US v. Stephen Washington, No. 07-4518 (4th Cir. 2009)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4518 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. STEPHEN J. WASHINGTON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge. (1:06-cr-00068-TSE) Submitted: July 10, 2009 Decided: July 24, 2009 Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert L. Jenkins, Jr., BYNUM & JENKINS, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Dennis M. Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Stephen J. Washington of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute furtherance U.S.C. marijuana, of a drug § 924(c)(1); and possession trafficking 21 U.S.C. crime, of in § 841(a)(1) firearms violation (2006), of and in 18 the district court sentenced Washington to a total of 130 months imprisonment. On appeal, Washington s counsel contends that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress drugs and firearms seized from the vehicle Washington was driving. Finding no error, we affirm. We review the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and the court s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 (2009). The evidence the is construed in the light most favorable to United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, prevailing party below. 704 (4th Cir. 2006). Counsel does not challenge the traffic stop initiated by law enforcement. propriety of the Rather, he asserts that the officer improperly extended the traffic stop into an unauthorized Terry * stop. * Counsel concludes that the officer s Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 2 entry into Washington s vehicle to retrieve a partially consumed bottle of alcohol violated the Fourth Amendment and that evidence resulting therefrom should be suppressed. If a police officer wants to detain a driver beyond the scope of a routine traffic stop, . . . he must possess a justification for doing so other than the initial violation that prompted the stop in the first place. 537 F.3d at 336. stop is to traffic Branch, One such justification for extending a traffic investigate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, known as a Terry stop. Id.; see also United States v. Sokolow, ( [T]he 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) briefly detain a officer has reasonable a person for police investigative suspicion can stop purposes supported by and if the articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30)). assessing totality the of validity the of a circumstances Terry . . stop, . we giv[ing] consider due weight In the to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their experience and training. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004). Upon initiating the traffic stop, officer Koenigsberg observed shaking. an that Washington had bloodshot, watery eyes and was The officer stated that, in his experience, this was indication of intoxication. 3 Moreover, the officer was alerted to a partially consumed bottle of alcohol located on the rear passenger officer had violation of side a floorboard. reasonable Va. Code Based suspicion Ann. on of § 18.2-323.1 these facts, criminal (2004) the activity, (prescribing rebuttable presumption that driver is drinking while operating a motor vehicle when partially consumed container of alcohol is located within passenger area and the behavior or the physical characteristics of the driver is consistent with the consumption of alcohol), that permitted the extension of the traffic stop. However, counsel asserts that Washington did not smell of alcohol, was not slurring his speech, and was able to keep his balance. Counsel also notes that, when questioned, Washington denied that he was intoxicated and denied ownership of the bottle. Koenigsberg likewise did not administer a field sobriety test. While Koenigsberg testified on cross-examination that he did not believe Washington was drunk, he nevertheless indicated that, appearance was in his consistent experience, with some Washington s manner of physical intoxication. Thus, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must, we conclude that Koenigsberg was not unreasonable in his suspicion that Washington was intoxicated. Additionally, the officer was within the scope of the automobile into exception Washington s when vehicle he initiated to 4 retrieve the warrantless the bottle. entry See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) ( If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, . . . a [warrantless] search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found[] [is authorized]. ); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (stating automobile exception permits search that is no broader and no narrower than that which could be authorized pursuant to a warrant). Therefore, the district court properly denied the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We deny Washington s motion to place the appeal in abeyance and deny his motion for leave to file a pro se reply brief. legal before We dispense with oral argument because the facts and contentions the court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
