United States v. Williams, No. 15-7114 (4th Cir. 2015)
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Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), contending that Guidelines Amendment 780, which revised the policy statement governing section 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions, renders him eligible for relief. The court agreed with the United States Attorney and defendant that the district court erred by failing to recognize that Amendment 780 altered the course the court followed in United States v. Hood. The district court failed to recognized that Amendment 780’s revision to Guidelines section 1B1.10 has modified the process for determining section 3582(c)(2) eligibility. Consequently, the court adhered to its pre-Hood decisions and recognized the Commission's authority to dictate the proper application of the Guidelines. The court's conclusion is consistent with the Sentencing Reform Act's focus on the elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparity and furthers the express Congressional policy of rewarding cooperation. In this case, defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2) because his revised Guidelines range is lower than his original range. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
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PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-7114 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. LANCE ANTONIO WILLIAMS, Defendant – Appellant. -----------------------JOHN DONLEY ADAMS, Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:07-cr-00429-JAB-6) Argued: October 7, 2015 Before TRAXLER, Judges. Chief Decided: Judge, and KING and December 14, 2015 THACKER, Circuit Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Thacker joined. Chief Judge Traxler wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: Eric David Placke, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Michael Hamilton, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. John Donley Adams, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, as Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel. ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Brian D. Schmalzbach, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae. 2 KING, Circuit Judge: Lance Antonio Williams appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Williams seeks the benefit of recent amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines and contends that the court in the Middle District of North Carolina erred ineligible for a sentence reduction. Guidelines Amendment 780, which when it ruled him According to Williams, revised the policy statement governing § 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions, renders him eligible for relief. The United position in this appeal. States Attorney supports Williams’s As explained below, we vacate and remand. 1 I. On March 3, 2008, Williams pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine base, in contravention of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Prior to his guilty plea, the United States Attorney filed a notice, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, advising Williams and the district 1 Because the United States Attorney sides with Williams in this appeal, we appointed attorney John Donley Adams of Richmond, Virginia, as amicus counsel to support the district court’s ruling. We appreciate his valuable service to our Court in this matter. 3 court that Williams’s prior North Carolina drug conviction would be utilized to seek an enhanced penalty under § 841(b)(1)(A). 2 The Probation Officer prepared Williams’s presentence report (the “PSR”) and recommended that he be sentenced to 240 months in prison. 3 The PSR made that recommendation by starting at a base offense level of 30, predicated on a drug weight of fifty-six grams. The offense level was then lowered to reflect Williams’s acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a final offense level of 27. With Williams’s criminal history category of VI, the Guidelines advised a sentencing range of 130 to 162 months. The § 841(b)(1)(A)’s prosecutor’s mandatory § 851 minimum notice, however, sentence of triggered 240 months. Because Williams’s entire advisory Guidelines range fell below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence, his sentence was the statutory minimum of 240 months. Guidelines See USSG § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the 2 Section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 mandates that, if a person commits a violation specified in that provision “after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years.” 3 The PSR relied on the 2007 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines. Unless otherwise specified, we refer to the 2014 edition, the Guidelines edition applicable to Williams’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See USSG § 1B1.10(b)(1). 4 statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”). Prior to the December 9, 2008 sentencing hearing, the prosecutors filed a motion for a downward departure, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. assistance § 3553(e), to recommendation, the the recognizing Williams’s authorities. 4 court imposed On a the sentence of substantial prosecutors’ 180 months, reflecting a twenty-five percent reduction from the 240-month Guidelines sentence. On May 9, 2012, more than three years after his conviction and sentencing, Williams filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court did not the act on that motion until after Probation Officer submitted a memorandum to the court on May 18, 2015, advising that Williams was eligible for a sentence reduction. On June 18, 2015, the court appointed a lawyer to represent Williams and ordered briefing on the sentence-reduction motion. 