Sec. Nat'l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, No. 14-3006 (8th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseIn a case alleging that Abbott's baby formula contained a harmful bacteria that caused permanent brain damage to J.M.K., the jury found in favor of Abbott. The district court then ordered defense counsel Ghezzi to show cause why she should not be sanctioned under FRCP 30(d)(2) for obstructing each deposition in which she had participated. Defense counsel was subsequently ordered to produce a discovery training video dealing with the impropriety of form objections, witness coaching, and excessive interruptions and to distribute the video to most of the attorneys in her national law firm, Jones Day. The Eighth Circuit reversed. While the court had authority to impose Rule 30 sanctions, generally sanctions should be imposed within a time frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be deterred and no advance notice was given of the unusual nature of the sanction being considered. The court noted that once information about an unusual sanction appears in public, the damage to the subject's career, reputation, and future professional opportunities can be difficult if not impossible to repair.
Court Description: Murphy, Author, with Colloton and Kelly, Circuit Judges] Civil case - Attorney Discipline. Following a jury verdict for the plaintiff in an action alleging Abbott Lab's baby formula caused permanent brain damage to an infant, the district court directed defendant's counsel to show cause why she should not be sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) for obstructing each deposition in which she participated. After considering her response, the district court ordered her to produce a discovery training video dealing with the impropriety of form objections, witness coaching and excessive interruptions and to distribute the video to most of the attorneys in her national law firm. The sanctions order is vacated. The plain language of Rule 30(d)(2) does not impose a limit on the district court's ability to impose sanctions on its motion; with few exceptions, sanctions for discovery misconduct should be imposed within a time frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be deterred, and the primary purpose of the rule was not well served by the post hoc procedures employed here where as much as two years had passed since the deposition conduct; further, no advance notice was given of the unusual nature of the sanctions being considered; so unusual a sanction as the one imposed here requires the district court to give particularized notice of the nature of the sanction it has in mind so that counsel has a meaningful opportunity to respond; assuming there was sanctionable conduct here, defense counsel has already suffered damage to her her reputation, as well as inevitable financial and personal costs, and no deterrent purpose would be served by remanding the case for further proceedings; the sanctions order is vacated.
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