Villas at Parkside Partners, et al. v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas
Justia.com Opinion Summary: The City appealed the district court's summary judgment enjoining it from implementing a purported housing ordinance that required all adults living in rental housing within the City to obtain an occupancy license conditioned upon the occupant's citizenship or lawful immigration status. The court concluded that the ordinance's sole purpose was not to regulate housing but to exclude undocumented aliens, specifically Latinos, from the City and that it was an impermissible regulation of immigration. The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional and presented an obstacle to federal authority on immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
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Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED March 21, 2012 No. 10-10751 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk VILLAS AT PARKSIDE PARTNERS, doing business as Villas at Parkside; LAKEVIEW AT PARKSIDE PARTNERS, LIMITED, doing business as Lakeview at Parkside; CHATEAU RITZ PARTNERS, doing business as Chateau De Ville; MARY MILLER SMITH; PlaintiffsâÄďAppellees v. THE CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH, TEXAS, Defendant-Appellant ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------VALENTIN REYES; ALICIA GARCIA; GINGER EDWARDS; JOSE GUADALUPE ARIAS; AIDE GARZA PlaintiffsâÄďAppellees v. CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH Defendant-Appellant Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. REAVLEY, Circuit Judge: Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 The City of Farmers Branch, Texas, (âÄúthe CityâÄĚ) appeals the district courtâÄôs summary judgment enjoining it from implementing a purported housing ordinance that requires all adults living in rental housing within the City to obtain an occupancy license conditioned upon the occupantâÄôs citizenship or lawful immigration status. The district court concluded that the ordinance was preempted by federal law as a regulation of immigration that infringed CongressâÄôs constitutional power. The court also concluded that the ordinance was field preempted and conflict preempted under federal law. We conclude that the ordinanceâÄôs sole purpose is not to regulate housing but to exclude undocumented aliens, specifically Latinos, from the City of Farmers Branch and that it is an impermissible regulation of immigration. We hold that the ordinance is unconstitutional and presents an obstacle to federal authority on immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs. We therefore AFFIRM the district courtâÄôs judgment. I. Background The City adopted Ordinance 2952 (âÄúthe OrdinanceâÄĚ) on January 22, 2008, requiring that every adult person wishing to rent or lease any single family residence or apartment within Farmers Branch must apply for a residential occupancy license from the CityâÄôs Building Inspector.1 Any proposed occupant who is not a United States citizen must provide an identification number establishing lawful presence in this country. If the non-citizen has no identification number, he may declare a lack of knowledge of such a number. The Building Inspector must verify with the federal government whether a noncitizen is âÄúan alien lawfully present in the United States.âÄĚ The Building Inspector will revoke the occupancy license of an alien who is unlawfully present in this country. If the federal government is unable to 1 The text of the Ordinance is set out in full in the appendix to this opinion. 2 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 verify the occupantâÄôs lawful status as requested, the Building inspector may take the word of the alien, but the Ordinance makes it a criminal offense to make a false declaration on the occupancy license application. It is also a criminal offense for a person to occupy rental housing without a valid occupancy license or for a lessor to knowingly permit a person to occupy a rental unit without a valid license. The penalty for each offense is a fine of $500 per day of the occupancy. The history of Ordinance 2952 began several years prior to its enactment when the City Council for Farmers Branch began considering a need to address perceived harms posed by illegal aliens, particularly Latinos, residing in the City. In 2006, the City Council passed a resolution expressing frustration over the federal governmentâÄôs purported failure to enforce immigration laws and to prevent the âÄúinflux of illegal aliens . . . estimated in the millionsâÄĚ that were âÄúcoming in across our most southerly border.âÄĚ The resolution declared the CityâÄôs intent to âÄútake whatever steps it legally can to respond to the legitimate concerns of our citizens.âÄĚ The City also adopted a resolution declaring English as the official language of Farmers Branch. The City subsequently passed Ordinance 2892, the first of three attempts to regulate immigration in the rental housing context. That ordinance directed owners and property managers to require submission of evidence of citizenship or immigration status for each tenant family. Around the time of that ordinanceâÄôs adoption, the City also created a task force to assess redevelopment opportunities in the City, which issued several reports identifying the CityâÄôs âÄúlower income, minority populationâÄĚ and its increasing Hispanic and ethnic population as concerns and obstacles for 3 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 redevelopment.2 Ordinance 2892 was later repealed in 2007 after a state court enjoined it due to possible violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act. The City Council subsequently adopted substantially similar provisions by passing Ordinance 2903, however, which additionally provided for a referendum on the measure. Voters in the City approved Ordinance 2903, but in May 2008 a federal district court enjoined its enforcement, holding that the ordinance violated due process, was void for vagueness, and was an impermissible regulation of immigration under the Supremacy Clause.3 The City tried again to affect immigration through its housing regulations with the adoption of Ordinance 2952. The preamble to the Ordinance expresses a specific intent âÄúto enact regulations that are harmonious with federal immigration law and which aid in its enforcement.âÄĚ Testimony of City officials during the proceedings in this case confirmed what was obvious from the text of the ordinanceâÄĒthat the CityâÄôs intent with each of the regulations noted above was to enact an exclusionary rule for illegal aliens in Farmers Branch. For example, Tim OâÄôHare, who was a member of the City Council until he was elected mayor in 2007, testified that the 2006 English language resolution was intended to increase assimilation of non-English speakers and to make the City 2 For example, a December report from the task force listed âÄúdemographicsâÄĚ among the barriers to redevelopment, noting that âÄú[t]he population of Farmers Branch is getting older and more diverse . . . .âÄĚ Explaining this remark, the task force stated that âÄú[t]he CityâÄôs Hispanic population increased from about 5 percent to 37 percent between 1970 and 2000 and continues to grow at a rate exceeding all other ethnic and racial populations in the City.âÄĚ The task force believed that âÄúfactors that impact the sustainability of the developmentâÄĚ of a major retail area in the City included the fact that retailers were âÄúresponding to demographic change by increasingly marketing to growing ethnic populations, which in turn is giving rise to shopping centers devoted exclusively to ethnic populations, especially Hispanic, African American, and Asian populations.