Stancle v. Clay, No. 09-56374 (9th Cir. 2012)
Annotate this CasePetitioner challenged the district court's conclusion that his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). As to statutory tolling, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that petitioner was not entitled to statutory gap tolling for the 44 day period between the denial of his first habeas petition filed in the superior court and the filing of his second petition in that same court, because his second petition was not limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in his first petition. As to equitable tolling, even assuming de novo review, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that petitioner was not entitled to such tolling where he has failed to meet his burden of showing that his "mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance."
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.