Annette Reddick v. William White, No. 08-2286 (4th Cir. 2011)
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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-2286 ANNETTE REDDICK; TASHA REDDICK; ARLENE CARTER; TIESE MITCHELL; CRYSTAL LEWIS; J.M., Infant, by his next friend Tiese Mitchell; J.M., Infant, by her next friend Tiese Mitchell; J.J., Infant, by his next friend Crystal Lewis; R.C., Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter; Z.C., Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter, Plaintiffs Appellants, v. WILLIAM A. WHITE, Respondent Appellee, and JOHN CROCKETT HENRY, a/k/a John Crockett Henry, Jr., a/k/a James Crockett Henry, a/k/a J.C. Henry; HENRY LLC OF VIRGINIA BEACH, Defendants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff. -----------------------------NEAL LAWRENCE WALTERS, Amicus Supporting Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District Judge. (2:07-cv-00342-RBS-FBS) Submitted: October 17, 2011 Decided: December 1, 2011 Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and William L. OSTEEN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Anthony F. Troy, William H. Hurd, Stephen C. Piepgrass, Robert M. Luck, III, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Neal L. Walters, Joshua M. Friedman, Third Year Law Student, F. Daphne Li, Third Year Law Student, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amicus Supporting Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PER CURIAM: After William A. White made internet postings about leadcounsel for the plaintiffs (the Tenants) in a Fair Housing Act case, the Tenants moved for sanctions against White. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who held an evidentiary hearing and entered an order denying the Tenants court motion. Applying affirmed. Because clear the error district review, court the was district required to perform a de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. I. The Tenants, as plaintiff-intervenors, were part of a Fair Housing Act proceeding brought owner in Virginia Beach. party to the action to White, an mailed letters to moved hearing on to quash that complex seeking the motion, the Tenants using The Tenants responded by issuing to determine connection to the apartment complex owner. White apartment In May 2007, White who was not a racially abusive language. subpoenas against subpoenas. White if had some In February 2008, However, posted he prior publicly to the available information about the Tenants counsel on an internet message board coupled with a warning that no one was to contact or disturb the attorney or his wife during the litigation. 3 (J.A. 333). The posting also stated that [a]fter we are done with our legal dispute, they are open game, but while we are involved in this legal dispute, there is to be nothing done. Id. The Tenants responded to White s posting by filing a motion for sanctions against him, citing the district court s inherent power to sanction bad-faith behavior. Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991). See Chambers v. NASCO, The district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing. * During the pendency of this motion, the Tenants settled the underlying Fair Housing Act litigation. Eventually, the magistrate judge issued a lengthy order denying the motion for sanctions. The Tenants filed objections to the magistrate judge s ruling and specifically requested a de novo review by the district court. Reviewing the Tenants objections under the clearly erroneous standard here applicable, magistrate judge s order. the district court affirmed the (J.A. 724). II. On appeal, the Tenants argue that the district court erred in applying a clearly erroneous standard instead of a de novo standard in reviewing the magistrate judge s ruling. * We agree. The docket sheet notes the magistrate judge was to enter a report and recommendation. (J.A. 14-15). 4 A magistrate judge s power is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 636, which provides court. two general types of referrals by a district Section 636(b)(1)(A) provides that a district court may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except for a non-exhaustive list of motions § 636(b)(1)(A). magistrate detailed in statute. 28 U.S.C. Under this section, a district court reviews a judge s order to determine if it is clearly Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. erroneous or contrary to law. 72(a). the In contrast, § 636(b)(1)(B) provides that, with regard to the motions excepted from subsection (A), a district court may designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge . . . proposed findings of § 636(b)(1)(B). fact and Further, recommendations. this section 28 authorizes U.S.C. a district court to issue appropriate additional duties to a magistrate judge so long as they are consistent with the Constitution. U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Because a magistrate judge is 28 only empowered under this section to make recommendations, a district court s review is de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Supreme Court has summarized these grants of authority to mean that nondispositive pretrial matters are governed by § 636(a) and dispositive matters are covered by § 636(b). United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1989). 5 Gomez v. Rule 72, which implements § 636, likewise that requires pretrial matter[s] are defense. de a novo dispositive of review a for claim or Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). On appeal, the Tenants contend that the magistrate judge s ruling on sanctions in this case is dispositive within the meaning of § 636 and Rule 72, and the district court was thus statutorily required to perform de novo review. the sanctions district ruling court s in inherent this case authority issued and after We agree that pursuant the to a underlying litigation had ended was dispositive and required de novo review. Sanctions are authorized by rule in several instances, including Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16, and 37. In Chambers, the Court recognized that federal courts also have an inherent power under Article III to award attorney s fees when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-46. This inherent power is governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Id. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). A motion for sanctions under the district court s inherent power is not a pretrial matter under §636(B)(1)(a). Magistrate judges have no inherent Article III powers they 6 See N.L.R.B. have only those powers vested in them by Congress. v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting magistrate judges are creatures of statute, and so is their jurisdiction. not created exercise statutory inherent Magazine, Inc., bankruptcy [Courts] cannot augment it ). authorization Article 77 judges F.3d have III for magistrate Cf. powers. 278, 283-84 inherent (9th power Congress has In to re Rainbow 1996) (noting sanction because Cir. to judges Congress created specific statutory authorization). Assuming a district court can delegate its inherent powers under § 636(b) s additional duties clause, de novo review of the exercise of those powers is required. F.3d 281, duties 289-90 clause magistrate judge (4th Cir. permitted to conduct See United States v. Osborne, 345 2003) (holding district court a plea that to colloquy, additional authorize but that a such authorization is consistent with Article III only if de novo review by an Article III court is available upon request). In addition, the sanctions order in this case addressed a non-party and was issued after the conclusion of the underlying litigation. The magistrate judge s ruling was thus dispositive of a claim, that is, a claim for sanctions against White. In fact, as the Tenants note, the sanctions motion was the only claim against White in the case. 7 In sum, the motion for sanctions in this case requested under the district court s inherent power and issued after the conclusion pretrial of the matter underlying was §636(B)(1)(a), under case and not a the nondispostive magistrate was permitted only to enter a Report and Recommendation subject to the district failure to court s apply reversible error. de the novo proper review. de The novo district standard of court s review is ALCOA v. EPA, 663 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir. 1981). III. Accordingly, district court s for the order and foregoing remand reasons, the case we for vacate the the district court to perform a de novo review of the magistrate judge s order denying sanctions. We express no opinion on the merits of the Tenants motion for sanctions. VACATED AND REMANDED 8
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