Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, et al v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, et al.
Justia.com Opinion Summary: The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a part of the United States Department of Treasury, froze the assets of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Oregon (AHIF-Oregon), a non-profit organization, and designated AHIF-Oregon as a "specially designated global terrorist" pursuant to Executive Order No. 13,224. AHIF-Oregon eventually filed an action asserting that the OFAC violated a variety of its statutory and constitutional rights. The Multicultural Association of Southern Oregon, which the government had not accused of supporting terrorism, challenged certain laws that barred it from providing services to designated entities such as the AHIF-Oregon. With the exception of one claim not at issue on appeal, the district court granted summary judgment to OFAC. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that substantial evidence supported OFAC's redesignation of AHIF-Oregon as a specially designated global terrorist, and the court affirmed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's due process claims. The court reversed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's Fourth Amendment claim and remanded for the district to determine what judicial relief, if any, was available. Finally, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' First Amendment claim.
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The court issued a Revised version of this opinion on February 27, 2012
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC FOUNDATION, INC., aka Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc.; and MULTICULTURAL ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN OREGON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; TIMOTHY GEITHNER; OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL; ADAM J. SZUBIN; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; and ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney General, Defendants-Appellees. No. 10-35032 D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01155-KI OPINION Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Garr M. King, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 9, 2011—Portland, Oregon Filed September 23, 2011 Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Sidney R. Thomas, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Graber 18043 18048 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY COUNSEL David D. Cole, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., for the plaintiffs-appellants. Douglas N. Letter and Michael P. Abate, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the defendants-appellees. OPINION GRABER, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Oregon (“AHIFOregon”), is a non-profit organization, incorporated in Oregon, whose stated purpose is to promote greater understanding of Islam. The United States government suspected AHIFOregon of supporting terrorism. In 2004, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), a part of the United States Department of the Treasury, froze AHIF-Oregon’s assets and designated AHIF-Oregon as a “specially designated global AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18049 terrorist” pursuant to Executive Order (“EO”) No. 13,224. President George W. Bush had issued EO 13,224 pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707, in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. AHIF-Oregon eventually filed this action, asserting that OFAC has violated a variety of its statutory and constitutional rights. Plaintiff Multicultural Association of Southern Oregon, which the government has not accused of supporting terrorism, challenges certain laws that bar it from providing services to designated entities such as AHIF-Oregon. With the exception of one claim not at issue on appeal, the district court granted summary judgment to OFAC. On appeal, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. We affirm the district court’s ruling that substantial evidence supports OFAC’s redesignation of AHIF-Oregon as a specially designated global terrorist, and we affirm the district court’s rejection of AHIF-Oregon’s due process claims. We reverse the district court’s rejection of AHIF-Oregon’s Fourth Amendment claim and remand for the district court to determine what judicial relief, if any, is available. Finally, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY AHIF-Oregon incorporated as a non-profit public benefit corporation under Oregon law in 1999. AHIF-Oregon describes itself as “an Oregon non-profit charitable organization that seeks to promote greater understanding of the Islamic religion through operating prayer houses, distributing religious publications, and engaging in other charitable activities.” It maintains headquarters in Ashland, Oregon, where it formerly owned and operated a prayer house. Its primary activities appear to have taken place in Oregon, though it also 18050 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY was a partial owner of a prayer house in Springfield, Missouri, and conducted some activities there and abroad. AHIF-Oregon is not the only organization with the name “Al Haramain Islamic Foundation.” At the time of its incorporation, organizations with that name existed in dozens of other countries. One of the largest, if not the largest, was AHIFSaudi Arabia, which had an annual budget of between $30 million and $80 million. Like AHIF-Oregon, AHIF-Saudi Arabia described itself as a charitable organization. AHIFSaudi Arabia dissolved in June 2004. The two organizations, AHIF-Oregon and AHIF-Saudi Arabia, shared some leaders in common. In particular, Saudi nationals Aqeel Al-Aqil and Soliman Al-Buthe1 both held leadership roles in the two organizations. Al-Aqil founded AHIF-Saudi Arabia and reportedly led that organization during much of its existence. He also founded AHIF-Oregon, along with Al-Buthe and two other persons, and served as president of that organization until he resigned in March 2003. Al-Buthe was a senior official of AHIF-Saudi Arabia, where he was primarily responsible for its internet and charitable works in the United States. Al-Buthe resigned from AHIF-Saudi Arabia in September 2002. Like Al-Aqil, AlButhe was a founding member of the board of directors of AHIF-Oregon. Unlike Al-Aqil, Al-Buthe has not resigned from AHIF-Oregon; Al-Buthe maintains a position on the board to this day. Shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, President Bush exercised his authority under the IEEPA by issuing EO 13,224. 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). Under the IEEPA, the President may, in specified ways, “deal with any 1 The names of some persons mentioned in this opinion have several alternate spellings. Consistent with the parties’ and the district court’s treatment, we use only one spelling. When quoting documents, we have substituted the chosen spelling without notation. AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18051 unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). Relevant here, the President may (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States[.] Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B). A person who violates the IEEPA is subject to civil penalties and, for willful violations, criminal penalties, including a fine up to $1 million and imprisonment for up to 20 years. Id. § 1705.2 2 The IEEPA also authorizes the President to issue regulations. 50 U.S.C. § 1704. Pursuant to that authority, OFAC has issued regulations governing blocked property. 