Leslie Patterson v. Denise Lawhorn, No. 16-1936 (4th Cir. 2017)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-1936 LESLIE PATTERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DENISE LAWHORN, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:15-cv-00477-LMB-JFA) Submitted: March 29, 2017 Before GREGORY, Judges. Chief Judge, Decided: and KEENAN and April 21, 2017 WYNN, Circuit Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James J. O’Keeffe, IV, JOHNSON, ROSEN & O’KEEFFE, LLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Rhodes B. Ritenour, Deputy Attorney General, Nicholas F. Simopoulos, Senior Assistant Attorney General, John G. Butler III, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Leslie summary Patterson judgment to appeals a the former district criminal court’s investigator Virginia Department of Taxation, Denise Lawhorn. out six felony complaints and seven grant of for the Lawhorn swore misdemeanor complaints against Patterson for violating Virginia Code provisions. The felony his complaints alleged that Patterson underreported income on his 2007 through 2010 tax returns and took credit for 2007 and 2008 employee withholding taxes that he did not pay to the Commonwealth of Virginia. The misdemeanor complaints alleged that Patterson, as president of his church, failed to pay the church’s 2009 and 2010 quarterly withholding taxes. The Commonwealth later entered orders of nolle prosequi for all 13 complaints. Patterson then sued Lawhorn for malicious prosecution under Virginia law and for a violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The district court granted both summary judgment to Lawhorn on grounds, and Patterson appealed. We review a district court’s award of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and inferences reasonably drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Core Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Md. LLC, 744 F.3d 310, 320 (4th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact remains and the record shows that the 2 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We begin with the malicious prosecution claim. Where, as here, such a claim arises from criminal proceedings, Virginia law generally disfavors it. 218 (Va. 2007). Reilly v. Shepherd, 643 S.E.2d 216, To prove malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the prosecutor: (1) lacked probable cause, (2) possessed malice, (3) caused the case to be brought against the plaintiff or cooperated in that effort, and (4) terminated the prosecution in a manner favorable to the plaintiff. We conclude that the district court Id. properly granted summary judgment to Lawhorn on this claim because Patterson has failed to show Lawhorn lacked probable felony or misdemeanor complaints. cause for either the In this context, probable cause means that the prosecutor had “knowledge of such a state of facts and circumstances as excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on such facts and circumstances, that the plaintiff [wa]s guilty of the crime of which he [wa]s suspected.” at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). See id. Based on conversations with church personnel and a review of Patterson’s accounts, Lawhorn had probable cause for all the complaints. Contrary to Patterson’s argument on appeal, Lawhorn did not need to consider Patterson’s innocent explanations for his tax discrepancies because any such self-serving statements could be 3 disbelieved when compared to contrary documentary evidence. Because Patterson has not met his burden to show that Lawhorn lacked probable cause, his malicious prosecution claim must fail. For the same reason, Patterson’s § 1983 claim also fails. Section under 1983 requires color of a state constitutional right. plaintiff law, to prove deprived 42 U.S.C. § 1983. a the person, acting plaintiff of a Patterson alleges that Lawhorn deprived him of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, which requires warrants to be based on probable cause and for seizures described cause, to be reasonable. above, meaning the that U.S. record she had shows Const., that “enough amend. Lawhorn evidence IV. had to As probable warrant the belief of a reasonable [prosecutor] that an offense has been or is being committed.” (2002). Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 Because the record supports a finding of probable cause regardless of any deficiencies in the information set forth in the warrants, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lawhorn on the § 1983 claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. dispense with contentions are oral argument adequately because presented in the the facts We and legal materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 4
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