Court Description: Per Curiam - Before Loken, Murphy and Shepherd, Circuit Judges] Civil case - Social Security. While a district court may consider the hourly rate in determining the reasonableness of a fee award in an EAJA matter, the court must first consider the fee agreement, testing it for reasonableness; then reduce the fees based on the character of the representation and the results achieved, determining whether counsel was responsible for delay and whether the benefits achieved were large in comparison to the time counsel expended; because the record does not disclose whether the district court conducted this analysis in making its fees decision, the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 17-1290 ___________________________ Shelia Kay Jones lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock ____________ Submitted: October 25, 2017 Filed: October 30, 2017 [Unpublished] ____________ Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. After plaintiff Shelia Jones was awarded past-due disability benefits by the Social Security Administration (SSA) on remand by the district court, she sought--through counsel--$13,000 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). The district court found that the hourly fee resulting from the requested amount was excessive, and that the $4,244.82 previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act--upon the district court’s remand to the SSA--was appropriate. Jones appeals. The Supreme Court has stated that, while the district court may consider the hourly rate in determining the reasonableness of a fee award, the court must first consider the fee agreement, testing it for reasonableness; then reduce the fees based on the character of the representation and results achieved, whether counsel was responsible for delay, and whether the benefits achieved were large in comparison to the time expended by counsel. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807-08 (2002). Because the record does not show whether the district court conducted the required analysis, we conclude that remand is appropriate. See Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, 643 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1981) (abuse of discretion review); see also Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (decision left to district court’s discretion must still be guided by sound legal principles). Accordingly, we remand the case for further consideration consistent with this opinion. ______________________________ -2-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