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.801-.808. With one exception at section 501.807, the regulations do not describe the designation process or appeals from designations. Section 501.807 states that “[a] person may seek administrative reconsideration of his, her or its designation . . . or assert that the circumstances resulting in the designation no longer apply, and thus seek to have the designation rescinded.” The regulation states that OFAC will review all submitted information and “may request clarifying, corroborating, or other additional information.” Id. § 501.807(b). “A blocked person seeking unblocking . . . may request a meeting” with OFAC, but “such meetings are not required,” and OFAC may decline such a request “at its discretion.” Id. § 501.807(c). “After [OFAC] has conducted a review of the request for reconsideration, it will provide a written decision to the blocked person.” Id. § 501.807(d). The regulation provides no time frame for OFAC’s decision on reconsideration. 18052 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY In the Executive Order, the President declared that the “September 11, 2001, acts . . . constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” EO 13,224 pmbl. The Order “blocked” “all property and interests in property” of 27 persons designated by the Order, and it delegated to the specified agency head the authority to designate other persons with substantial connections to terrorist activities and organizations. Id. § 1. Specifically, Section 1 of the Order states that all property and interests in property of the following persons that are in the United States or that hereafter come within the United States, or that hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons are blocked: (a) foreign persons listed in the Annex to this order; (b) foreign persons determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States; (c) persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of those persons listed in the Annex to this order or those persons determined to be subject to subsection 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d)(i) of this order; (d) except as provided in section 5 of this order and after such consultation, if any, with foreign authorities as the Secretary of State, in consultation AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18053 with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, deems appropriate in the exercise of [her] discretion, persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General; (i) to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed in the Annex to this order or determined to be subject to this order; or (ii) to be otherwise associated with those persons listed in the Annex to this order or those persons determined to be subject to subsection 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d)(i) of this order. The 27 persons and entities specifically listed in the Annex did not include Al-Aqil, Al-Buthe, or any AHIF organization.3 Id. at annex. In the years following the issuance of EO 13,224, OFAC periodically designated new persons and entities.4 Relevant here, by February 1, 2004, OFAC had designated AHIF organizations in six countries: Somalia, Bosnia, Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Pakistan. But OFAC had not designated AHIFOregon, AHIF-Saudi Arabia, or any AHIF organization other than those six in the countries just listed. On February 18, 2004, federal and state officials executed 3 In 2002, President Bush amended EO 13,224 to add one entity and one person, neither of which relates to this case. Exec. Order No. 13,268, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,751 (July 2, 2002). 4 For simplicity, we will refer to persons and entities designated by the President or OFAC under EO 13,224 as “designated persons” or “designated entities.” We intend these terms to have the same meaning as the phrase “specially designated global terrorists.” 18054 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY a search warrant at AHIF-Oregon’s Ashland office. The search warrant concerned investigations into possible criminal violations of tax, banking, and money-laundering laws. Agents found, among other things, photographs and other documents related to violence in Chechnya. The next day, February 19, 2004, OFAC issued a press release stating that it had blocked AHIF-Oregon’s assets pending an investigation concerning the potential designation of AHIF-Oregon under EO 13,224.5 The press release did not state reasons for the investigation. OFAC did not provide prior notice to AHIF-Oregon before blocking its assets, and OFAC did not obtain a warrant to block the assets. In the months following that press release, OFAC and AHIF-Oregon exchanged voluminous documents on a range of topics. At the request of OFAC, AHIF-Oregon submitted a copy of a Koran that AHIF-Oregon previously had distributed to prisoners and others. The Koran was the only item specifically requested by OFAC. The bulk of the exchange concerned AHIF-Oregon’s possible connections to Chechen terrorism in Russia. The dispute centers on a donation in 2000 by AHIF-Oregon to AHIFSaudi Arabia of more than $150,000. AHIF-Oregon concedes that it made the donation but strenuously argues that it was intended to be used, and in fact was used, for humanitarian relief in Chechnya. The donation originated from an Egyptian national who apparently wished to funnel the money through AHIF-Oregon. AHIF-Oregon received the funds and then transferred them to AHIF-Saudi Arabia. 5 The government states that approximately $20,310 of AHIF-Oregon’s assets have been blocked, but AHIF-Oregon counters that that figure does not include $440,000 in proceeds from the sale of the Ashland property. We need not resolve those competing claims; the amount of blocked assets is not material to the issues on appeal. AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18055 In June 2004, while OFAC’s investigation of AHIF-Oregon continued, two important events occurred. First, AHIF-Saudi Arabia dissolved. OFAC had not designated AHIF-Saudi Arabia under EO 13,224 or otherwise as a terrorist organization. Second, OFAC designated Al-Aqil as a specially designated global terrorist. At the time, though, Al-Aqil no longer had an official connection to AHIF-Oregon; he had resigned from AHIF-Oregon’s board in March 2003. On September 9, 2004, OFAC issued a press release declaring that it had designated AHIF-Oregon. The press release also stated that OFAC had designated Al-Buthe, even though OFAC had not advised Al-Buthe of any investigation of him. The press release read, in part: The investigation shows direct links between the U.S. branch and Usama bin Laden. In addition, the affidavit alleges the U.S. branch of [AHIF] criminally violated tax laws and engaged in other money laundering offenses. Information shows that individuals associated with the branch tried to conceal the movement of funds intended for Chechnya by omitting them from tax returns and mischaracterizing their use, which they claimed was for the purchase of a prayer house in Springfield, Missouri. Other information available to the U.S. shows that funds that were donated to [AHIF-Oregon] with the intention of supporting Chechen refugees were diverted to support mujahideen, as well as Chechen leaders affiliated with the al Qaida network. One week later, on September 16, 2004, OFAC sent a letter to AHIF-Oregon entitled “BLOCKING NOTICE.” The letter provided: “You are hereby notified that pursuant to [Executive Order No. 13,224] and under the authorities granted by IEEPA, OFAC has determined that [AHIF-Oregon] is an entity that falls within the criteria for designation set forth in 18056 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY the Order at § 1(c), (d). Accordingly, [AHIF-Oregon] is