âÄĚ 3 See Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 866âÄď77, 879 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (Farmers Branch I). 4 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 less attractive to undocumented immigrants.4 He stated that the resolution and the ordinance that followed were meant to âÄúhelp reduce the illegal immigrant population in Farmers Branch.âÄĚ Indeed, OâÄôHare testified that the purpose of all three ordinancesâÄĒ2892, 2903, and 2952âÄĒwas to âÄúmak[e] it difficult for illegal aliens to rent property in the City of Farmers Branch . . . .âÄĚ He also testified about his frustration with the federal governmentâÄôs failure to enforce immigration laws, and he confirmed that Ordinance 2952 was intended to compensate for that perceived failure. OâÄôHareâÄôs testimony was consistent with that of City Attorney Tim Scott, who also testified that the goal of the Ordinance was to address illegal immigration issues and to âÄúreduce the number of illegal immigrants in Farmers Branch.âÄĚ As justification for the above intent, the Ordinance expresses that it is authorized pursuant to the CityâÄôs âÄúpolice power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.âÄĚ It further states that the Ordinance does not entail an intent to âÄúalter supplant, disrupt, or interfere with federal immigration law.âÄĚ Two groups of plaintiffs representing lessors and lessees of rental property in Farmers Branch brought a pre-enforcement action against the City raising a facial challenge to the Ordinance. In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Ordinance on three grounds.5 The district court concluded that the Ordinance was a local âÄúregulation of immigrationâÄĚ entrusted by the Constitution to Congress and was therefore preempted under the Supremacy Clause.6 Although some local 4 OâÄôHare testified that the resolution was âÄúone of several things that sent a message to people who arenâÄôt in the country legally, Farmers Branch is not the place for you.âÄĚ 5 See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (âÄúFarmers Branch IIâÄĚ). The district court first determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Ordinance. Id. at 845âÄď51. The City has not appealed the district courtâÄôs ruling on standing. 6 Id. at 855. 5 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 regulation which merely touches on aliens may be permissible,7 the district court here reasoned that âÄúthe Ordinance, though grounded in federal immigration classifications, is an invalid regulation of immigration because it uses those classifications for purposes not authorized or contemplated by federal law.âÄĚ8 The district court further determined that the Ordinance was impliedly preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (âÄúINAâÄĚ)9 under theories of both field preemption and conflict preemption.10 The court reasoned that the INA is a âÄúcomprehensive regime for adjudicating an individualâÄôs right to remain in the country;âÄĚ therefore, the Ordinance, âÄúin addition to constituting a prohibited regulation of immigration [was field] preempted by the INA, which provides the exclusive means for removing aliens or adjudicating their status for that purpose.âÄĚ11 With respect to conflict preemption, the district court noted that âÄú[a] local regulation may notâÄĒthough it may share a common goal with federal lawâÄĒinterfere with CongressâÄôs chosen methods.âÄĚ12 Therefore, even though the Ordinance did not âÄúpurport to remove aliens from the United States,âÄĚ it was conflict preempted because it âÄúregulates local residence based on federal classifications in a manner that directly affects the uniform enforcement of immigration laws.âÄĚ13 The district court held that the City was impermissibly attempting to enforce its own immigration scheme.14 The City now appeals. 7 See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355, 96 S. Ct. 933, 936 (1976). 8 Farmers Branch II, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855. 9 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1101 et seq. 10 Farmers Branch II, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 857âÄď58. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 857. 13 Id. at 857âÄď58. 14 Id. at 859. 6 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 II. Discussion We review a grant of summary judgment on preemption grounds de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.15 âÄúSummary judgment is proper if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.âÄĚ16 The City contends on appeal that the district court erred by declining to afford the Ordinance a presumption against preemption, by finding that the Ordinance is a regulation of immigration, and by finding that the Ordinance is field and conflict preempted. It contends that the Ordinance is merely an exercise of its police power to enact a housing regulation and that the Ordinance only tangentially touches upon aliens and immigration. We conclude, however, that the Ordinance is designed to burden aliens, both documented and undocumented, in Farmers Branch. As such, the Ordinance serves no legitimate City interest and is not a mere housing regulation entitled to a presumption against preemption; instead, it burdens the field of immigration. A. Effect of Ordinance 2952 and the presumption against preemption In the field of immigration, the power to regulate âÄúis unquestionably exclusively a federal power.âÄĚ17 The exclusivity of CongressâÄôs power stems from multiple constitutional sources, âÄúincluding the Federal GovernmentâÄôs power âÄė[t]o establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,âÄô . . . its power âÄė[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,âÄô . . . and its broad authority over foreign affairs.âÄĚ18 It is clear from these sources of the federal power that immigration 15 OâÄôHara v. Gen. Motors Corp., 508 F.3d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 2007). 16 Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 17 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354, 96 S. Ct. at 936. 18 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 7 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 is inextricably tied to national interests in many areas, one of the most significant of which is foreign relations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that immigration and the governing national policy thereof are inherently part of foreign affairs: âÄú[T]he supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution.âÄĚ19 Given the breadth of the ConstitutionâÄôs understanding of immigration as a domain of the federal government, state and local laws that attempt to affect aliens will, with limited exceptions, be preempted by the national interest. We therefore begin by considering the preemption doctrine.20 âÄúBy virtue of the Supremacy Clause, it is a âÄėfundamental principle of the Constitution . . . that Congress has the power to preempt state law.âÄôâÄĚ21 Federal law will preempt a state or local regulation âÄúwhen (1) Congress expressly preempts state law; (2) Congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from the existence of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme; or (3) state law conflicts with federal law or its purposes.âÄĚ22 A pervasive federal regulatory scheme may 19 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62, 61 S. Ct. 399, 402âÄď03 (1941) (emphasis added). 