposeful direction) analysis,â Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011), in a products liability case. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, â U.S. â, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion). Nevertheless, we recently found J. McIntyre âconsistent with the line of cases finding specific jurisdiction when there has been purposeful direction.â CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1077. In any event, for our purposes, there is no reason to question the continuing validity of the two lines of analysis for contract and tort cases, because the plurality in J. McIntyre questioned whether the âpurposefully availsâ test was appropriate âin cases involving an intentional tort.â 131 S. Ct. at 2785; see also id. at 2787 (acknowledging that the âpurposefully availsâ test from Hanson might not address adequately âsome cases, as with an intentional tortâ). WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 9 harm in the forum state, even if that act takes place outside of the forum state. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1206; Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1320 (âIt is not required that a defendant be physically present or have physical contacts with the forum, so long as his efforts are âpurposefully directedâ toward forum residents.â). We are going to consider each of these elements in turn. Our discussion, however, is limited to Washington Shoeâs willful infringement claim, because that is its strongest basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in Washington. If Washington has jurisdiction over this claim, it may exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims, which are related. See Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (adopting the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction, which allows a court to exercise âjurisdiction over a defendant with respect to a claim for which there is no independent basis of personal jurisdiction so long as it arises out of a common nucleus of operative facts with a claim in the same suit over which the court does have personal jurisdictionâ); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing district courts with supplemental subject matter jurisdiction for claims so related that they âform part of the same case or controversyâ). 1. Intentional Act First, we address whether A-Z âcommitted an intentional actâ when it, allegedly, willfully infringed Washington Shoeâs copyright. See Brayton Purcell II, 606 F.3d at 1128. Although the issue is not a difficult one in this case, we wish to be careful not to confuse the âintentional actâ prong of the Calder test with the allegation that A-Z acted willfully. ââIntentional actâ has a specialized meaning in the context of 10 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS the Calder effects test.â Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. We have defined an âactâ as âdenot[ing] an external manifestation of the actorâs will . . . not includ[ing] any of its results, even the most direct, immediate, and intended.â Id. (âThus, if the actor, having pointed a pistol at another, pulls the trigger, the act is the pulling of the trigger and not the impingement of the bullet upon the otherâs person.â (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 2 & cmt. c (1964))). Further, â[w]e construe âintentâ . . . as referring to an intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.â Id. Accordingly, an intentional act is an external manifestation of the actorâs intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world, not including any of its actual or intended results. According to Washington Shoeâs allegations, A-Z purchased the boots at issue from China and the infringing boots were sold in the same Arkansas store as Washington Shoeâs footwear. Subsequently, after receiving notice of the alleged copyright infringement through cease-and-desist letters, A-Z sold the infringing boots to a thrift store. We have little difficulty finding that by intentionally engaging in the actual, physical acts of purchasing and selling the allegedly infringing boots, A-Z has clearly committed an âintentional actâ within the meaning of the Calder test. 2. Expressly Aimed Determining whether A-Zâs conduct was expressly aimed at the state of Washington is a more difficult question that, in this case, depends to a great degree on the allegations of a willful copyright violation. âTo establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 11 (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.â Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Copyright Act provides an additional damage remedy if the plaintiff can show that the violation was willful. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). We have explained that âa finding of âwillfulnessâ in [the copyright] context can be based on either âintentionalâ behavior, or merely ârecklessâ behavior,â Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza), 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008), and that ââ[t]o prove âwillfulnessâ under the Copyright Act, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity, or (2) that the defendantâs actions were the result of âreckless disregardâ for, or âwillful blindnessâ to, the copyright holderâs rights,ââ Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 263 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd v. Video Palace Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 356, 361â62 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (âTo prove willfulness, plaintiffs must show that the infringer had actual or constructive knowledge that it was infringing the plaintiffsâ copyrights or else acted in reckless disregard of the high probability that it was infringing plaintiffsâ copyrights.â). â[E]vidence that notice had been accorded to the alleged infringer . . . is perhaps the most persuasive evidence of willfulness.â Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1227 (7th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). We have characterized copyright infringement as a âtort,â Brayton Purcell II, 606 F.3d at 1128, and suggested that willful infringement is an intentional tort, Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 289 (9th Cir. 1997), revâd on 12 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS other grounds sub nom. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998). According to Washington Shoeâs allegations, there was an ongoing relationship between A-Z and Washington Shoe, during which A-Z received catalogs or brochures that included rain boots, allegedly including the copyrighted boots in this case, thus making A-Z aware of both the existence of the Ditsy Dot and Spider boots and Washington Shoeâs copyright. Washington Shoe further alleged that A-Z purchased the boots at issue from China, and that the infringing boots were sold in the same Arkansas store as Washington Shoeâs footwear, thus placing the infringing items in direct competition with Washington Shoeâs copyrighted boots. Once Washington Shoe discovered that AZ was selling infringing boots, it advised A-Z of the copyright infringement through cease-and-desist letters and requested proof that A-Z was no longer violating its copyright. After receiving the letters, A-Z sold the infringing boots to a thrift store. These facts, if sustained, likely constitute a willful violation of Washington Shoeâs copyright based upon A-Zâs actual awareness of its infringing activity. We have held that Calder âcannot stand for the broad proposition that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state always gives rise to specific jurisdiction.â Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Natâl Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). We noted that our previous cases said that there must be âsomething more,â see Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321, and we held that that ââsomething moreâ is what the Supreme Court described as âexpress aimingâ at the forum state.â Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087. We have repeatedly stated that the âexpress aimingâ requirement is satisfied, and specific jurisdiction exists, âwhen âthe WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 13 defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state.ââ Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087); see also Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087 (ââ[E]xpress aimingâ encompasses wrongful conduct individually targeting a known forum resident.â). We have observed that â[t]he âexpress aimingâ analysis depends, to a significant degree, on the specific type of tort or other wrongful conduct at issue.â Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 807. Calder, we explained, was not a case of ââuntargeted negligence,ââ id. (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789), but was âintentional behavior directed at Jones in California,â id. Even though directed entirely within Florida, the intentional acts in Calderâthe writing and editing of an allegedly libelous articleâwere âexpressly aimedâ at California because the petitioners âknew [the article] would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondentâ who they knew lived and worked in California. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789â90 (emphasis added). Thus, the respective directions of the intentional act and the known impact need not coincide for the âexpress aimingâ requirement to be satisfied. Particularly in the case of a willful copyright infringement, the intentional act constituting the violation may occur solely within one state while the known impact of that copyright infringement is directed at another state. We have been more clearâand found jurisdiction in the plaintiffâs home forumâwhen we have determined that the tort is an intentional one, because in such cases the âacts are performed for the very purpose of having their consequences felt in the forum state.â Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alta., 873 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 14 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) (â[S]tates have a special interest in exercising jurisdiction over those who commit intentional torts causing injury to their residents.â). So, for example, in Columbia Pictures, Columbia alleged that Feltner, the owner of television stations in the southeast that continued to broadcast Columbia-licensed shows after failing to pay royalties, âwillfully infringed copyrights owned by Columbia, which, as Feltner knew, had its principal place of business in the Central District [of California].â Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 289. Thus, even though the intentional act of broadcasting the Columbia-licensed shows was directed at the southeastern United States, the impact of that intentional act was âexpressly aimedâ at the Central District of California because Feltner knew the impact of his willful violation would be felt there. We held that â[t]his fact alone is sufficient to satisfy the âpurposeful availmentâ requirement.â Id. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789â90). More recently, in Brayton Purcell II, we considered the claim brought by Brayton Purcell, a Northern California law firm, that Recordon, a Southern California law firm, plagiarized Brayton Purcellâs copyrighted website and was thus subject to suit in the Northern District of California for willful copyright infringement.3 Brayton Purcell II, 606 F.3d at 1127. We found that âRecordon allegedly placed the two law firms in competition in the area of elder abuse law and created confusion among potential clients as to the true authorship of the elder abuse material. This individualized 3 Although the issue in Brayton Purcell II was proper venue, the decision rested on a determination of personal jurisdiction in the district. See Brayton Purcell II, 606 F.3d at 1128; Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 289. WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 15 targeting distinguishes the instant case from [a case in which jurisdiction was not proper].