hereby designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to the Order.” The letter described the legal consequences of the designation, including the blocking of all assets, and warned the organization of the civil and criminal penalties for violations of the IEEPA. The letter concluded that AHIF-Oregon could request administrative reconsideration pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 501.807. In early 2005, AHIF-Oregon submitted additional documents for the administrative record and requested administrative reconsideration. In the letter, AHIF-Oregon asserted that it had no connection to terrorism and provided a detailed explanation concerning certain subjects, including the Chechen donation. In the many months following its request for administrative reconsideration, AHIF-Oregon repeatedly sought both an explanation for the designation and a final determination of its request for administrative reconsideration. Like AHIF-Oregon, Al-Buthe requested administrative reconsideration of OFAC’s designation of him. Having received no response to its 2005 request for administrative reconsideration, AHIF-Oregon filed this action in August 2007. AHIF-Oregon brought a substantive challenge to the designation and several procedural challenges. As to the latter, AHIF-Oregon argued that OFAC’s use of classified information violated its due process rights, that OFAC’s refusal to provide reasons for the investigation and designation violated its due process rights, and that OFAC’s failure to obtain a warrant before seizing its assets violated the Fourth Amendment. Three months after AHIF-Oregon filed its complaint, in November 2007, OFAC sent a letter to AHIF-Oregon and AlButhe notifying them of OFAC’s provisional intent to “redesignate” them and offering a final chance to submit documentation. The parties again exchanged many documents, AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18057 including nearly 1,000 pages of material submitted by AHIFOregon. On February 6, 2008, OFAC sent AHIF-Oregon and AlButhe a letter stating that, “after a thorough investigation and review of the evidence in the record regarding AHIF-Oregon and Mr. Al-Buthe, OFAC has determined that AHIF-Oregon and Mr. Al-Buthe continue to meet the criteria for designation.” The letter specified three reasons for redesignating AHIF-Oregon: “(1) being owned or controlled by [designated persons] Aqeel Al-Aqil and Al-Buthe, (2) acting for or on behalf of [designated persons] Al-Aqil and Al-Buthe, and (3) supporting and operating as a branch office of AHIF, an international charity that employed its branch offices to provide financial, material, and other services and support to al Qaida and other [designated persons].” In a memorandum dated the same day, OFAC explained, in more detail, its reasons for redesignating AHIF-Oregon. Much of the document is redacted, but its unredacted conclusions are the same as the ones stated in the letter: AH[I]F-Oregon should be determined to be subject to Executive Order 13,224 for the following reasons:  AH[I]F-Oregon has been owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of AlAqil;  AH[I]F-Oregon has been owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of Al-Buthe;  As a branch of the Saudi charity Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, AH[I]F-Oregon has acted for or on behalf of, or has assisted in, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of Al Qaida and other [designated persons]. (Emphasis omitted.) Four months later, on June 19, 2008, OFAC designated “the world-wide organization of AHIF.” 18058 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY In this action, the district court granted summary judgment to OFAC on all of AHIF-Oregon’s claims. The court held that substantial evidence did not support OFAC’s determination that Al-Aqil owned or controlled AHIF-Oregon at the time of redesignation. But the court found that substantial evidence did support OFAC’s other two reasons: that Al-Buthe owned or controlled AHIF-Oregon and that AHIF-Oregon supported designated persons as a branch office of AHIF-Saudi Arabia. With respect to the procedural challenges, the district court rejected AHIF-Oregon’s argument that OFAC cannot rely on classified information in making its designation determinations. The district court next held that OFAC violated AHIFOregon’s procedural due process rights by failing to provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. But the district court held that the violation was harmless because, even if AHIF-Oregon properly had been informed of OFAC’s reasons for suspicion, AHIF-Oregon could not have avoided the redesignation. Finally, the district court held that the blocking of assets is a “seizure” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. But the court held that OFAC’s actions fell within the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement. The second named plaintiff in this action is Multicultural Association of Southern Oregon (“MCASO”). MCASO describes itself as “an Oregon public benefit corporation with members, incorporated in 1995 and operating in Medford, [Oregon, as] a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization.” “MCASO’s objectives include serving as a catalyst in the southern Oregon community to promote understanding and appreciation between cultures in order to reduce racism, promote and support multicultural education, and provide forums for problem solving related to intercultural differences.” Before the designation of AHIF-Oregon, MCASO had co-sponsored events with AHIF-Oregon. MCASO alleged that it would continue to co-sponsor events and conduct other activities in coordination with AHIF-Oregon, were it not for AHIF-Oregon’s designation. MCASO asserts that EO 13,224 and its implementing AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18059 regulations are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and that they violate MCASO’s First and Fifth Amendment rights by prohibiting it from working with AHIF-Oregon.6 With one exception concerning a claim not before us on appeal,7 the district court rejected MCASO’s claims and granted summary judgment to OFAC. AHIF-Oregon and MCASO timely appeal. STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review de novo the district court’s decision on crossmotions for summary judgment. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2011). “We review de novo questions of law, including constitutional rulings, resolved on summary judgment.” Nader v. Cronin, 620 F.3d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1844 (2011). We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2010). The judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), govern challenges to OFAC’s designation decisions. See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496-97 & n.18 (2004) (holding that, when considering an agency action as to which the statute does not specify the standard of review, the courts of appeals must proceed pursuant to the APA’s general standard of review for agency actions in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)); see also Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation’s application); accord Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Accordingly, we may set aside OFAC’s designation only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, 6 AHIF-Oregon also joins in these causes of action but, for simplicity, we refer to these claims as MCASO’s claims. 7 The government originally cross-appealed but soon after filed a motion to dismiss the cross-appeal, which we granted. 