20 As an initial matter, the City argues that the district court misapplied the standard for evaluating facial challenges to statutes because the court here did not consider whether there were any circumstances under which application of the Ordinance would be constitutional. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987) (stating that a facial challenge âÄúmust establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged] Act would be validâÄĚ). The CityâÄôs reliance on Salerno in support of its argument is unconvincing. If the Ordinance here goes beyond the CityâÄôs constitutional authority to act, or if it conflicts with Congressional intent, it is irrelevant whether some of its provisions might be constitutionally applied. We therefore proceed to consider whether the Ordinance is a permissible exercise of the CityâÄôs regulatory authority. 21 Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 336 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Crosby v. NatâÄôl Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2293 (2000)). 22 Frank v. Delta Airlines Inc., 314 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78âÄď79, 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990)). 8 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 show that Congress intended to preempt the field, leaving no room for the states to supplement it.23 Even if Congress has not occupied the field, however, a state law will be preempted âÄúwhere it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law,âÄĚ or where the state law presents an âÄúobstacleâÄĚ to the accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law.24 A state law will be presumed to be valid âÄú[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.âÄĚ25 This presumption serves purposes of federalism because where Congress acts in a field traditionally occupied by the states, âÄúwe start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.âÄĚ26 Nevertheless, this presumption against federal preemption âÄúis not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.âÄĚ27 A threshold question then is whether the Ordinance here stands in an area of traditional state regulation, entitled to a presumption of validity, or instead receives no benefit from the presumption because it attempts to legislate in an area of significant federal concern. As noted above, Congress has plenary power to regulate immigration.28 Thus, Congress and the federal government historically have had a presence in 23 English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S. Ct. at 2275. 24 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372âÄď73, 120 S. Ct. at 2294. 25 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 26 Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947). 27 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 90, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1139 (2000). 28 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354, 96 S. Ct. at 936. 9 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 the immigration field. However, the fact that aliens are the subject of a local regulation, standing alone, does not mean that the statute is a regulation of immigration that is preempted by federal law.29 For example, in DeCanas, the State of California prohibited the employment of unlawful aliens in the state, and the Court held that this was a permissible attempt to âÄústrengthen [CaliforniaâÄôs] economy by adopting federal standards in imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly employ aliens who have no federal right to employment within the country.âÄĚ30 Thus, the Court viewed the state statute as an employment regulation, an area in which states have traditionally regulated, not a regulation of immigration. The Court further reasoned that the state statute was not field or conflict preempted because states retain âÄúbroad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State,âÄĚ and there was no indication that Congress intended to preclude states from regulating the employment of aliens.31 Instead, at the time of the state regulation Congress had expressed âÄúat bestâÄĚ only a âÄúperipheral concern with [the] employment of illegal entrants.âÄĚ32 Rather than conflict with a Congressional act, the state law was consistent with a Congressional intent to allow states to regulate the employment of illegal aliens.33 29 Id. at 355, 96 S. Ct. at 936; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2399 (1982) (âÄú[T]he States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.âÄĚ). 30 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S. Ct. at 936. 31 Id. at 356 & 358, 96 S. Ct. at 937âÄď38. 32 Id. at 361, 96 S. Ct. at 939. 33 Id.; Congress later overruled this part of DeCanasâÄôs holding when it passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, which expressly preempted âÄústate laws imposing civil fines for the employment of unauthorized workers like the one [DeCanas] upheld.âÄĚ Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011). 10 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 In the instant case, the City asserts that a presumption against preemption of the Ordinance applies because the Ordinance is a regulation of residential housing and the issuance of licenses to occupy rental units, which it argues is an area historically occupied by the states. According to the City, the Ordinance merely applies federal classifications consistent with federal law to achieve a purely local result. We disagree. The text of the Ordinance, and the circumstances surrounding its adoption, show that its purpose and effect are to regulate immigration, an area of federal concern, rather than to regulate housing. The preamble to the Ordinance specifically states that the Ordinance is intended to aid the enforcement of âÄúfederal immigration law,âÄĚ not housing law. (Emphasis added). In fact, the Ordinance refers to federal immigration law either directly or by implication in seven of its eleven introductory âÄúwhereasâÄĚ clauses. Moreover, the Ordinance ranges beyond landlord-tenant law because it conditions the validity of an occupancy license on the lawfulness of an occupantâÄôs immigration status, thereby expressly tying the OrdinanceâÄôs criminal offenses to immigration rather than to some violation of the housing code. These facts belie the CityâÄôs argument that the Ordinance is nothing more than a housing regulation. On the contrary, the Ordinance has virtually nothing to say about the housing rental market, except for boilerplate language referencing the CityâÄôs police power to protect its citizens. The regulatory scheme created by the Ordinance has none of the indicia one would expect of a housing regulation. For example, the Ordinance says nothing about the location, design, construction, maintenance, ownership, or alteration of residential rental units. It also provides no regulation for the number of residents or the permitted uses of rental housing. The Ordinance creates an application process for an occupancy license, but the applicant is not required to submit information about his employment or credit history, his past residence information, or his criminal 11 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 history. All that is required, besides standard information such as oneâÄôs name and address, is oneâÄôs citizenship information. Moreover, the only reason an occupancy license may be revoked is based on immigration status. On its face then the Ordinance hardly evinces a purpose to regulate rental housing in the City and instead points toward the real target of the regulationâÄĒthe ferreting out and exclusion of undesirable illegal immigrants. This purpose of the statute is confirmed by the evidence in the record. Despite an assertion in the preamble that the Ordinance was intended to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare, the City points to nothing showing an effect on public welfare by illegal aliensâÄô occupancy of rental housing. The mayor of Farmers Branch confirmed that the City conducted no studies on the effects of undocumented aliens on the value of property in Farmers Branch, the quality of its schools, the crime rate, or the availability of healthcare to its residents. One City Council member, Gary Greer, testified that there was no data showing whether undocumented immigrants commit more crimes than others in Farmers Branch. Still another council member, David Koch, agreed that the Ordinance was âÄúnot directed in any way towards revitalizationâÄĚ but rather was âÄúdirected solely towards removing illegal immigrants.