Andrews v. Davis, No. 09-99012 (9th Cir. 2019)
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The en banc court affirmed the district court's grant of sentencing relief based on petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that petitioner received constitutionally adequate representation at the penalty phase of his trial.
The en banc court held that the only reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and the facts of this case lead to the following conclusions: (1) that counsel failed in their duty to undertake a reasonable investigation at the penalty phase of petitioner's trial; (2) that counsel's choices cannot be rationalized as "strategic" or "tactical;" and (3) that any reasonably competent attorney would have discovered and introduced the substantial and compelling mitigating evidence that existed. The en banc court held that no fair-minded jurist would conclude otherwise. The en banc court also held that the California Supreme Court's conclusion that petitioner suffered no prejudice was objectively unreasonable. Without having heard the substantial and compelling mitigating evidence, the en banc court held that the jury could not fairly gauge petitioner's moral culpability at sentencing.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty. In an appeal and cross-appeal arising from Jesse Andrews’s habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction and death sentence on three counts of murder, the en banc court affirmed the district court’s grant of sentencing relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, dismissed as unripe Andrews’s Eighth Amendment claim challenging California’s lethal-injection protocol, and denied a request to certify for appeal Andrews’s uncertified claims. Regarding the performance prong in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the en banc court held that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in concluding that Andrews received constitutionally adequate counsel at the penalty phase. The en banc court held that the only reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and the facts of this case lead to the following conclusions: (1) that Andrews’s attorneys failed in their duty to undertake a reasonable investigation at the penalty phase; (2) that their choices cannot be rationalized as “strategic” or “tactical;” and (3) that any reasonably competent attorney would have discovered and introduced substantial and compelling mitigating evidence that existed. The en banc court held that no fair-minded jurist would conclude otherwise. Regarding Strickland’s prejudice prong, the en banc court held that the California Supreme Court’s conclusion— ANDREWS V. DAVIS 3 that Andrews suffered no prejudice from the omission of the substantial and compelling evidence that his attorneys should have introduced but didn’t—was objectively unreasonable. The en banc court held that, without having heard the substantial and compelling mitigating evidence, the jury could not fairly gauge Andrews’s moral culpability at sentencing, and that no fair-minded jurist would disagree. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge N.R. Smith, joined by Judges Rawlinson and Owens, wrote that the majority essentially evaluated the merits de novo rather than with the appropriate deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act; and that the California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Andrews was not prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance during sentencing.
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on August 5, 2015.
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