4 Williams and Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), a prosecutor’s downwarddeparture motion confers upon a sentencing court “the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” Such a sentence must be imposed “in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.; see USSG 5K1.1 (requiring sentencing court to consider quality, credibility, extent, riskiness, and timeliness of assistance to determine extent of departure under § 3553(e)). 5 the United States Attorney agreed that Williams was eligible for a sentence reduction under Guidelines Amendments 750 and 782 — both of which — conviction reduced due the to offense the Guidelines Amendment 780. level procedural applicable changes to his introduced by See USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014) (revising Guidelines to clarify § 3582(c)(2) eligibility for defendant sentenced below statutory minimum due to substantial-assistance departure). By memorandum opinion of July 10, 2015, the district court denied Williams’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See United States v. Williams, No. 1:07-cr-00429 (M.D.N.C. July 10, 2015), ECF No. 372 (the “Opinion”). The Opinion acknowledged that, based on Amendments 750 and 782, Williams’s final offense level would be 21 instead of 27, resulting in a Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months. Nonetheless, the court ruled that Williams had not satisfied the eligibility requirements of § 3582(c)(2) because his 180-month sentence was based on a statutory mandatory minimum and a statutorily authorized departure for substantial assistance, subsequently rather than lowered. on The a Guidelines court reached range that that had been conclusion in reliance on our 2009 decision in United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009). 6 Williams filed a timely notice of appeal, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). II. We review de novo a district court’s ruling on the scope of its legal authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Mann, 709 F.3d 301, 304 (4th Cir. 2013). III. On appeal, Williams maintains that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). court, in motion, its Opinion disagreed with denying that Williams’s contention. The district sentence-reduction The amicus counsel defends the position of the district court in this proceeding. Williams and the United States Attorney counter that the court misunderstood the scope of its authority under § 3582(c)(2), because, inter alia, Amendment 780, promulgated in 2014, revised the Sentencing Commission’s policy eligibility for a sentence reduction. statement governing As a result, they contend that the court’s denial of Williams’s § 3582(c)(2) motion should be vacated. 7 A. In order to properly assess Williams’s eligibility for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), we first relevant principles governing such reductions. implicates the determine a adhering Court’s prisoner’s to involves Supreme the the mandate eligibility Commission’s Commission’s authority that a federal court § 3582(c)(2) statements, to the That discussion under policy identify and dictate the by also proper application of the Guidelines. 1. Congress created the Commission in 1984 guidance, clarity, and fairness in sentencing. § 991(b). to provide See 28 U.S.C. The Guidelines reflect the Commission’s efforts to that end and assist the federal courts in imposing appropriate sentences on Guidelines account the or current revisions § 994(o), (p). modified case-by-case reflect for empowered a to Commission basis. views statutory to amend To on ensure criminal provisions, the that the behavior and Congress has Guidelines. See id. Those amendments are effective unless “otherwise disapproved by Act of Congress.” Id. § 994(p). When an amendment lowers the Guidelines range for a particular offense, the Commission must indicate whether and in what circumstances such amendment will have retroactive effect — that is, by “specify[ing] in what circumstances and by what amount 8 the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced.” Congress sentence has Id. § 994(u). authorized reductions based the on federal the courts Commission’s to grant retroactive amendments through a narrow exception to the general rule that a court may not modify a defendant’s sentence “once it has been imposed.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Pursuant thereto, in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant . . . , the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3582(c)(2). As the Supreme Court recognized in 2010, the “policy statement governing § 3582(c)(2) proceedings” is set forth in Guidelines section 1B1.10. U.S. 817, amendments 819 (2010). designated See Dillon v. United States, 560 Section by the 1B1.10 lists Commission application in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. the for Guidelines retroactive See USSG § 1B1.10(d). Pertinent here, a sentence reduction is not authorized unless one of those defendant’s amendments applicable § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). has “the guideline effect of range.” lowering the USSG To determine whether a particular amendment 9 has that effect, the sentencing court must “substitute only the amendments” rendered retroactive by the Commission and “leave all other guideline § 1B1.10(b)(1). must “use the application decisions unaffected.” Id. When assessing a § 3582(c)(2) motion, the court version of [the] policy statement that is in effect on the date on which the court reduces the defendant’s term of imprisonment.” In Dillon, See id. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.8. the Supreme Court reinforced § 3582(c)(2)’s emphasis on the Commission’s policy statements, and it spelled out a two-step motions. See inquiry 560 U.S. for the at review 827. At of sentence-reduction the first step, the sentencing court must review “the Commission’s instructions in § 1B1.10 to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction authorized.” (emphasis added). Id. If the court determines that the prisoner is eligible for a sentence reduction, the court moves to the second step and determines the extent of the reduction. Id. 2. The Commission possesses the authority to dictate the proper application of the Guidelines through the promulgation of Guidelines amendments. “Congress necessarily periodically whatever review clarifying As the Supreme Court has recognized, contemplated the work revisions of to 10 that the the the courts, Commission and Guidelines would would make conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.” 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991). Braxton v. United States, The Court applied that principle in its Braxton opinion by declining to resolve the circuit split on which it had granted certiorari, because the poised to “eliminate [the] circuit conflict.” 49. Commission was See id. at 348- By deferring to the Commission’s anticipated resolution of a circuit split regarding an interpretation of the Guidelines, the Court implicitly recognized the Commission’s power to power to abrogate precedent in the courts of appeals. We have override similarly recognized our precedent through the Commission’s amendments to the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1112-13 (4th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that amendment to Guidelines commentary required “us to scrap our earlier interpretation of that guideline”); United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481, 488 (4th Cir. 1995) review (explaining the work that of the the “Commission courts and has revise the the authority to Guidelines by adopting an interpretation of a particular guideline in conflict with prior judicial constructions of that guideline”). not alone among Commission’s Guidelines the courts authority that to effectively of appeals promulgate vacate in yielding amendments circuit We are to to precedent. the the See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Cruz, 692 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Of course, a change 11 in the language of an applicable Guidelines application notes provision, or including commentary, a supersedes change prior in decisions applying earlier versions of that provision, just as we would be bound to apply the updated version of an agency rule or regulation.”); United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 493 n.7 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause of the Sentencing Commission’s broad power to interpret the Guidelines, clarifying amendments should be conflict considered with by the established sentencing precedent, court unless despite ex post any facto concerns are present.”); United States v. Prezioso, 989 F.2d 52, 54 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1993) (recognizing applicability of amendment to commentary despite contrary circuit precedent). Writing for this Court in United States v. Goines, our then Chief Judge recognized in 2004 the Commission’s power to impact precedent in the various circuits, explaining that “Congress anticipated that the Commission would use the amendment process to resolve disagreements among courts of appeals.” 469, 474 (4th Cir. 2004). See 357 F.3d When the circuits have split on the application of a Guidelines provision, the Commission typically resolves such amendment,” a which disagreement does not by alter promulgating “the legal a “clarifying effect of the guidelines, but merely clarifies what the Commission deems the guidelines to have already meant.” a clarifying amendment “conflicts 12 Id. As Goines explained, if with our precedent,” we recognize that it has “the effect of changing the law in this circuit.” Id. Consistent with the foregoing, our precedent in the sentence-reduction context must give way if it conflicts with the Commission’s amendments. As the Goines decision emphasized, Congress has granted the Commission the unusual explicit power to decide whether and to what extent its amendments reducing sentences will be given retroactive effect. The amendment and retroactivity powers operate in tandem: The Commission decides how to modify the guidelines and also decides how such modifications should be implemented. This is appropriate, as the Commission has both the authority and the obligation to enact policies designed to achieve the underlying purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. 357 F.3d at 476 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wilkins also explained that the Commission can Chief Judge utilize that “unusual explicit power” to abrogate decisions concerning the Guidelines that risk producing “wildly disparate sentences.” Id. B. Having identified the legal framework for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2) and the Commission’s authority to dictate the availability of such relief, we now turn to our decision in United States v. Hood, on which the district court relied. See 556 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009). We then discuss the Commission’s promulgation of Amendment 780, which, according to 13 the United States Attorney and Williams, undermines the court’s reliance on Hood. 1. Decided in 2009, Hood involved the issue of whether a defendant who received a substantial-assistance departure from an above-Guidelines-range mandatory minimum sentence eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). F.3d at 228. was See 556 Consistent with the Guidelines then in effect, we ruled that Hood was ineligible for such relief. See id. at 233. In 2001, Hood pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in contravention of 21 U.S.C. § 846. See Hood, 556 F.3d at 228. After calculating Hood’s Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months, the district court conviction acknowledged triggered See id. at 228-29. a that 240-month Hood’s prior mandatory felony minimum drug sentence. Accordingly, by applying Guidelines section 5G1.1(b), the court identified 240 months as Hood’s Guidelines sentence. On the basis of a § 3553(e) motion, however, the court departed downward and imposed a sentence of 100 months. See id. at 229. In 2008, Hood filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion seeking a sentence reduction pursuant to Guidelines Amendment 706, which had lowered the offense level applicable to his underlying drug offense. See Hood, 556 F.3d at 230. 