âÄĚ The removal of illegal immigrants is thus the precise and intended effect of the Ordinance. Although the Ordinance provides no express removal mechanism, removal is the practical result of the Ordinance because it regulates who may be an occupant based solely on immigration status. This functional denial to aliens of access to rental housing based on their immigration status is âÄútantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode,âÄĚ an area that is historically one of federal, not state, concern.34 34 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42, 10 S. Ct. 7, 11 (1915). 12 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in a case addressing a similar municipal ordinance that required prospective occupants of rental housing to obtain an occupancy license and provide proof of legal citizenship or residency.35 As the Third Circuit noted, we cannot ignore âÄúthe realityâÄĚ that the Ordinance seeks to affect directly the presence of aliens in Farmers Branch and to condition that presence upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their immigration status.36 The reality is that all aliens who are deemed unlawfully present because of an absence of documentation are effectively excluded from Farmers Branch. But because the prerogative of deciding which aliens may live in the United States belongs to the federal government, the CityâÄôs Ordinance does not regulate in an area historically occupied by the states, and the district court correctly declined to afford it a presumption of validity. B. Regulation of immigration and preemption The conclusion that the Ordinance is not a local housing regulation, and instead determines which aliens may reside in Farmers Branch, necessarily compels our conclusion about preemption of the Ordinance as a regulation of immigration contrary to federal authority. Because we conclude that the sole purpose of the Ordinance is to target illegal aliens and effect their removal from 35 Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated by 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The Third CircuitâÄôs decision in Lozano addressed local regulations concerning aliens and immigration in both the housing and employment contexts. The Supreme Court recently vacated the Third CircuitâÄôs judgment for further consideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). See City of Hazelton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). In Whiting, the Court upheld a local regulation concerning the employment of illegal aliens, but it was not faced with regulations affecting immigration in the housing context. Therefore, although we acknowledge that the entirety of the Third CircuitâÄôs judgment has been vacated, we nevertheless find LozanoâÄôs reasoning instructive in this case because the Third Circuit was faced with a housing regulation squarely analogous to the one in the instant case, and the Supreme CourtâÄôs decision in Whiting does not affect that reasoning. 36 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 220. 13 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 the City, we also conclude that the Ordinance is an impermissible regulation of immigration posing an obstacle to federal control of immigration policy. As noted above, the national government is entrusted with significant constitutional power to regulate immigration flowing from, inter alia, its power over foreign affairs. In light of this close relationship between immigration and foreign relations, then, it is necessary that the federal government, rather than individual states, have âÄúbroadâÄĚ power over the presence of aliens, including the power to âÄúdetermin[e] what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization.âÄĚ Takahashi v. Fish & Game CommâÄôn.37 Indeed, Congress has exercised its exclusive power by enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act (âÄúINAâÄĚ),38 which âÄúestablished a âÄėcomprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalizationâÄô and set âÄėthe terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.âÄôâÄĚ39 State or local legislation that interferes with or burdens the broad federal power is impermissible, even if local and federal laws share a common goal.40 For example, in Hines the Supreme Court addressed the validity of a state alienregistration law in light of a subsequently enacted federal law that required 37 334 U.S. 410, 419, 68 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (1948) (citation omitted); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84, 96 S. Ct. 1883, 1893âÄď94 (1976) (âÄú[I]t is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.âÄĚ). 38 See 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1101 et seq. 39 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973 (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 353 & 359, 96 S. Ct. at 935 & 938). 40 See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419, 68 S. Ct. at 1142 (âÄúState laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.âÄĚ) (footnote omitted). 14 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 similar registration.41 The subject matter of the state and federal laws was essentially identical, but the Court concluded that the state did not possess equal and concurrent power over alien registration.42 Of particular âÄúimportanceâÄĚ was the fact that the state law was âÄúin a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our government that from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority.âÄĚ43 Because of this imperative for a uniform national expression of policy, the Court concluded that the state could not enact its own laws that inter alia âÄúcomplement the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.âÄĚ44 The Court so concluded, even though compliance with both the federal and state laws was possible, because the state act was âÄúan obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.âÄĚ45 In the instant case, we think that the Ordinance similarly infringes CongressâÄôs exclusive authority over the regulation of immigration and treads on foreign relations in a way contrary to the requirement of a national voice on immigration policy. The City argues that the Ordinance does not regulate 41 Hines, 312 U.S. at 56, 61 S. Ct. at 400. 42 Id. at 68, 61 S. Ct. at 405. Although the Court did not address whether the state law was impermissible because federal power, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive, see id. at 401, 61 S. Ct. at 62, we find the CourtâÄôs discussion of state-federal interaction to be particularly instructive to the instant case. As noted above, the exclusivity of CongressâÄôs power to regulate immigration is well established. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354, 96 S. Ct. at 936; Truax, 239 U.S. at 42, 36 S. Ct. at 11 (âÄúThe authority to control immigrationâÄĒto admit or exclude aliensâÄĒis vested solely in the Federal Government.âÄĚ) (citation omitted). 43 Hines, 312 U.S. at 68, 61 S. Ct. at 404; see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381, 120 S. Ct. at 2298 (holding preempted a state law restricting authority of state agencies to purchase goods and services from companies doing business with Burma, even though it shared the same goal as a similar federal law, because inter alia the state law âÄúcompromise[d] the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governmentsâÄĚ). 44 Hines, 312 U.S. at 66âÄď67, 61 S. Ct. at 404. 45 Id. at 67, 61 S. Ct. at 404. 15 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 immigration because it does not make a determination about admittance into the United States or the conditions under which a lawful entrant may remain in this country. The City contends that the Ordinance instead merely defers to federal categories of immigration status and to federal determinations of any particular alienâÄôs status. We are unconvinced. The Supreme Court stated in DeCanas that a âÄúregulation of immigration . . . is essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.âÄĚ46 We recognize that the Ordinance here does not literally control the entry and exit of aliens into and out of Farmers Branch or the United States. However, we do not read the quoted language from DeCanas in the same literal and hypertechnical manner as does the City because we do not read DeCanas as attempting to define an impermissible regulation of immigration. In context, the quoted language merely recognized as impermissible a category of state and local regulation that would be unconstitutional even with explicit Congressional authorization. But as the Court later explained, DeCanas âÄúrejected the pre-emption claim not because of an absence of congressional intent to pre-empt, but because Congress intended that the States be allowed, âÄėto the extent consistent with federal law, [to] regulate the employment of illegal aliens.âÄôâÄĚ47 The Court found specific Congressional authorization for the local law in DeCanas, in an areaâÄĒemploymentâÄĒthat also had historic state regulation, and so there was no need to define the outer bounds of what it means to be a regulation of immigration. In this case, however, we believe that the Ordinance 46 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, 96 S. Ct. at 936 (emphasis added). 47 Toll, 458 U.S. at 13 n.18, 102 S. Ct. at 2984 n.18 (emphasis in original) (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 361, 96 S. Ct. at 939). In DeCanas, the Court found evidence that Congress intended to permit states to regulate the employment of illegal aliens by looking to amendments made in 1974 to the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 361, 96 S. Ct. at 939 (citing 88 Stat. 1652, 7 U.S.C. Â§ 2041 et seq.). 16 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 does in fact regulate immigration because it seeks to address directly the presence of aliens within the CityâÄôs borders. We agree with the Third CircuitâÄôs view that âÄú[i]t is difficult to conceive of a more effective method of ensuring that persons do not enter or remain in a locality than by precluding their ability to live in it.âÄĚ48 By denying aliens access to rental housing, the Ordinance here effectively forces them to relocate. As noted above, the preamble to the Ordinance expressly states that it is designed to enforce immigration law, and numerous City officials explicitly stated that the ordinance was intended to reduce the number of illegal aliens in Farmers Branch. The undeniable practical effect of the Ordinance is thus to compel the departure of aliens from the City to other cities, states, or foreign countries, thereby setting the CityâÄôs own policy on immigration and regulating immigration across and outside the CityâÄôs borders.49 Moreover, as the district court held, the Ordinance imposes additional burdens on aliens that were not contemplated by Congress.50 For example, the Ordinance requires illegal aliens to declare themselves to the City Building Inspector, denies them the ability to enter private contracts for shelter, and subjects them to criminal sanctions, all in an effort to exclude them from the 48 Lozano, 620 F.3d at 220âÄď21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We also think that access to housing, or the lack thereof, is also a more direct regulation of an alienâÄôs presence in a location than the denial of employment, which further distinguishes this case from DeCanas. Cf. Truax, 239 U.S. at 42, 10 S. Ct. at 11. 49 See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 367 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J., concurring) (finding that where state legislature declared that the presence of illegal aliens was to be discouraged and their number diminished by Arizona statute requiring law enforcement officers to check a personâÄôs immigration status, âÄú[w]ithout qualification, Arizona establishes its policy on immigrationâÄĚ), cert. granted by 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011) (No. 10A1277, 11-182); cf. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 332, 109 S. Ct. 2491, 2497 (1989) (âÄú[A] state law that has the âÄėpractical effectâÄô of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that StateâÄôs borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause.âÄĚ). 50 See Farmers Branch II, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855. 17 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 City. Because states lack the constitutional power of the federal government when it comes to immigration, however, the Ordinance may âÄúneither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.âÄĚ51 Because the Ordinance has no other purpose than to exclude undocumented aliens who are in the city seeking residence, it adds to the serious national federal problem with immigration and the relations of this country with other countries, especially Mexico. Growing evidence of this national problem can be seen in federal court litigation, as numerous state and local governments seek to target problems, real or imagined, with illegal immigrants. As already noted, a Pennsylvania municipality passed an ordinance virtually identical to Farmers BranchâÄôs ordinance seeking to condition residence in rental housing on an occupantâÄôs lawful immigrations status.52 Arizona, reacting to âÄúa serious problem of unauthorized immigration along the Arizona-Mexico border,âÄĚ enacted legislation creating its own immigration policies and seeking to deter unlawful entry by requiring its police officers to enforce those policies.53 And the state legislature in Alabama has also sought to discourage illegal immigration 51 Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419, 68 S. Ct. at 1142; see also Lozano, 620 F.3d at 220 (âÄúThe comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization . . . plainly precludes state efforts, whether harmonious or conflicting, to regulate residence in this country based on immigration status.âÄĚ) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 52 See Lozano, 620 F.3d at 180. 