18060 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under that standard, we review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Alaska Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 424 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2005). DISCUSSION A. Substantive Challenge to the Redesignation OFAC supported its 2008 redesignation of AHIF-Oregon on three grounds: (1) that AHIF-Oregon is owned or controlled by Al-Aqil; (2) that AHIF-Oregon is owned or controlled by Al-Buthe; and (3) that AHIF-Oregon provided support to al Qaida and other designated persons as a branch office of AHIF-Saudi Arabia. AHIF-Oregon argues under the APA that substantial evidence does not support those reasons. Like the district court, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the last two reasons, but not the first. We address them in turn, below. Before doing so, however, we note that AHIF-Oregon also describes its APA challenge in two other ways. First, AHIFOregon argues that OFAC reached its decision without affording AHIF-Oregon a meaningful opportunity to respond and thus violated the APA. We occasionally have held that an agency’s prejudicial procedural failure violates the APA and, accordingly, have remanded to the agency for reconsideration. See, e.g., Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 288 n.4 (1974)). But the genesis of that rule appears to be the Due Process Clause, rather than a separate statutory grant of procedural rights. See Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 288 n.4 (“Indeed, the Due Process Clause forbids an agency to use evidence in a way that forecloses an opportunity to offer a contrary presentation.”). In any event, AHIFOregon does not argue with any specificity that its procedural objections under the APA are any different from its identical AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18061 objections under the Due Process Clause. We address its due process claim concerning inadequate notice in Part B-2, below. Second, AHIF-Oregon argues that OFAC lacked “authorization” to redesignate AHIF-Oregon. We disagree. The regulations clearly contemplate administrative reconsideration, 31 C.F.R. § 501.807; indeed, OFAC issued its redesignation decision at AHIF-Oregon’s specific request under the regulations. Just as OFAC has authority to designate an entity, it likewise has the authority to respond to that entity’s request for reconsideration, including with updated reasons. It appears that AHIF-Oregon’s primary point is that OFAC’s 2008 reasons actually are a post-hoc rationalization for its original 2004 designation and that AHIF-Oregon had no earlier notice of the reasons OFAC eventually gave in 2008. As with the previous argument, we see no difference between this argument and AHIF-Oregon’s procedural due process claim concerning inadequate notice, which we analyze below, in Part B-2. We turn, then, to our review of OFAC’s three stated reasons and assess whether substantial evidence supports its designation of AHIF-Oregon as a specially designated global terrorist. 1. Ownership or Control by Al-Aqil  Al-Aqil was a founding member of AHIF-Oregon. The organization’s 2001 tax return described Al-Aqil as the organization’s president. But he resigned from AHIF-Oregon’s board in March 2003. OFAC did not take any action against AHIF-Oregon until almost a year later, in February 2004, when it provisionally blocked its funds pending investigation. Having reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that “[t]here is no evidence Al-Aqil was involved with AHIFOregon after his resignation, or at the time AHIF-Oregon was designated.” 18062 2. AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY Ownership or Control by Al-Buthe  Al-Buthe is a designated person. Al-Buthe exercises control over AHIF-Oregon because he is on its board of directors. EO 13,224 authorizes the designation of an entity that is controlled by a designated person. EO 13,224, § 1(c). It is, therefore, a valid reason to designate AHIF-Oregon based on Al-Buthe’s control. We agree with the district court that substantial evidence supports this reason. AHIF-Oregon makes only two counterarguments. Neither persuades us. First, AHIF-Oregon asserts that Al-Buthe’s designation—an undisputed fact—is “unfounded.” But AlButhe did not join this action as a plaintiff or intervenor. Whether Al-Buthe’s designation is supported by substantial evidence is simply not before us. A plaintiff cannot collaterally attack the designation of a third party. In short, AHIFOregon knowingly retained (and continues to retain) a designated person on its board of directors. Second, AHIF-Oregon argues that, because OFAC gave no reasons for designating Al-Buthe in 2004, AHIF-Oregon and Al-Buthe reasonably assumed that he was designated not for an independent reason germane to him, but because of his connection to AHIF-Oregon. Al-Buthe asserted in a declaration, filed in the district court, that he would have resigned from the board had he known that the taint flowed from him to AHIF-Oregon, rather than vice versa. That argument, however, does not challenge the evidence in the administrative record, on which the agency made its decision, and on which we must conduct our review. The evidence in the administrative record demonstrates that Al-Buthe controlled AHIF-Oregon. To the extent that AHIF-Oregon argues that OFAC violated Al-Buthe’s procedural rights, that issue is not before us because, as noted, Al-Buthe is not a party to this action. To the extent that AHIF-Oregon argues that OFAC violated AHIF-Oregon’s own procedural rights, AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18063 that argument is best viewed as part of the procedural due process claim concerning inadequate notice, discussed in Part B-2, below. Moreover, to the extent that we could consider evidence beyond the administrative record, such as Al-Buthe’s declaration, it remains true that Al-Buthe did not, in fact, resign after the 2008 redesignation and, so far as the record demonstrates, remains a board member of AHIF-Oregon. AHIF-Oregon now has kept on its board of directors a designated person for more than five years, two years since it has known OFAC’s reasoning, and that designated person has not challenged OFAC’s designation before this court. AHIF-Oregon is “controlled by” a designated person. EO 13,224 § 1(c). There is no basis to set aside the agency action. 3. Support of Al Qaida and Other Designated Persons as a Branch Office of AHIF-Saudi Arabia  OFAC asserts that AHIF-Oregon is a branch office of AHIF-Saudi Arabia and that AHIF-Saudi Arabia, through its other branches and perhaps directly, supported designated persons. We have no trouble concluding that substantial evidence supports OFAC’s determination that AHIF-Oregon is a branch office of AHIF-Saudi Arabia and of the worldwide network of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation. One obvious connection is that AHIF-Oregon chose its name to parallel the Saudi Arabian organization’s name and the names of other branches. Additionally, three out of four founding members of AHIF-Oregon were senior officials of AHIF-Saudi Arabia. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency (IARA-USA) v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“An entity’s ‘genesis and history’ may properly be considered by OFAC in making the designation or blocking, at least where the ties have not been severed.” (quoting Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 162)). Moreover, several documents in the record demonstrate that, at times at least, AHIF-Oregon described itself to others as a branch office of the larger AHIF organization. Before us, AHIF- 18064 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY Oregon strenuously objects to OFAC’s characterization of it as a “branch office” but, given the deferential standard of review and the evidence just described, we are unmoved. Substantial evidence supports OFAC’s determination that AHIFOregon is a “branch office” of the larger AHIF organization. The next question is whether, on this record, the larger AHIF organization provided support for al Qaida or other designated persons. That is, the strong connection between AHIF-Oregon and AHIF-Saudi Arabia does not, by itself, establish OFAC’s third reason. At the time of AHIF-Oregon’s designation and redesignation, OFAC had designated several separate AHIF entities, but it had not designated AHIF-Saudi Arabia or some of the additional AHIF branches that were designated later. OFAC argues that the various designated branches of the global AHIF organization formed a loose, mutually supportive network such that the designation of other branches substantiates the designation of AHIF-Oregon.  In addition, OFAC directs us to evidence in the unclassified record of two events that occurred in 1999: AHIFOregon provided direct financial support to AHIF-Albania, allegedly to abet terrorist activities in Kosovo; and AHIFOregon funneled a large donation to AHIF-Saudi Arabia, allegedly to abet terrorist activities in Chechnya. Although AHIF-Oregon claims that the funds were meant to be used, and in fact were used, for humanitarian efforts and not terrorist activities, it does acknowledge the underlying facts of those financial transactions. Of course, in 1999, there were no designated persons under EO 13,224 because the President did not issue that Order until 2001. As we just observed, though, in making a decision whether to designate, OFAC may consider the origin and history of an entity, at least when the historical ties have not been severed. IARA-USA, 477 F.3d at 734. And we note that, AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18065 when OFAC designated AHIF-Oregon, it already had designated AHIF-Albania.  In summary, the evidence in the unclassified record supports OFAC’s contentions that AHIF-Oregon is a branch office of an international network of entities that, together, form the global AHIF organization and that AHIF-Oregon has ties to other branches, including at least one designated entity. As did the District of Columbia Circuit, “[w]e acknowledge that the unclassified record evidence is not overwhelming, but we reiterate that our review—in an area at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law—is extremely deferential.” Id. Additionally, we have reviewed the classified record. In light of all the evidence in the record, we conclude confidently that substantial evidence supports OFAC’s conclusion that AHIF-Oregon supported designated persons as a branch office of AHIF-Saudi Arabia. See EO 13,224 § 1(d)(i) (permitting designation of an entity that provides “financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of,” designated persons).  Because substantial evidence supports two of OFAC’s three reasons for redesignating AHIF-Oregon under EO 13,224, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to OFAC on AHIF-Oregon’s substantive claims. B. Procedural Due Process Challenges  AHIF-Oregon argues that OFAC violated its procedural due process rights by using classified information without any disclosure of its content and by failing to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. We apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 329 F.3d 700, 709 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, for procedural due process claims, the Mathews test is “a general test that applies in all but a few 18066 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY contexts”); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying the Mathews test in a similar context); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (ADC), 70 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29 (2004) (plurality) (holding that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a person’s due process rights is the Mathews balancing test). Under the Mathews balancing test, we “must weigh (1) [the person’s or entity’s] private property interest, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, and (3) the Government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of additional procedural requirements.” Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35).  There are strong interests on both sides of the scale, generally encapsulated in the first and third Mathews factors. The private party’s property interest is significant. By design, a designation by OFAC completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity. All assets are frozen. No person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with the entity, other than a very narrow category of actions such as legal defense. Civil penalties attach even for unwitting violations. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b). Criminal penalties, including up to 20 years’ imprisonment, attach for willful violations. Id. § 1705(c). For domestic organizations such as AHIF-Oregon, a designation means that it conducts no business at all. The designation is indefinite. Although an entity can seek administrative reconsideration and limited judicial relief, those remedies take considerable time, as evidenced by OFAC’s long administrative delay in this case and the ordinary delays inherent in our judicial system. In sum, designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct. AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18067 On the other side of the scale, the government’s interest in national security cannot be understated. We owe unique deference to the executive branch’s determination that we face “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security” of the United States. EO 13,224 pmbl. It is beyond dispute that “the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010). Striking a balance between those two strong competing interests cannot be done in the abstract. As the Mathews balancing test makes clear, we must carefully assess the precise “procedures used” by the government, “the value of additional safeguards,” and “the burdens of additional procedural requirements.” Foss, 161 F.3d at 589 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35). As explained in more detail below, the Constitution certainly does not require that the government take actions that would endanger national security; nor does it require the government to undertake every possible effort to mitigate the risk of erroneous deprivation and the potential harm to the private party. But the Constitution does require that the government take reasonable measures to ensure basic fairness to the private party and that the government follow procedures reasonably designed to protect against erroneous deprivation of the private party’s interests. 1. OFAC’s Use of Classified Information AHIF-Oregon argues that OFAC’s use of classified information violates its procedural due process rights. The first two Mathews factors support AHIF-Oregon’s position. As noted above, its private interests are significant. And, as we have held previously with respect to the use of classified information without disclosure: “One would be hard pressed to design a procedure more likely to result in erroneous deprivations.” ADC, 70 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he very foundation of the adversary process assumes that use of undisclosed information will violate due process 18068 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY because of the risk of error.” Id. But the third Mathews factor —the government’s interest in maintaining national security —supports OFAC’s position.  