â Brayton Purcell II, 606 F.3d at 1130. We further found that âRecordonâs conduct was intentional, wrongful, and aimed at Braytonâ; that âRecordonâs actions placed it in direct competition with Brayton in Northern Californiaâ; and that â[a]nyone in Northern California searching for a law firm specializing in elder abuse would have been confused when choosing between Brayton Purcellâs and Recordonâs web sites.â Id. at 1130â31. We concluded that â[t]he express aiming prong is therefore satisfied.â Id. at 1131. In Mavrix Photo, we addressed another case involving intentional copyright infringement. 647 F.3d 1218. Mavrix, a celebrity photo agency, was a Florida corporation operating in Miami; it also had a Los Angeles office. Id. at 1221â22. Brand, an Ohio corporation out of Toledo, operated a celebrity gossip website. Id. at 1222. Mavrix alleged that Brand had posted Mavrixâs copyrighted photos on its website. Id. at 1221. The question in Mavrix Photo was whether Brand was subject to personal jurisdiction in California, even though neither party was headquartered there. Id. at 1221â22. Regarding the âexpressly aimedâ requirement, we focused on â[t]he fact that the advertisements targeted California residents [as] indicat[ing] that Brand kn[ew]âeither actually or constructivelyâabout its California user base, and that it exploit[ed] that base for commercial gain by selling space on its website for advertisements.â Id. at 1230. Further, we concluded that âBrand anticipated, desired, and achieved a substantial California viewer base.â Id. Thus, personal jurisdiction in California was warranted where the facts established that Brand had engaged in the intentional act of posting the copyrighted photos on its website outside of California with the knowledge that the impactâdirect 16 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS competition in the California marketâwould be felt by Mavrix in California.4 We were careful to distinguish this from other instances where âa local newspaper, an individual, or an unpaid bloggerâ commits an intentional act by posting copyrighted material on a website lacking the knowledge that it would impact users outside of the known or anticipated physical area of influence. Id. at 1231. âNot all material placed on the Internet is, solely by virtue of its universal accessibility, expressly aimed at every state in which it is accessed.â Id. As was the case in Mavrix, however, where a defendant knowsâas opposed to being able to foreseeâthat an intentional act will impact another state, the âexpressly aimedâ requirement is satisfied. See also Amini Innovation Corp. v. JS Imps., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1105â08 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding jurisdiction proper when California corporation alleged that New York and Maryland entities willfully infringed its copyright and design patents, even though defendants had no connection to California besides knowing that corporation was located in California). Knowledge that an intentional act will have an impact in another state also distinguishes our decisions in Schwarzenegger and Pebble Beach. In Schwarzenegger we addressed a case alleging âstate law causes of action arising out of the unauthorized use of [Schwarzeneggerâs] image . . . .â 374 F.3d at 800. Fred Martin, an automobile dealership located in Ohio, ran a full-page color 4 Notably, our opinion assured, in response to argument Brand made at oral argument, that Mavrix could have sued Brand âin Ohio or Florida,â Florida being M avrixâs home office. 647 F.3d at 1231 (emphasis added). See id. at 1230 (âIt was foreseeable that [Mavrixâs] economic loss would be inflicted not only in Florida, Mavrixâs principal place of business, but also in California.â) (emphasis added). WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 17 advertisement in a local newspaper including a âsmall, but clearly recognizable photograph of Schwarzenegger as the Terminator.â Id. at 799. The photograph included a âbubble quotationâ stating, âArnold says: âTerminate EARLY at Fred Martin!ââ Id. The advertisement was meant to encourage customers to âclose out their current leases before the expected termination date, and to buy or lease a new car from Fred Martin.â Id. We recognized that the intentional act was placing the ad, incorporating Schwarzeneggerâs photograph, in the newspaper. Id. at 807. We found, however, that the advertisement circulated in the local Ohio-based newspaper âwas never circulated in California, and Fred Martin had no reason to believe that any Californians would see it and pay a visit to the dealership.â Id. Even though â[i]t may be true that Fred Martinâs intentional act eventually caused harm to Schwarzenegger in California, and Fred Martin may have known that Schwarzenegger lived in California,â id., the facts did not establish that Fred Martin knew that the impact of his intentional act would be felt in California. Pebble Beach was a case involving allegations of intentional infringement and dilution of a trademark. 453 F.3d at 1154. Caddy, a dual citizen of the United States and United Kingdom, ran a bed and breakfast, restaurant, and bar called âPebble Beachâ in southern England. Id. at 1153. Caddy maintained a non-interactive website containing general information about his operation. Id. Furthermore, besides a brief stint working at a restaurant in Carmel, California, Caddy had always been domiciled in the United Kingdom. Id. at 1154. Undoubtedly, Caddy committed an intentional act by maintaining a website using the name âPebble Beach.