53 See Arizona, 641 F.3d at 343. The Arizona law requires police to investigate a personâÄôs immigration status when stopped or arrested if the person is suspected of being in the state without authorization, see id. at 346; creates offenses for an alien to fail to carry registration documents, id. at 354âÄď55, or to work in the state without authorization, id. at 357; and allows police to arrest a person without a warrant if police have probable cause to believe the person is removable from the United States, id. at 360. As noted above, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Arizona case and will decide whether ArizonaâÄôs statute is preempted by federal immigration law. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011) (No. 10A1277, 11-182). 18 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 by enacting a law creating numerous criminal offenses predicated on immigration status.54 This increasing treatmentâÄĒsome might say mistreatmentâÄĒof illegal immigrants around the country only reinforces what the Supreme Court has said in explaining why a national policy on immigration unimpeded by the whims of the various states is paramount. As the Court has put it, âÄú[i]f th[e] government [of California] should get into a difficulty [because of its treatment of noncitizens] which would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union?âÄĚ55 Clearly then, the treatment of aliens entails issues of national concern that reach beyond parochial concerns of individual states and includes matters such as trade, treaty obligations, and reciprocal rights agreements. It is imperative that the nation act singularly in conducting matters of foreign relations, particularly the treatment of noncitizens, because the burdening of another countryâÄôs citizens will undoubtedly affect how this nationâÄôs citizens are in turn treated abroad. The Supreme Court has said that [o]ne of the most important and delicate of all international relationships, recognized immemorially as a responsibility of government, has to do with the protection of the just rights of a countryâÄôs own nationals when those nationals are in another country. Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from 54 See United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011). The Alabama law, inter alia, makes it a misdemeanor to willfully fail to carry an alien registration document; makes it unlawful for an unauthorized alien to apply for, solicit, or perform work; requires law enforcement officers to determine citizenship for persons stopped, detained, or arrested when the person is suspected to be unlawfully present in the United States; makes it unlawful to conceal, harbor, or shield an unlawful alien or to encourage an unlawful alien to come to the United States; forbids employers from claiming as business tax deductions wages paid to unauthorized aliens; and makes it a felony for an unlawful alien to enter into a business transaction with the state or any of the stateâÄôs political subdivisions. Id. at 1292âÄď93. 55 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875). 19 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 20 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 real or imagined wrongs to anotherâÄôs subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.56 It is clear to us that the City of Farmers Branch, by enacting the Ordinance, threatens the careful balance that the federal government must maintain in foreign affairs and impedes the federal prerogative for deciding how to treat illegal immigrants, which it achieves through the scheme of the INA. Although the City argues that the Ordinance is consistent with the INA and that Congress explicitly contemplated state regulations addressing the presence of illegal aliens, we are unpersuaded. The INA provisions cited by the City may contemplate cooperation among the federal, state, and local governments in the enforcement of the federal immigration scheme and the arrest of illegal immigrants,57 but we do not read the INA to contemplate a locality enacting its 56 Hines, 312 U.S. at 65, 61 S. Ct. at 403 (footnote omitted); see also Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279 (âÄú[W]e venture the assertion, that, if citizens of our own government were treated by any foreign nation as subjects of the Emperor of China have been actually treated under this law, no administration could withstand the call for a demand on such government for redress.âÄĚ). How non-citizens within our borders are treated and the consequences for our international obligations and the treatment of our own citizens abroad are just as much a national concern today as in the days of Hines and Chy Lung. Only this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed this point in a written statement to Congress, where she stated that âÄú[t]he State Department has no greater responsibility than the protection of U.S. citizens overseasâÄĚ and that âÄú[t]o protect our citizens, we need to do our part to protect those of other countries.âÄĚ Fulfilling Our Treaty Obligations and Protecting Americans Abroad: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 12-13 (2011) (appendix to testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State); digested at 157 C O N G . R E C . D 8 5 3 , a v a i l a b l e a t http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba6 2c686d&witid=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba62c686d-1-1. 57 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1324(c) (contemplating that âÄúofficers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws,âÄĚ including state officers, may arrest persons who violate the INAâÄôs antiharboring provisions); Â§ 1357(g)(10) (contemplating cooperation between state officers and the federal government âÄúin the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United StatesâÄĚ); Â§ 1373(c) (requiring Immigration and Naturalization Service to âÄúrespond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by lawâÄĚ); Â§ 1621 (making unlawful aliens ineligible for certain defined state benefits and public assistance); Â§ 1644 (requiring that state 20 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 21 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 own scheme of immigration enforcement or its own ordinances to deal with illegal aliens in whatever manner the locality deems fit.58 The INA provides a comprehensive scheme, with ample provision for the exercise of discretion, for the federal government to determine how best to address or to not address illegal aliens. Whereas the Ordinance precludes an alienâÄôs presence in rental housingâÄĒand by extension within the CityâÄĒbased solely on the unlawfulness of the alienâÄôs immigration status, a similar unlawfulness determination in the federal scheme would merely subject an alien to the process of the INA, under which removal of an alien may not result until after a hearing and an opportunity for the alien to be heard.59 The federal government has determined that such process is the exclusive means for adjudicating whether a particular alien will be removed.60 It is no response to say, as the City does, that the Ordinance defers to the federal classification of an alienâÄôs immigration status because, although the Ordinance uses some of the and local governments must be permitted to âÄúsend to or receiv[e] from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United StatesâÄĚ). 58 It is true that in Plyler, which addressed an equal protection challenge to a stateâÄôs denial of public education to the children of undocumented aliens, the Supreme Court said that states are not âÄúwithout any power to deter the influx of persons entering the United States against federal law, and whose numbers might have a discernible impact on traditional state concerns.