US v. Antonio Taste, No. 08-4388 (4th Cir. 2008)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4388 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ANTONIO TASTE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:07-cr-00280-WO-1) Submitted: November 18, 2008 Decided: December 16, 2008 Before TRAXLER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Antonio Taste appeals the 180-month sentence the district court imposed after he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by § 922(g)(1) a convicted (2006). felon, Counsel in violation submitted a of brief 18 U.S.C. pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), averring there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but suggesting this court should consider whether the district court erred by enhancing Taste s sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006), because he had at least three previous convictions for violent felonies. Specifically, Taste was convicted of four counts of breaking or entering in North Carolina state court in 2007 and was convicted of strong arm robbery in South Carolina state court in 1998. Under § 924(e), a violent felony is defined as a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that is one of several specified offenses, or a crime that otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). to another. 18 U.S.C. In considering whether the district court properly designated Taste an armed career criminal, we review the district court s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. 350 F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 2003). United States v. Wardrick, In determining whether a crime is a violent felony within the meaning of § 924(e), the offense is considered generically 2 in terms of how the law defines the offender Begay offense might v. have United particular, and not committed States, the in phrase 128 terms it on S. a Ct. maximum of term how an individual particular 1581, of 1584 occasion. (2008). imprisonment . In . . prescribed by law for the offense was not meant to apply to the top sentence in a guidelines range. United States v. Rodriguez, 128 S. Ct. 1783, 1792 (2008). In 2005), the United States defendant v. argued Harp, that 406 one F.3d of his 242 (4th Armed Cir. Career Criminal Act predicate convictions, a North Carolina Class I felony, did not qualify as an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year because the maximum nonaggravated punishment was twelve months. 245-46. Harp, 406 F.3d at Declining, as in United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999), to apply an individualized analysis, we held in Harp that, to determine whether a conviction is a crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one year, Jones dictates that we consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history. Taste Harp, 406 F.3d at 246. acknowledges that the maximum sentences that could be imposed upon any defendant for his prior convictions exceed one year. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying the § 924(e)(1) enhancement. 3 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Taste, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Taste requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in representation. this court for leave to withdraw from Counsel s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Taste. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal before contentions the court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