Given the extreme importance of maintaining national security, we cannot accept AHIF-Oregon’s most sweeping argument—that OFAC is not entitled to use classified information in making its designation determination. See generally Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1905 (2011) (“[P]rotecting our national security sometimes requires keeping information about our military, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts secret.”). In AHIF-Oregon’s view, if classified information concerning national security demonstrates that an entity is supporting terrorism, OFAC either must decline to designate the entity or must reveal the classified information to the entity that OFAC believes supports terrorist activities. Common sense dictates that AHIF-Oregon is overreaching. Not surprisingly, all federal courts to have considered this argument have rejected it. Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 164; Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts II), 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D.D.C. 2008); see also NCORI, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding that, in a designation of a “foreign terrorist organization” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the government’s use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organization’s due process rights); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (following NCORI and describing in detail its holding on this point); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that, in a military criminal trial, the government’s use of classified information, without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information, did not violate the defendant’s due process rights); cf. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18069 dismissal of an action because of the state secrets doctrine in a case involving classified information), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); IARA-USA, 477 F.3d 728 (rejecting a challenge that the agency failed to comply with its regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 17.17(a)(1), which required the agency to determine which portions of the classified record “can be declassified”). The only case that could be read to yield the contrary conclusion is our decision in ADC, 70 F.3d 1045. There, the government used classified information in summary proceedings to exclude certain long-time resident aliens. Id. at 1052-54. The aliens brought suit, alleging that the use of classified information violated their due process rights. Id. at 1054. The district court, after viewing the classified information ex parte and in camera, agreed. Id. Applying the Mathews balancing test, we affirmed. ADC, 70 F.3d at 1068-70. We found that the first two factors strongly favored the plaintiffs. And, under the facts of that case, we held that the government’s claims of national security were “insufficient to tip the Mathews scale towards the Government.” Id. at 1070. We reached that conclusion because of the content of the classified information. Specifically, the government had argued that the aliens threatened national security, but the classified information contained nothing about the aliens themselves; the classified information demonstrated only that the aliens were nominal members of a foreign organization that had engaged in terrorist activities. Id. at 1069-70. Notably, we stated that “[t]hese aliens have been free since the beginning of this litigation almost eight years ago, without criminal charges being brought against them for their activities. . . . [The classified evidence] does not indicate that either alien has personally advocated those [impermissible] doctrines or has participated in terrorist activities.” Id. at 1070. We concluded that the use of classified information “should be presumptively unconstitutional. Only the most extraordinary circumstances could support onesided process.” Id. Because extraordinary circumstances did 18070 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY not exist in that case, the use of the classified information was impermissible. Id.  AHIF-Oregon argues that ADC is directly on point and “controls here.” AHIF-Oregon is mistaken. We did not hold that classified information can never be used. Instead, we held that such use is “presumptively unconstitutional” subject to the government’s overcoming the presumption in “the most extraordinary circumstances.” Id. Even assuming that the standard enunciated in ADC remains good law,8 the use of classified information in the fight against terrorism, during a presidentially declared “national emergency,” qualifies as sufficiently “extraordinary” to overcome the presumption.9 See EO 13,224 pmbl. (“[The] September 11, 2001, acts . . . consti8 We express some hesitation about the continuing vitality of ADC, especially in light of its premise that “a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.” 70 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we recently explained at great length sitting en banc, that premise does not hold, at least in some contexts. Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1077 (“One [form of the state secrets doctrine] completely bars adjudication of claims premised on state secrets . . . ; the other is an evidentiary privilege . . . that excludes privileged evidence from the case and may result in dismissal of the claims.” (emphasis omitted)); cf. Gen. Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. at 1905 (“[P]rotecting our national security sometimes requires keeping information about our military, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts secret.”). Because we distinguish ADC, we need not decide whether ADC remains valid precedent. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining when a three-judge panel may conclude that an earlier precedent has been fatally undermined). 9 Additionally, our determination in ADC that the government could not use the classified information depended on the content of the classified information itself, which the district court had viewed in camera and ex parte. It is clear from our analysis in ADC that, had the classified information demonstrated that the plaintiff-aliens had, in fact, engaged in terrorism, then the government’s reliance on the information would have been permissible. In other words, our decision appears to have agreed with the premise that the government may use classified information without disclosure, if that information truly implicates national security. Here, the classified information implicates national security. AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18071 tute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States . . . .”). In sum, we join all other courts to have addressed the issue in holding that, subject to the limitations discussed below, the government may use classified information, without disclosure, when making designation determinations. AHIF-Oregon’s more nuanced argument, however, presents a different question. AHIF-Oregon argues that, even if OFAC may use classified information, it must undertake some reasonable measure to mitigate the potential unfairness to AHIF-Oregon. AHIF-Oregon proffers that OFAC could, for example, provide an unclassified summary of the classified information or permit AHIF-Oregon’s lawyer to view the documents after receiving a security clearance and pursuant to a protective order. In essence, AHIF-Oregon argues that, to the extent possible, OFAC must take reasonable measures that do not implicate national security and impose only a small burden on the agency.  