14 The sentencing court denied Hood’s motion, and we affirmed. Id. In our Hood decision, we explained that, because Amendment 706 had no impact on either the statutory mandatory minimum or the substantialassistance departure, it did “not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guidelines (quoting USSG § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B)). “based which on a statutory remained Moreover, in the minimum place sentence range.” Id. at 232 Instead, Hood’s sentence was and after USSG § 5G1.1(b),” Amendment resulted from a 706. both Id. § 3553(e) at of 233. departure predicated on Hood’s substantial assistance to the authorities and guided by the factors outlined in Guidelines section 5K1.1. Id. at 233-34. Because Amendment 706 did not impact any of those provisions, it could not provide relief for Hood under § 3582(c)(2). Several Id. at 234. of the other courts of appeals adhered to the approach enunciated in Hood and denied sentence reductions to prisoners who had been sentenced below statutory mandatory minimums as a result of substantial-assistance motions. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 734 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Joiner, 727 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Carter, 595 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2009). The Third and D.C. Circuits, prisoners in contrast, ruled that 15 such could be eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2). See In re Sealed Case, 722 F.3d 361 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Savani, 733 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2013). 2. In recognition Commission of promulgated the foregoing Guidelines circuit Amendment 780 split, in the 2014 to clarify “when, if at all, § 1B1.10 provides that a statutory minimum continues to limit the amount by which a defendant’s sentence may be reduced under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) when the defendant’s original sentence was below the statutory minimum.” USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014). The Commission embraced the apparent minority view, explaining that its Amendment 780 “generally adopts the approach of the Third Circuit in Savani and the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Sealed Case.” To 1B1.10, that end, the policy § 3582(c)(2) Amendment relief. statement 780 that revised Amendment Guidelines dictates 780 moved section eligibility the Id. list for of retroactive amendments from subsection (c) to subsection (d) and inserted the following in subsection (c): If the case involves a statutorily required minimum sentence and the court had the authority to impose a sentence below the statutorily required minimum sentence pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities, then for purposes of this policy statement the amended guideline range shall be determined without regard to the operation of § 5G1.1 (Sentencing on a Single Count 16 of Conviction) and § 5G1.2 Counts of Conviction). USSG § 1B1.10(c). Commission In (Sentencing justifying recognized the value the to on Multiple foregoing mandate, our system of the justice of those cooperating defendants who provide substantial assistance to the authorities. According to the Commission, such cooperating defendants should be rewarded because they are differently situated than other defendants and should be considered for a sentence below a guideline or statutory minimum even when defendants who are otherwise similar (but did not provide substantial assistance) are subject to a guideline or statutory minimum. Applying this principle when the guideline range has been reduced and made available for retroactive application under section 3582(c)(2) appropriately maintains this distinction and furthers the purposes of sentencing. USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014). C. This appeal requires us to assess the impact of Amendment 780 on our decision in Hood. The amicus counsel contends that the district court correctly recognized the viability of Hood as our circuit precedent § 3582(c)(2) motion. and thus properly denied Williams’s The United States Attorney, on the other hand, agrees with Williams and maintains that the court erred by failing to recognize that Amendment 780 altered the course we followed in Hood. As explained below, we agree with the United States Attorney and Williams. 17 1. In this circuit, we are bound by “the basic principle that one panel cannot overrule a decision issued by another panel.” McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). When panel opinions conflict, we are obliged to apply the “earliest-case-governs” rule and adhere to “the earlier of the conflicting opinions.” Id. at 333. At the same time, “[a] decision by a panel of this court, or by the court sitting en banc, does not bind subsequent panels if the decision rests on authority that subsequently proves untenable.” U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 983 F.2d 578, 581-82 (4th Cir. 1992). authority to “chang[e] the § 3582(c)(2) eligibility. The district relief, applied however, that 1B1.10 had modified eligibility. in Hood Amendment the law in this circuit” regarding See Goines, 357 F.3d at 474. court, our Moreover, the Commission has the deeming decision. 