Carston Woodson v. US, No. 17-1255 (4th Cir. 2017)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 17-1255 CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-1257 CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-1259 CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-1260 CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-1261 CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-1262 CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, 2 v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-1263 CARSTON MARKEL WOODSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant - Appellee. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District Judge. (3:17-cv-00046-HEH; 3:17-cv-00047HEH; 3:17-cv-00048-HEH; 3:17-cv-00049-HEH; 3:17-cv-00050-HEH; 3:17-cv-00051HEH; 3:17-cv-00052-HEH;) Submitted: May 25, 2017 Decided: May 30, 2017 Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Carton Markel Woodson, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 3 PER CURIAM: Carston Markel Woodson seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2012), for failing to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 12(h)(3). This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). Because the district court identified deficiencies that Woodson may remedy by filing an amended complaint, we conclude that the order Woodson seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623–24 (4th Cir. 2015); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We “remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow [Woodson] to amend his complaint.” Goode, 807 F.3d at 630. We also deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and deny Woodson’s motions to deconsolidate his seven nearly identical cases, “to invoke the law of disqualification force,” to set aside the order to dismiss the complaints, and for default judgment. DISMISSED AND REMANDED 4

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