Under the Mathews test, we must consider “the value of additional safeguards” against the risk of error and “the burdens of additional procedural requirements.” Foss, 161 F.3d at 589. The value of AHIF-Oregon’s suggested methods seems clear. Without disclosure of classified information, the designated entity cannot possibly know how to respond to OFAC’s concerns. Without knowledge of a charge, even simple factual errors may go uncorrected despite potentially easy, ready, and persuasive explanations. To the extent that an unclassified summary could provide helpful information, such as the subject matter of the agency’s concerns, and to the extent that it is feasible to permit a lawyer with security clearance to view the classified information, the value of those methods seems undeniable. Indeed, the benefits from such disclosure could flow not only to the designated entity, which may be able to clear up errors, but also to OFAC, which may benefit from the resulting information provided by the designated entity. 18072 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY We find significant that there may be means of providing information to the potential designee that do not implicate national security. For example, an unclassified summary, by definition, does not implicate national security because it is unclassified. Similarly, a lawyer for the designated entity who has the appropriate security clearance also does not implicate national security when viewing the classified material because, by definition, he or she has the appropriate security clearance.10  We recognize that disclosure may not always be possible. For example, an unclassified summary may not be possible because, in some cases, the subject matter itself may be classified and cannot be revealed without implicating national security. Depending on the circumstances, OFAC might have a legitimate interest in shielding the materials even from someone with the appropriate security clearance. See Ott, 827 F.2d at 477 (holding, in a different context, that “Congress has a legitimate interest in authorizing the Attorney General to invoke procedures designed to ensure that sensitive security information is not unnecessarily disseminated to anyone not involved in the surveillance operation in question, whether or not she happens for unrelated reasons to enjoy security clearance”); see also Gen. Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. at 1904 (noting that disclosure of sensitive information to a limited number of lawyers led to “unauthorized disclosure of military secrets”). In many cases, though, some information could be summarized or presented to a lawyer with a security clearance without implicating national security. 10 We recognize that the utility of the methods described in text may be limited. For example, the information conveyed by an unclassified summary will be decidedly less helpful to the entity than the classified information itself. But limited utility is very different from no utility. An unclassified summary is analogous to privilege logs in the context of discovery disputes, yet their use is routine. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5); see also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that, on a motion for attorney fees, the requesting party must disclose its time sheets to the other party, redacted as necessary where protected by the attorney-client privilege). AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18073 Indeed, OFAC has not defended its failure to provide an unclassified summary or access by a lawyer with the proper security clearance on the ground that any such measure would have implicated national security. Instead, OFAC asserts that any mechanism would be unduly burdensome. OFAC points to the large number of designated persons and argues that any of the proposed measures could overwhelm the agency, diminishing its ability to carry out its important mission of protecting national security. We acknowledge the agency’s abstract concerns but find that they have little practical reality. Here, for instance, OFAC eventually presented a list of unclassified reasons to AHIFOregon, which could have been augmented by a short unclassified summary of classified evidence. The small expenditure in time and resources would not outweigh the entity’s interest in knowing the charges and evidence against it. In fact, OFAC has provided just such a summary in a different case. See KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner (KindHearts I), 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (noting that OFAC had provided “an unclassified threepage summary of the classified evidence” to the entity under investigation).  We understand from the parties that many (and likely most) of the designated persons are not United States citizens or entities. That conclusion is unsurprising given that EO 13,224 primarily targets “foreign persons.”11 Many of those persons likely cannot assert the due process protections that are available to AHIF-Oregon, a United States entity. See NCORI, 251 F.3d at 201 (holding that “a foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional 11 Compare EO 13,224, § 1(a), (b) (blocking the assets of “foreign persons listed in the Annex” and “foreign persons” listed in the future that meet certain requirements), with id. § 1(c), (d) (blocking the assets of “persons” listed in the future, provided that certain other, more onerous requirements are met). 18074 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY rights, under the Due Process Clause or otherwise” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the “significant” “distinction” between those aliens who have entered the United States and those who have not: “Aliens standing on the threshold of entry are not entitled to the constitutional protections provided to those within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). So far as we can tell from the record in this case, very few designated persons respond to OFAC at all, let alone with requests for mitigation measures concerning classified information. In any event, if OFAC becomes inundated by mitigation requests in the future, the agency properly can raise that issue before the appropriate court. For purposes of this case, we hold that the small burden on the agency of providing mitigation measures does not outweigh the potential value to AHIF-Oregon. OFAC’s failure to pursue potential mitigation measures violated AHIF-Oregon’s due process rights.  We note that we are not the first court to reach this conclusion. In KindHearts II, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 657-60, the district court surveyed the sparse case law on this topic and, having viewed the material in camera, concluded that, in the circumstances of that case, the government must “expeditiously declassify and/or summarize” its classified information and that, “[i]f declassification or summarization of classified information is insufficient or impossible,” the government must permit a lawyer for the plaintiff to view the classified information under a protective order. We agree that a case-by-case approach is proper. As we have alluded to earlier, the proper measures in any given case will depend on a number of factors. We expect the agency (and, if necessary, the district court) to consider, at a minimum, the nature and extent of the classified information, the nature and extent of the threat to national security, and the possible avenues available to allow the designated person to respond more effectively to the charges. AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 2. 