780’s Williams It revision process for ineligible failed to to recognize, Guidelines determining for section § 3582(c)(2) Although the Commission did not mention Hood in its “Reason for Amendment” accompanying Amendment 780, the Hood decision was consistent with the rulings made in two of the three appellate disapproved. United States decisions that the Commission specifically See USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014); see also v. Joiner, 727 F.3d 18 601, 609 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of § 3582(c)(2) motion where defendant’s sentence was based on statutory mandatory minimum sentence not lowered by subsequent Guidelines amendment); United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2012) (same). Moreover, the Commission explained that Amendment 780 “generally adopts” the D.C. Circuit’s approach in 2013 in In re Sealed Case, which had expressly rejected Hood. See USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014); see also In re Sealed Case, 722 F.3d at 368-69. Amendment Williams’s reduction. 780 situation The explicitly is provides eligible applicable for policy a that a defendant § 3582(c)(2) statement now in sentence requires a sentencing court to remove Guidelines section 5G1.1 from the § 3582(c)(2) eligibility determination. Compare Hood, 556 F.3d at 234-35 (denying § 3582(c)(2) relief because the impact of “§ 5G1.1(b) . . . was never removed from operation”), with USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014) (requiring sentencing court to determine § 3582(c)(2) operation of § 5G1.1”). eligibility “without regard to the Because Amendment 780 clarifies the applicability of § 3582(c)(2) relief in this case and “conflicts with our precedent,” we must recognize, pursuant to Goines, its “effect of changing the law in this circuit.” See 357 F.3d at 474. Hood’s logic, which was predicated on the pre-Amendment 780 Guidelines, is simply inapplicable here. 19 Consistent with the Commission’s power to determine “how to modify the guidelines” and “how such modifications should be implemented,” Goines, 357 F.3d at 476, the revised Guidelines section 1B1.10(c) mandates a different result. And, in “earliest-case-governs” rule. any event, we are bound by the Pursuant thereto, we must adhere to our pre-Hood decisions — for example, Turner, Capers, and Goines — and recognize the Commission’s authority to dictate the proper application of the Guidelines. See McMellon, 387 F.3d at 333. 2. Our approval of the position espoused by the United States Attorney and Williams is also consistent with the Sentencing Reform Act’s focus on “the elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparity.” See Goines, 357 F.3d at 475-76. A contrary ruling would permit cooperating defendants with Guidelines ranges above their statutory minimums — perhaps due to extensive criminal histories or severe offense conduct — to nevertheless secure sentencing relief under § 3582(c)(2). On the other hand, cooperating defendants such as Williams, whose Guidelines ranges are entirely below their statutory minimums, would be denied relief. Such a disparity should not occur within the category of defendants who should benefit from Amendment 780: provide substantial investigation and assistance prosecution of 20 to the others.” those “who government See USSG in app. the C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014). Moreover, Amendment 780 makes no distinction among such defendants, and we lack the authority to create one. 217 (4th See United States v. Maroquin-Bran, 587 F.3d 214, Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “rewriting [the Guidelines] is beyond our purview as a court and remains the domain of either the Sentencing Commission or the Congress”). Finally, our Congressional ruling policy today of rewarding furthers “the cooperation” expressed with the authorities. See United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 171 (4th Cir. 1991). Our criminal justice system advances that policy by, inter authority alia, to affording file prosecutors the discretion and motions, which moderate “the § 3553(e) rigorous inflexibility of mandatory sentences where the offender has rendered substantial assistance to the Government.” States v. Daiagi, 892 F.2d 31, 32 (4th Cir. 1989). United The prospect of securing substantial-assistance motions from the prosecutors encourages defendants to aid in investigations and prosecutions of their coconspirators and criminal cohorts. is a powerful placing tool restrictions for on more effective law sentence-reduction That inducement enforcement, and eligibility for cooperating defendants such as Williams would weaken that tool. D. In these circumstances, we reject the contention of the amicus counsel that the Hood decision 21 is controlling. We therefore sentence turn to the reduction section 1B1.10. issue under of the Williams’s policy eligibility statement in for a Guidelines As explained below, Williams is eligible for such a reduction. Section 3582(c)(2) requires a sentencing court to adhere to the Commission’s policy statement in Guidelines section 1B1.10 when assessing a motion for a sentence reduction. 