US v. Jonathan Melendez, No. 12-4283 (4th Cir. 2013)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4283 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JONATHAN A. MELENDEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00114-WDQ-1) Submitted: December 28, 2012 Decided: January 17, 2013 Before KING, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William L. Welch, III, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Christopher J. Romano, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Following the district court s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop, Jonathan Melendez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). prison. Melendez was sentenced to 120 months in He now appeals. We affirm. I Melendez first challenges the district court s denial of his suppression motion. In considering this claim, we review the district court s legal determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2012). Using the analytic framework of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), we determine first whether the officer s actions were justified at the inception of the traffic stop. were, we then address whether the continued sufficiently limited in scope and duration. If they stop was Vaughan, 700 F.3d at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the suppression hearing, Maryland State Trooper Jeremiah Gussoni testified that he initiated a traffic stop of Melendez s vehicle because Melendez was traveling seventy-six miles per hour eleven miles over the posted speed limit and 2 because he observed Melendez make an unsafe lane change, cutting off a vehicle that Melendez had just passed. Because [a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996), conclude vehicle Melendez s we based that upon Gussoni s the initial infractions was stop of reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Following a traffic stop, an officer may: detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop. . . . [The] officer may request a driver s license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. . . . [O]nce the driver has demonstrated that he is entitled to operate his vehicle, and the police officer has issued the requisite warning or ticket, the driver must be allowed to proceed on his way. . . . If a police officer wants to detain a driver beyond the scope of a routine traffic stop, . . . he must possess a justification for doing so other than the initial traffic violation. . . . Thus, a prolonged automobile stop requires either the driver s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). Here, traffic stop Melendez s and car. unreasonable, eleven the We minutes elapsed discovery do especially not of cocaine consider because between Gussoni this did in the the length not initial trunk of receive of time the results of a requested license check until after the cocaine was found. 3 Even if the delay was unreasonable, we conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Gussoni had ample reason to suspect that criminal activity was afoot and that, consequently, Among other the extended things, exceptionally detention Gussoni nervous: an was not testified that Melendez artery in his unreasonable. neck was appeared visibly pounding; his breathing was rapid; and his hand trembled as he handed his license and car rental contract to Gussoni. Additionally, the vehicle had a lived-in look its interior was strewn wrappers, with and coffee cups, cigarettes. partially This consumed signifies to food, snack experienced officers such as Gussoni that the vehicle s occupant does not want to leave the vehicle for any reason, often because the vehicle contains money, drugs, or weapons. Further, the car was a driving one-way rental, and Melendez was from Fort Lauderdale, a known source city for drugs, to New York City, a known destination city for drugs. Accordingly, we hold that neither the initial traffic stop nor the subsequent detention violated the Fourth Amendment. The motion to suppress was properly denied. II Melendez contends that the district court improperly denied him the benefit of the safety valve, which permits a 4 sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines regard to any statutory minimum sentence. range without To benefit from the safety valve, the defendant bears the burden of showing that he meets the five requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006) and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5C1.2(a) (2011). United States v. Henry, 673 F.3d 285, 292-95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 182 (2012). We review the district court s determination concerning eligibility for safety valve relief for clear error. Id. at 292. It is requirements. undisputed that Melendez met the first The issue before us is whether he also met the fifth requirement of truthful and complete disclosure. U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5), requirement, information four the he USSG § 5C1.2(a)(5). defendant has about must the To truthfully offense of satisfy this disclose all conviction other crimes that constitute relevant conduct. See 18 and any United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600, 610 (4th Cir. 2012). We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying Melendez the benefit of the safety valve. Melendez, who claimed to be a truck driver without the $3000 needed to repair his truck, was not forthcoming about the source of $29,000 he sent to the Dominican Republic. Nor was he truthful about the locations of his meetings with Julio, his contact in New York, or his physical descriptions of Julio. 5 He therefore failed to satisfy the requirement that the defendant truthfully disclose all information he has about the offense and relevant conduct. See USSG § 5C1.2(a)(5); United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d at 610. III We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6
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