USA v. Daniel Wilson, Jr., No. 18-60569 (5th Cir. 2019)

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Case: 18-60569 Document: 00514975125 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/29/2019 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 18-60569 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED May 29, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Plaintiff-Appellee v. DANIEL EARL WILSON, JR., Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 3:18-CR-42-1 Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Daniel Earl Wilson, Jr. pled guilty to one count of failure to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment and seven years of supervised release. On appeal, Wilson challenges three of the special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court: (1) a prohibition on direct contact with any child under the age of 18, not including Wilson’s own children, without court permission; (2) a prohibition on going to or remaining Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. * Case: 18-60569 Document: 00514975125 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/29/2019 No. 18-60569 at places frequented by children under the age of 18 without approval by a U.S. probation officer; and (3) a requirement that he submit to polygraph examinations to ensure his compliance with the conditions of his supervised release and a sex offender treatment program. Reviewing the district court’s imposition of these supervised release conditions for abuse of discretion, we affirm. United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 224-25 (5th Cir. 2013). In light of Wilson’s prior convictions for sex offenses against his daughter and his prolonged disappearance from parole on those convictions, the supervised release conditions imposed by the district court are reasonably related to the relevant statutory sentencing factors, do not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to fulfill those purposes, and are consistent with the relevant Sentencing Commission policy statements. See id. at 225-26; United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 915 (5th Cir. 2016). AFFIRMED. 2

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