US v. Jeremiah Teague, No. 08-4319 (4th Cir. 2010)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4319 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JEREMIAH LAMAR TEAGUE, a/k/a Booper, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (5:06-cr-00022-RLV-CH-4) Submitted: July 29, 2010 Decided: August 12, 2010 Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Joseph R. Conte, LAW OFFICES OF J.R. CONTE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, United States Attorney, Mark A. Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Jeremiah Lamar Teague pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine powder and cocaine base (crack), 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006) (Count 1), and possession of crack with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West Supp. 2010) (Counts 8-10). He was sentenced within the advisory guideline range to a term of 288 months imprisonment. Teague appeals his sentence, arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm. Teague participated in the conspiracy for eight years. Because he had a prior felony drug conviction, he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months. was 235-293 months. His guideline range At sentencing, Teague requested a downward variance to remedy the disparity between sentences for crack offenses and for cocaine powder offenses. The district court declined to vary. The court stated that it had considered the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), the Supreme Court s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and the sentencing guidelines. The court explained its sentence as follows: The court has found that the sentence is justified in terms of the [§] 3553(a) factors because of the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense. Defendant was involved in the conspiracy for a lengthy period of time. Further, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment. The other factors are taken 2 into account adequately by the guidelines. sentence is within the guideline range. And his The court finds that his record as scored by the probation officer does not overstate the seriousness of the criminal history. The guideline adjustment that has been applied by the probation officer sufficiently addresses any disparity between crack and powder. And the other factors fully justify the sentence imposed. On appeal, Teague argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors adequately, and substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary in light of the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity. * We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), which requires consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. first whether the district court Id. properly We must assess calculated the guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. 592 F.3d 572, 576 Id. at 49-50; see United States v. Lynn, (4th Cir. 2010) ( [A]n individualized explanation must accompany every sentence ); United States v. * Teague also describes the sentence as cruel and unusual, but does not argue that it violates the Eighth Amendment. To the extent that the issue is before us, we discern no constitutional violation. 3 Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). An extensive explanation is not required as long as the appellate court is satisfied that [the district court] has considered the parties arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority. 592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) United States v. Engle, (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3764 (June 10, 2010) (No. 09-1512). Finally, we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, examining the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a). United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). On appeal, with new counsel, Teague concedes that he was subject to a 240-month mandatory minimum sentence. He argues, however, that the district court s bare pronouncement that it found the sentence justified under the § 3553(a) factors was insufficient to permit appellate review. We conclude that the court s explanation for the sentence was adequate and did not amount addressed to several procedural of the error. § 3553(a) The court factors, specifically principally, the seriousness of the offense and the length of time Teague was involved in the conspiracy. The court expressed its belief that the sentence it had decided to impose would promote respect for 4 the law and provide a just punishment, and noted that the other factors were adequately calculation. the taken into account in the guideline Teague does not identify any relevant factor that district court failed to address nor does the record disclose any such factor. The claim of substantive error is similarly lacking in merit. range. Teague s sentence was within the advisory guideline An appellate court may presume that a sentence within the properly calculated Guideline range is reasonable. States v. Raby, 575 F.3d 376, 381 (4th Cir. 2009). United Although the defendant may rebut the presumption of reasonableness, Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, we conclude that Teague has not done so. Teague contends that, because his sentence is at the upper end of the guideline range, the district court failed to consider the between a offense and need to defendant one who avoid like is unwarranted himself guilty who of a sentencing is guilty cocaine disparity of a crack offense. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (holding that sentencing court may consider crack/powder ratio as basis for variance). cocaine sentencing Teague asserts that, to avoid disparity, the district court should have sentenced him to the 240-month mandatory minimum sentence. sentence, the court stated its view However, in imposing the that the reduction in offense levels afforded by the 2007 amendments to the guidelines 5 for crack offenses disparity. was adequate to remedy the sentencing Kimbrough does not require the district court to go beyond the remedy that Congress has provided. We district facts court. and materials therefore legal before We affirm dispense the with sentence oral argument contentions are adequately the and argument court imposed by the because the presented would not in the aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 6
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