âÄĚ Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 n.23, 102 S. Ct. at 2400 n.23. The Court supported its statement by citing DeCanas, which we have already noted involved the regulation of employment, an area of frequent state concern and regulation. See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356âÄď57, 96 S. Ct. at 937 (noting statesâÄô âÄúbroadâÄĚ authority over employment relationships and the local problems addressed by the state regulation). The Plyler Court thus recognized state authority to regulate aliens in areas of traditional state interest; it did not find permissible state regulations that directly affect the entry or removal of illegal aliens, which is what the Ordinance in this case does. 59 See 8 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 1229 and 1229a (outlining procedures for removal proceedings). 60 See Â§ 1229a(a)(3) (providing that âÄúa proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United StatesâÄĚ). 21 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 22 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 same terms as federal immigration law, it seeks to use an alienâÄôs immigration status for a purpose different from that intended under the federal scheme.61 An alienâÄôs unlawful status and eligibility for removal does not ipso facto mean that the alien will be removed, as it would under the Ordinance. Instead, the federal government has broad discretion to cancel removal or adjust an alienâÄôs status under a variety of circumstances.62 âÄúIn light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from [removal], a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented [alien] will in fact be [removed] until after [removal] proceedings have been completed.âÄĚ63 Yet, the Ordinance here dispenses with the procedures and discretion of the federal scheme to preclude an alien from residence in the City solely due to a status classification as unlawful even though the same alien might be entitled to relief under the federal process. That is not permissible under the Constitution and the Supremacy Clause. III. Conclusion This country has a large Latino population and millions of Latinos live here without legal permission. However, the great majority live quietly, raise families, obey the law daily, and do work for our country. For all that they 61 See, Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225, 102 S. Ct. at 2399 (state regulation of aliens must âÄúmirror federal objectivesâÄĚ) (emphasis added). 62 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1229b(a) (providing Attorney General with discretion to cancel removal of an alien who is otherwise inadmissible or subject to deportation if alien meets specified requirements); Â§ 1229b(b)(2) (providing Attorney General with discretion to cancel removal and adjust status of an alien who is a victim of domestic violence). 63 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226, 102 S. Ct. at 2399. We might add that we do not read any provision of the INA as contemplating that illegal aliens would be homeless during the process. See Cent. Ala. Fair Housing Ctr. v. Magee, 2011 WL 6010501, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2011) (âÄúCongress never criminalized an alienâÄôs attempt to lawfully reside in his home; nor has Congress permitted States to regulate the residence of aliens. Instead, enforcement is left to the executive.âÄĚ); see also 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1229(a)(1)(F) (requiring aliens in removal proceedings to provide an address where the alien may be contacted). 22 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 23 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 contribute to our welfare, they live in constant dread of being apprehended as illegal aliens and being evicted, perhaps having their families disrupted. As unsatisfactory as this situation is it is the immigration scheme we have today. Any verbal and legal discrimination against these people, as Farmers Branch exemplifies by this ordinance, exacerbate the difficulty of that immigration scheme. This is a national problem, needing a national solution. And it impacts the nationâÄôs relations with Mexico and other nations. The Supreme Court long ago pointed out in Chy Lung the problem for this country of treating Chinese people poorly.64 And as the Court said in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, âÄúany policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.âÄĚ65 Because the sole purpose and effect of this ordinance is to target the presence of illegal aliens within the City of Farmers Branch and to cause their removal, it contravenes the federal governmentâÄôs exclusive authority over the regulation of immigration and the conditions of residence in this country, and it constitutes an obstacle to federal authority over immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs. The ordinance is unconstitutional, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. 64 92 U.S. at 279. 65 342 U.S. 580, 588âÄď89, 72 S. Ct. 512, 519 (1952). 23 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 24 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 Appendix CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH ORDINANCE NO. 2952 AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR RESIDENTIAL OCCUPANCY LICENSES; PROVIDING FOR VERIFICATION OF ALIENSâÄô IMMIGRATION STATUS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL LAW; CREATING OFFENSES; PROVIDING FOR ENFORCEMENT; PROVIDING FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW; PROVIDING A PENALTY; PROVIDING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. WHEREAS, federal law prescribes certain conditions (found principally in Title 8, United States Code, Sections 1101, et seq.), that must be met before an alien may be lawfully present in the United States; and WHEREAS, aliens not lawfully present in the United States, as determined by federal law, do not meet such conditions as a matter of law when present in the City of Farmers Branch; and WHEREAS, pursuant to Title 8, United States Code Sections 1621, et seq., certain aliens not lawfully present in the United States are not eligible for certain State or local public benefits, including licenses; and WHEREAS, Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A), prohibits the harboring of aliens not lawfully present in the United States, including, as the courts of the United States have held, the provision of residential accommodations to such aliens; and WHEREAS, the City of Farmers Branch is authorized to adopt ordinances pursuant to its police power to protect the heath, safety, and welfare of its citizens; and WHEREAS, the City of Farmers Branch is authorized to adopt regulations touching on aliens that are consistent with pertinent federal laws; and WHEREAS, it is the intent of the City of Farmers Branch to enact regulations that are harmonious with federal immigration law and which aid in its enforcement; and WHEREAS, it is not the intent of the City of Farmers Branch to alter, supplant, 24 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 25 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 disrupt, or interfere with federal immigration law; and WHEREAS, the provisions of this ordinance shall be applied uniformly and in a nondiscriminatory manner, and the application of these provisions must not differ based on a personâÄôs race, religion, or national origin; and WHEREAS, the City of Farmers Branch has complied with all prerequisites for the passage of this Ordinance; and WHEREAS, the meeting at which this Ordinance was adopted was properly posted in accordance with the Open Meetings Act, and this Ordinance was considered and approved in an open meeting of the