560 U.S. at Guidelines 827 (requiring section 1B1.10 the sentencing “to determine court the See Dillon, to assess prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence reduction”); United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, Commission’s 250 policy (4th Cir. statements 2009) (recognizing implementing the that “the statute’s authorization of retroactive sentence reductions are binding”). Because Amendment 780 went into effect prior to the district court’s resolution of Williams’s § 3582(c)(2) motion, the court was required to assess the motion in light of the now applicable policy statement in Guidelines section 1B1.10(c). See USSG § 1B1.10 cmt. n.8 (requiring court to “use the version of this policy statement that is in effect on the date on which the court reduces the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)”). In determining whether a retroactive Guidelines amendment has the effect of lowering a defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, the court must import the amendment as it appears in the 22 most recent edition of the Guidelines into the original sentencing calculations, substituting only the retroactive provisions and “all guideline application decisions leaving unaffected.” other USSG § 1B1.10(b)(1). If the new Guidelines calculation results in a lower advisory range, the prisoner is eligible for a sentence reduction. The proper application of the policy statement in Guidelines section 1B1.10 shows that Williams is eligible for relief. Since Commission has Williams’s original promulgated two sentencing in retroactively 2008, the effective Guidelines amendments that lowered the base offense levels for cocaine base offenses: Amendments 750 and 782. See USSG app. C, amend. 782 (Supp. 2014); id. app. C, amend. 750 (2011). the district court recognized, Amendments 750 and 782 As would reduce Williams’s original total offense level from 27 to 21, and his advisory Guidelines range would now be 77 to 96 months. See Opinion 4-5. Although Guidelines section 5G1.1(b) would otherwise turn the 240-month mandatory minimum into Williams’s revised “guideline sentence,” the revisions made to Guidelines section 1B1.10 by Amendment 780 bar the sentencing court from calculating his amended range in that manner. Accordingly, because Williams’s revised Guidelines range is lower than his original range, he is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). 23 The fact that Williams is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) does not dictate the propriety or amount of any such reduction. See United States v. Stewart, 595 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2010). That decision is for the sentencing court, after “consider[ing] the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” see Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); (recognizing sentencing court’s discretion to decide whether sentence reduction is warranted). IV. Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for such other and further proceedings as may be appropriate. VACATED AND REMANDED 24 TRAXLER, Chief Judge, dissenting: Williams’s sentence minimum. Congress Commission has no was not has power based lowered to lower on a statutory it, it. and the mandatory Sentencing Accordingly, I would affirm. I. District courts “are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2690 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This “rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions” prescribed by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Id. One defendant’s applicable of these sentencing exceptions range is applies lowered when after a the sentencing court has already imposed a prison term: [I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . , the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). Based on his criminal history and the characteristics of his crack-distribution offense, Williams’s sentencing range was 130-162 months. original advisory But, because of a prior felony drug offense, Williams was subject to a mandatory minimum 25 sentence fixed by Congress of 240 months. 841(b)(1)(A). When a crime carries See 21 U.S.C. § a mandatory minimum sentence, a district court must impose at least the mandatory minimum unless departure for a statutory substantial exception—such assistance under as § a downward 3553(e)—applies. See United States v. Campbell, 995 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1993) (“When a sentence is fixed by statute, any exception to the statutory directive must also be given by statute.”). Congress could authorize a departure from the “Only statutorily mandated minimum sentence, and it did so in § 3553(e) for the limited purpose stated there—‘to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.’” United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)). The district court when sentencing Williams determined that a statutory minimum term of 240 months applied but then departed downward to 180 months under § 3553(e) to reflect Williams’s substantial assistance to the government. Since the applicable mandatory minimum sentence was greater than the high district end court of was Williams’s required advisory to impose sentencing the range, mandatory the minimum sentence without regard to the advisory sentencing range. In essence, the advisory sentencing range “became irrelevant.” Id. Accordingly, Williams’s 180-month term of imprisonment could not 26 have been “based on a sentencing range that [was] subsequently . . . lowered 3582(c)(2) by the (emphasis Sentencing added), Commission,” because it was 18 not U.S.C. based § on a sentencing range in the first instance. Likewise, part in Williams’s the substantial departure advisory calculation assistance. from, not minimum sentence.” (4th Cir. 1999). the of sentencing the downward First, “§ removal of, 3553(e) a range played departure allows statutorily no for for a required United States v. Pillow, 191 F.3d 403, 407 Thus, the baseline for that departure is the statutory minimum—not the otherwise applicable sentencing range. See id. (concluding a downward departure motion under § 3553(e) does not “restore[] the otherwise applicable guideline range that would have applied absent the mandatory minimum sentence”). The fact that the Commission lowered the advisory sentencing range has no bearing on the factors relevant to the substantial assistance given by Williams. See United States v. Spinks, 770 F.3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[O]ur