â As in Schwarzenegger, however, Pebble Beach did not present any facts establishing knowledge that there would be an impact in Californiaâeven though Pebble 18 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS Beach did involve allegations of intentional infringement and dilution of a trademark. Id. at 1158. We found that the âonly acts identified by Pebble Beach as being directed at California are the website and the use of the name âPebble Beachâ in the domain name.â Id. at 1156. While it may have been foreseeable that Caddyâs intentional act would have an impact in California, we require âsomething moreâ than a possible foreseeable effect. Id. at 1156â58. Since Pebble Beach provided no facts suggesting that Caddy knew his intentional act would have an impact in California, personal jurisdiction was not proper. Id. (âHere, Caddy has hatched no such plan [to obtain money or engage in competition] directed at Pebble Beach.â). Because the harm caused by an infringement of the copyright laws must be felt at least at the place where the copyright is held, we think that the impact of a willful infringement is necessarily directed there as well. Under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., âthe owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rightsâ to display, reproduce, or distribute copies of the copyrighted work, and to prepare derivative works. Id. § 106. âThe copyright is the right to control the work, including the decision to make the work available to or withhold it from the public.â Laws v. Sony Music Entmât, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006). When copyrights are held by corporations, the âright to control the workâ will typically be exercised where the corporation is located. The impact of an intentional violation of that right is necessarily directed at that location. Here, the question is whether an intentional infringement of Washington Shoeâs copyright in its shoes is expressly aimed at the state of Washington, where Washington Shoe has it headquarters and from which it controls its exclusive WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 19 rights in its copyright. The intentional acts infringing Washington Shoeâs copyright likely took place in Arkansas, where A-Z received the infringing boots from a Chinese manufacturer, displayed them for sale, and thenâafter having been advised that they were knock-offsâsold them to a thrift store. Even if A-Z was not aware of the infringing boots at the outset, A-Z made a bulk sale of the infringing boots after receiving two cease-and-desist letters from Washington Shoeâs corporate counsel in Washington. A-Zâs intentional acts were expressly aimed at the copyright held by Washington Shoe because A-Z knew that its intentional acts would impact Washington Shoeâs copyright by virtue of the cease-and-desist letters it had received. Where A-Z knew or should have known that Washington Shoe is a Washington company, A-Zâs intentional acts were expressly aimed at the state of Washington. When the infringer intentionally interferes with the holderâs copyright, he strikes at the heart of the rights conferred by the Copyright Act, the holderâs right to control his copyright on his own terms. See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 159, 165 (N.Y. 2011) (â[T]he injury to a New York copyright holder, while difficult to quantify, is not as remote as a purely indirect financial loss due to the broad spectrum of rights accorded by copyright law.â); see also Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 640 F.3d 497, 500â01 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the copyright holder suffered injury âwithin the stateâ even though the infringing acts occurred outside of New York). We think that A-Zâs alleged willful infringement of Washington Shoeâs copyright, and its knowledge of both the existence of the copyright and the forum of the copyright holder, is sufficient âindividualized targetingâ to establish the 20 WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS âsomething moreâ necessary to satisfy the express aiming requirement. 3. Causing Harm that the Defendant Knows Is Likely to Be Suffered in the Forum State âThe economic loss caused by the intentional infringement of a plaintiffâs copyright is foreseeable.â Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1231. It is foreseeable that the loss will be inflicted both in the forum where the infringement took placeâArkansasâand where the copyright holder has its principal place of businessâWashington. Id.; see also McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Ingenium Techs. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (âIt is reasonably foreseeable that the provision of materials that infringe the copyrights and trademarks of a New York company will have consequences in New York . . . .â). A-Z knew that its intentional acts would have an impact on Washington Shoe and it knew that Washington Shoe had its headquarters in the state of Washington. A-Z knew or should have known that the impact of its willful infringement of Washington Shoeâs copyright would cause harm likely to be suffered in the forum. As a consequence, A-Z can âreasonably anticipate being haled into courtâ in Washington. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). III. CONCLUSION Washington Shoe presented evidence that A-Z engaged in intentional acts that willfully infringed its copyright, knowing that it would adversely impact Washington Shoe in the state of Washington, and knew or should have known both about the existence of the copyright and the forum. Thus, A-Zâs WASHINGTON SHOE V . A-Z SPORTING GOODS 21 intentional acts were expressly aimed at Washington Shoe in Washington and the harm was felt in Washington. The district court therefore erred in dismissing the action. We express no views on any other issue related to jurisdiction or the merits. In light of our disposition, A-Zâs appeal of the denial of attorneys fees is moot. REVERSED and REMANDED.