Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds, No. 22-3464 (8th Cir. 2024)
Annotate this CaseThe United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in a case concerning a law in Iowa that penalized anyone who, while trespassing, knowingly placed or used a camera or surveillance device on the trespassed property. The law was challenged by five animal-welfare groups who argued that it unconstitutionally punished activity protected by the First Amendment. The lower court agreed with the plaintiffs, ruling that the law was unconstitutional on its face because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's substantial interests. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the part of the law that penalized the use of cameras while trespassing (the "Use Provision"), but not the part penalizing the placement of cameras on trespassed property (the "Place Provision"). The court also disagreed with the lower court's conclusion that the law was unconstitutional, holding that it survived intermediate scrutiny against a facial challenge and was not unconstitutionally overbroad, as it did not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Court Description: [Grasz, Author, with Colloton and Kobes, Circuit Judges] Civil case - Constitutional law (First Amendment). Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Iowa Code Sec. 727.8A, a trespass-surveillance law penalizing anyone who, while trespassing knowingly places or uses a camera or electronic surveillance device to record or transmit images or data while the device is on the trespassed property. The district court concluded plaintiffs, five animal-welfare groups, had standing, that the case was ripe, and that the statute was unconstitutional on its face because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's substantial interests; the court permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute, and the State defendants appeal. The statute separately punishes placement and use of a camera or recording device, and the court would separately examine plaintiffs' standing on both the placement and use provisions; plaintiffs met the standing requirement under the use provision as they have an arguable constitutional interest in recording themselves, and the use provision's steep penalties chill their speech, thereby creating an injury in fact; additionally, a favorable decision would likely redress plaintiffs' injuries; further, their claims are ripe on the use provision; with respect to the place provision, plaintiffs did not plead any facts suggesting they have historically placed cameras on trespassed property or intend to do so; as a result, plaintiffs cannot say the place provision chills their conduct, and they lack standing to challenge that provision in the statute; given the state's interests in stymieing surveillance-trespass, the statute's use provision does not restrict speech more than is necessary to achieve the state's ends; because the statute's restrictions on use of a camera apply only to situations where there has first been an unlawful trespass, the statute does not unduly burden substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve the state's legitimate interests. In sum, plaintiffs have standing to challenge the statute's use provision, but not its place provision; the district court's judgment finding the statute facially unconstitutional is reversed, the permanent injunction is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
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