precedent on this point is clear: the extent of a § 3553(e) departure below a mandatory minimum must be based solely on a defendant’s substantial assistance and factors related to that assistance.”). In sum, Williams’s sentence was based on the applicable mandatory minimum fixed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and the downward departure he received under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) was 27 based on the substantial assistance he gave the government. Since only Congress, not the Sentencing Commission, can change either of sentence these factors, I not “based on a been lowered by the was subsequently must conclude sentencing Sentencing that Williams’s range that Commission,” has § 3582(c)(2), and that he is therefore not eligible for a sentence reduction under that section. II. This court’s decision in United States v. Hood is on all fours with this case and, in my view, is still good law. In Hood, the defendant pled guilty to a crack drug offense that yielded a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months, but he was subject to a 240-month mandatory minimum as a result of a prior felony drug conviction. The district court imposed the 240- month sentence but departed downward to 100 months pursuant to § 3553(e) for Hood’s substantial assistance to the government. The Sentencing Commission subsequently reduced the base offense level applicable to crack offenses, and Hood sought a reduction on that basis pursuant to § 3582(c). We held that the defendant’s sentence “was not ‘based on’ the sentencing range for crack cocaine offenses that was lowered by Amendment 706.” Hood, 556 F.3d at 236. Rather, we concluded that Hood’s sentence “was based on a statutory minimum fixed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and it was reduced 28 to an appropriate sentence authorized under § 3553(e) for his substantial assistance.” at 236-37. Commission Hood has no explained authority that to because lower a “the Id. Sentencing statutory mandatory minimum,” Amendment 706 “did not have the effect of lowering Hood’s Guidelines Range.” did Id. at 233. Hood’s sentencing range substantial assistance downward Congress could authorize play a Nor, the court reasoned, any role in departure. departure the court’s See the from id. (“Only statutorily mandated minimum sentence . . . .”). Hood, in my view, remains good law despite the apparent conflict with Sentencing Mandatory Sentencing Commission Minimum Guidelines added Sentences to and Amendment address Substantial 780, “Cases which the Involving Assistance.” It states: If the case involves a statutorily required minimum sentence and the court had the authority to impose a sentence below the statutorily required minimum sentence pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities, then for purposes of this policy statement the amended guideline range shall be determined without regard to the operation of § 5G1.1 . . . . U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) (emphasis added). Section 5G1.1(b) recognizes that a mandatory minimum sentence fixed by Congress trumps an advisory sentencing range determined application of the Sentencing Guidelines: pursuant to “Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the 29 applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.” The parties contend that Amendment 780 eviscerated Hood’s prohibition against a sentence reduction under § 3582(c) where the original U.S.S.G. § Amendment sentence was 5G1.1(b).” 780 directs “based 556 the on F.3d a at statutory 233 sentencing minimum (emphasis court to and added). determine the amended sentencing range in these circumstances “without regard to the operation of § 5G1.1.” referred to question was § 5G1.1(b) “based in on a U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). explaining statutory that the minimum and Since Hood sentence in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b),” and § 5G1.1 can now be disregarded under Amendment 780 for purposes of determining whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), the contention is that Hood no longer controls cases such as the one before the court. Hood, however, did not turn on the operation of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1. Rather, Hood’s holding clearly rested on the court’s conclusion that Hood’s 100-month sentence was based “on the mandated statutory minimum sentence required by [21 U.S.C.] § 841(b)(1)(A) from which the district court departed as authorized by § 3553(e), employing the factors identified in U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.” Hood, 556 F.3d at 235-36. Indeed, Hood’s sentence would have been the same with or without § 5G1.1--21 30 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) required the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) allowed the imposition of a sentence below the statutory substantial assistance factors. minimum only based on Section 3582(c) provides that a defendant’s sentence may be reduced if the sentence he received was “based on a sentencing range that lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” has subsequently been Hood interpreted that statutory language and held that a statutorily mandated minimum sentence is not a sentence that is based on a sentencing range. While the Sentencing Commission has the authority to overrule circuit precedent interpreting Guidelines provisions, it cannot overrule circuit precedent interpreting a statutory provision. Hood’s interpretation of the statutory phrase “based on” thus remains controlling. Accordingly, I must conclude that Williams’s sentence was not “based on a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” § 3582(c)(2), and that he is therefore not eligible for a sentence reduction under that section. I respectfully dissent. 31
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