18075 Adequate Notice and Meaningful Opportunity to Respond AHIF-Oregon argues that OFAC violated its due process rights by failing to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond to OFAC’s designation and redesignation determinations. Specifically, AHIF-Oregon asserts that OFAC refused to disclose its reasons for investigating and designating AHIF-Oregon, leaving AHIF-Oregon unable to respond adequately to the agency’s unknown suspicions. “Due process requires notice ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378 (2010) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). “ ‘Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (brackets omitted) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). Once again, the Mathews balancing test applies. Foss, 161 F.3d at 589. At the outset, we note that AHIF-Oregon wisely does not challenge OFAC’s decision not to provide pre-deprivation notice. As the district court noted, and as many courts have held, the potential for “asset flight” almost certainly justifies OFAC’s decision not to provide notice before freezing the assets. See Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 163-64; Global Relief, 315 F.3d at 754. Instead, AHIF-Oregon challenges the alleged failure to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond during the four-year period between the freezing of the assets in February 2004 and the redesignation determination in February 2008.12 12 Notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond are, in many circumstances, two different inquiries. Here, however, they are two sides of the same coin. No one disputes that OFAC permitted AHIF-Oregon the 18076 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY In the first seven months, OFAC gave AHIF-Oregon no statement of reasons. OFAC did provide some unclassified documents to AHIF-Oregon and requested that AHIF-Oregon provide a copy of a Koran. But OFAC neither explained the relevance of the documents nor provided a statement of reasons for its investigation. After receiving the documents and request for a copy of a Koran, AHIF-Oregon took a guess at what reasons OFAC might possibly have had in mind. Some of those guesses ended up being correct (the $150,000 check to Chechens), and some of those guesses ended up being incorrect (distribution of Korans). In the entire four-year period, only one document could be viewed as supplying some reasons for OFAC’s investigation and designation decision. Seven months after blocking AHIF-Oregon’s assets, OFAC issued a press release that explained some of OFAC’s reasons for the designation.13 In particular, the press release stated that AHIF-Oregon had provided support to Chechen terrorists and attempted to conceal that activity.  We hold that all three Mathews factors support the conclusion that OFAC violated AHIF-Oregon’s due process rights. First, OFAC’s blocking notice deprived AHIF-Oregon of its ability to use any funds whatsoever, for any purpose. Second, because AHIF-Oregon could only guess (partly opportunity to submit evidence and arguments during the pendency of OFAC’s determinations. The dispute concerns whether OFAC adequately apprised AHIF-Oregon of its reasons for considering designation and redesignation. If there was inadequate notice, then there was an inadequate opportunity to respond. But if there was adequate notice, then there was an adequate opportunity to respond. Although they are both implicated, we refer in text generally to adequate notice because, in the circumstances here, the two inquiries collapse. 13 OFAC also sent a letter to AHIF-Oregon one week after the 2004 press release. But that letter contains no statement of reasons. The letter states that OFAC had designated AHIF-Oregon pursuant to EO 13,224, § 1(c), (d); those provisions contain all the general reasons for which an entity such as AHIF-Oregon may be designated. AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18077 incorrectly) as to the reasons for the investigation, the risk of erroneous deprivation was high. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although national security might justify keeping AHIF-Oregon in the dark, OFAC makes no effort to demonstrate that its failure to provide AHIF-Oregon with reasons for its investigation promoted national security. OFAC presents three different arguments to justify its failure to provide a statement of reasons. First, OFAC argues that its September 2004 press release constituted sufficient notice. We agree with OFAC that the press release states with some clarity that AHIF-Oregon supported Chechen terrorists (the third reason given in the 2008 redesignation notice). OFAC also claims that there was sufficient information in the press release to apprise AHIF-Oregon of OFAC’s concern about control by Al-Aqil and Al-Buthe (the first and second reasons given in the 2008 redesignation notice). But, as the district court correctly pointed out, the press release stated nothing about ownership or control of AHIF-Oregon. OFAC provided notice concerning only one of three reasons for its investigation and designation, and that notice occurred seven months after it froze AHIF-Oregon’s assets. Such a significantly untimely and incomplete notice does not meet the requirements of due process. Second, OFAC argues that it was impractical to provide reasons to AHIF-Oregon during the four-year investigation. We are unpersuaded for many of the same reasons, just discussed, concerning OFAC’s failure to provide mitigation measures regarding the classified information. It is clear that OFAC had its reasons for investigating AHIF-Oregon (otherwise its investigation would be unjustified), so the summary of those reasons would not present a practical burden. Moreover, as discussed above, it appears that very few of the entities under investigation request a statement of reasons or are even entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause. 18078 AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY We can envision situations in which OFAC acts so quickly between the original deprivation and its decision to designate that it may be impractical to provide a statement of reasons. But the seven-month period of the original investigation, and certainly the four-year period of the entire redesignation determination, gave OFAC ample time to provide AHIFOregon with, at a minimum, a terse and complete statement of reasons for the investigation. There is no reason why OFAC could not have given notice in this particular case.14 If a notice requirement is unduly burdensome in some future case, OFAC may present that argument to the appropriate court. Finally, OFAC argues that the circumstances of its investigation and the documentation that it submitted to AHIFOregon provided that entity with sufficient information from which AHIF-Oregon could guess OFAC’s reasons. In any event, OFAC asserts, AHIF-Oregon’s guesses proved partly correct. We have rejected that argument in an analogous situation; the opportunity to guess at the factual and legal bases for a government action does not substitute for actual notice of the government’s intentions. In Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1287-91 (9th Cir. 1997), the INS seized motor vehicles from certain aliens and offered only summary process of the aliens’ requests to recover those vehicles. The INS argued, similarly to OFAC here, that nothing required additional process and, in any event, the motor vehicle “owners will frequently have at least a general idea of the factual basis for the seizure.” Id. at 1297. We disagreed and held that the Due Process Clause required the INS “to give sufficient notice concerning the factual and legal bases 14 Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for OFAC disavowed the argument that OFAC could not have given timely notice to AHIF-Oregon in this particular case. See Oral Arg. Transcript at 44:20 (Counsel for OFAC: “Your Honor, I am not arguing—my argument today is not that [OFAC] could not have noticed [AHIF-Oregon]. That is not the argument.”). AL HARAMAIN ISLAMIC v. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 18079