City Council with opportunity for public comment regarding its terms and provisions; and WHEREAS, the purposes of this Ordinance are to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare, NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH, TEXAS: Section 1: Chapter 26, Businesses, Article III, Single-Family Rental Housing, of the Code of Ordinances, City of Farmers Branch, Texas, is hereby amended by adding the following as Section 26-79: âÄúSection 26-79. Citizenship or Immigration Status Verification (A) Definitions The following terms and phrases, when used in this section, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this section, and shall be construed so as to be consistent with state and federal law, including federal immigration law: (1) âÄúAlienâÄĚ means any person not a citizen or national of the United States, as set forth in Title 8, United States Code, Section 1101(3), as amended. (2) âÄúLessorâÄĚ means a person who leases or rents a single family residence as or on behalf of a landlord. (3) âÄúOccupantâÄĚ means a person, age 18 or older, who resides at a single family residence. A temporary guest of an occupant is not an occupant for the purposes of this section. 25 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 26 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 (B) Residential Occupancy Licenses (1) Prior to occupying any leased or rented single-family residence, each occupant must obtain a residential occupancy license. (2) It is the occupantâÄôs responsibility to submit an occupancy license application to the building inspector, pay a fee of $5 to the City, and obtain a residential occupancy license. If there are multiple occupants seeking to occupy a single rental unit, each occupant must obtain his or her own residential occupancy license. Multiple applicants for occupancy of the same single family residence may designate one of their number as their agent to submit the required application forms, provided that each individual applicant signs his or her own application form. The building inspector may establish a procedure whereby an applicant (or designated agent) may submit the application forms), signed by the applicant(s), via facsimile or website portal. (3) The lessor shall notify each prospective tenant of the requirements of paragraph (B)(2) of this section. (4) A residential occupancy license is valid only for as long as the occupant continues to occupy the single family residence for which the license was issued. Any relocation to a different leased or rented dwelling unit requires a new residential occupancy license. (5) An application for a residential occupancy license shall be made on a form furnished by the building inspector for such purpose. The form shall require the following information: (a) full legal name of the occupant; (b) mailing address of the occupant; (c) address of the single family residence for which the occupant is applying, if different from the mailing address; (d) name and business address of the lessor; (e) date of lease or rental commencement; (f) date of birth of the occupant; 26 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 27 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 (g) the occupantâÄôs country of citizenship; (h) if the applicant is a United States citizen or national, a signed declaration that the applicant is a United States citizen or national; the form shall state that it is a crime under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1015(e), for a person to knowingly make any false statement or claim that he or she is, or at any time has been, a citizen or national of the United States, with the intent to obtain on behalf of himself or herself, or any other person, any Federal or State benefit or service; -or(i) if the applicant is not a United States citizen or national, an identification number assigned by the federal government that the occupant believes establishes his or her lawful presence in the United States (examples include, but are not limited to: resident alien card number, visa number, âÄúAâÄĚ number, 1-94 registration number, employment authorization number, or any other number on a document issued by the U.S. Government). If the applicant does not know of any such number, he or she shall so declare. Such a declaration shall be sufficient to satisfy this requirement. (6) Upon receipt of the completed application and the payment of the application fee as set forth above, the building inspector shall immediately issue a residential occupancy license. The building inspector shall not deny a residential occupancy license to any occupant who submits a completed application and pays the application fee. (7) The information provided on an application may be disclosed to the federal government according to paragraph (D) of this section, pursuant to Title 8, United States Code, Section 1373. (C) Offenses (1) It shall be an offense for a person to be an occupant of a leased or rented single family residence without first obtaining a valid occupancy license permitting the person to occupy that single family residence. (2) It shall be an offense for a person to knowingly make a false statement of fact on an application for a residential occupancy license. 27 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 28 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 (3) It shall be an offense for a person to create, possess, sell, or distribute a counterfeit residential occupancy license. (4) It shall be an offense for a lessor to lease or rent a single family residence without obtaining and retaining a copy of the residential occupancy license of any and all known occupants. (5) It shall be an offense for a landlord to fail to maintain at the landlordâÄôs residence or regular place of business a copy of the residential occupancy license of each known occupant of a leased or rented single-family residence, or to fail to make such copy available for inspection by the Building Inspector during regular business hours. (6) It shall be an offense for a lessor to lease a single family residence without including in the terms of the lease a provision stating that occupancy of the premises by a person, age 18 or older, who does not hold a valid residential occupancy license constitutes an event of default under the lease. (7) It shall be an offense for a landlord or any agent of a landlord with authority to initiate proceedings to terminate a lease or tenancy to knowingly permit an occupant to occupy a single family residence without a valid residential occupancy license. It is a defense to a prosecution under this paragraph that the landlord or agent has commenced and diligently pursued such steps as may be required under the applicable law and lease provisions to terminate the lease or tenancy. (D) Enforcement The building inspector shall enforce the requirements of this section as follows. (1) Promptly after issuance of a residential occupancy license to any occupant who has not declared himself or herself to be either a citizen or a national of the United States in accordance with paragraph (B)(5)(h) of this section, the building inspector shall, pursuant to Title 8, United States Code, Section 1373(c), verify with the federal government whether the occupant is an alien lawfully present in the United States. The building official shall submit to the federal government the identity and status information contained on the application for the residential occupancy license, along with any other information requested by the federal government. 28 Case: 10-10751 Document: 00511796125 Page: 29 Date Filed: 03/21/2012 No. 10-10751 (2) If th