Hedlund v. Ryan, No. 09-99019 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that petitioner's leg restraint was not imposed based on a clearly unreasonable determination of the facts, nor was its imposition contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law; the use of dual juries at trial was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law; the trial court complied with clearly established federal law when it determined no juror bias was present; there was no clearly established law governing implied bias, and petitioner had not shown that implied bias should apply here; the state post-conviction relief court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington during the plea process and during the penalty phase; and the Arizona Supreme court properly applied Lockett v. Ohio, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and their progeny in regards to mitigation evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty. The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging a conviction and capital sentence for murder. The panel held that the district court properly denied relief on petitioner’s claims regarding (1) the use of a visible leg brace, (2) the use of dual juries for petitioner and his co- defendant, (3) juror bias, (4) ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process, (5) consideration of mitigating evidence and the use of an unconstitutional causal nexus test under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase, because the state court decision denying relief was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Judge Wardlaw concurred in part and dissented in part. She explained that, because the relevant state court decisions addressing petitioner’s claim under Eddings, and his ineffective assistance of counsel and shackling claims are unreasonable applications of clearly established Supreme Court precedent and include unreasonable factual determinations, she would reverse and remand this appeal.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on September 4, 2014.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on March 4, 2016.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on April 13, 2017.
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