Roger Murray v. Schriro, No. 08-99013 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, convicted of two murders and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court concluded that the state court's determination that media coverage was not constitutionally prejudicial was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent; the state court's rejection of petitioner's challenge to the jury venire was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent where the prosecutor provided race-neutral explanations for the exercise of his peremptory challenges against two Hispanic potential jurors; because the Supreme Court has eschewed claims predicated on the unavailability of immaterial evidence, the state court's denial of petitioner's belated request to inspect a sanitized crime scene was also not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent; the evidence did not support petitioner's request for jury instructions on voluntary intoxication and second degree murder and the state court's denial of relief was consistent with Supreme Court precedent; the state court meticulously weighed the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating factors before imposing a death sentence and its determination was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent; the state court's decisions denying relief on the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington; the district court correctly resolved the claims of evidence presented to the state courts; no cognizable Martinez v. Ryan claims were asserted; and the court denied habeas relief as to all claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty. The panel affirmed the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging a conviction and capital sentence for murder. The panel affirmed the denial of relief as to petitioner’s change of venue motion, including petitioner’s contention that there is a heightened obligation to change venue in capital cases, because the state court’s decision—that the substantial media coverage of this “sensational, small-town murder” was not constitutionally prejudicial—was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. The panel affirmed the denial of relief as to petitioner’s claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), because the state court’s decision that the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for exercising peremptory challenges against two Hispanic potential jurors was not contrary or an unreasonable application of Batson. The panel also affirmed the denial of relief as to petitioner’s claim that he was denied due process based on a belated request for access to the sanitized crime scene. The panel affirmed the denial of relief as to petitioner’s request for jury instructions on voluntary intoxication instruction and second degree murder, for lack of supporting evidence, because the state court’s decision was consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The panel held that the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim that the trial court erroneously applied a causal nexus test to evidence that petitioner’s dysfunctional childhood could not be considered as an independent mitigating factor was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. The panel explained that the record reflects that the sentencing court “meticulously” weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors and employed the causal nexus test as a permissible means of weighing the entirety of the mitigating evidence prior to imposing sentence, and any error did not prejudice petitioner. Finally, the panel held that the state court’s denial of relief on petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and did not warrant a remand under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). Petitioner claimed that he was denied his right to counsel due to an irreconcilable conflict, and that counsel was ineffective by sleeping during the trial and by failing to interview a critical witness who would have supported the defense theory that petitioner happened to be in the area where the murders were committed but did not commit them.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on February 14, 2018.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.