County of Nassau, NY v. Leavitt, No. 09-3193 (2d Cir. 2010)

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09-3193-cv County of Nassau, NY v. Leavitt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2009 (Argued: April 19, 2010 Decided: May 24, 2010) Docket No. 09-3193-cv C OUNTY OF S UFFOLK, N EW Y ORK, F EDERATION E MPLOYMENT AND G UIDANCE S ERVICES, I NC., L ONG I SLAND M INORITY A IDS C OALITION, I NC., T HURSDAY S C HILD, I NC., T RACI B OWMAN, M IRIAM S PAIER, J EROME K NIGHT, and D ONNA U YSAL, Plaintiffs, C OUNTY OF N ASSAU, N EW Y ORK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. K ATHLEEN S EBELIUS, in her official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, M ARY W AKEFIELD, Ph.D., R.N., in her official capacity as Administrator for the Health Resources and Services Administration of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and U NITED S TATES D EPARTMENT OF H EALTH AND H UMAN S ERVICES, Defendants-Appellees. * * The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption of this action to conform to the caption of this opinion. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Before: C ABRANES, W ESLEY, and L IVINGSTON, Circuit Judges. Appeal from a May 22, 2009 order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Seybert, J.), which dismissed plaintiffs claims as moot. We hold that, because the congressional appropriations at issue have been exhausted by the federal agency named as a defendant in this action, no justiciable Article III controversy remains. A FFIRMED. P ETER J. C LINES, (Rosanne M. Harvey, on the brief), Deputy County Attorneys, for Lorna B. Goodman, County Attorney, County of Nassau, Mineola, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant. T HOMAS A. M CF ARLAND, (Varuni Nelson, of counsel), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Central Islip, NY, for Defendants-Appellees. W ESLEY, Circuit Judge: 29 In this action brought pursuant to § 702 of the 30 Administrative Procedure Act, plaintiffs seek additional 31 funding for fiscal years ( FYs ) 2007 and 2008 from a grant 32 program administered by the Department of Health and Human 33 Services ( HHS ) pursuant to the Ryan White HIV/AIDS 34 Treatment Modernization Act of 2006. 35 relating to plaintiffs application for a preliminary 2 In a previous appeal 1 injunction, we held that they had demonstrated a likelihood 2 of success on the merits. 3 dismiss plaintiffs claims, arguing that HHS had awarded the 4 funds at issue to other grant recipients. 5 court verified that the pertinent congressional 6 appropriations had, in fact, been exhausted, and held that 7 plaintiffs claims are moot. 8 9 On remand, defendants moved to The district Despite the seemingly harsh result, we agree with the district court. Obliged, as we are, to avoid issuing 10 advisory opinions, our authority is limited to live cases 11 in which there remains a possibility that the court can 12 grant some form of effectual relief. 13 this one, the scope of available relief is bookended by the 14 government s sovereign immunity, on the one hand, and the 15 Appropriations Clause of the Constitution, on the other. 16 Where, as here, the congressional appropriations relating to 17 the funds sought by private litigants have been lawfully 18 distributed and therefore exhausted by a federal agency, 19 courts lack authority to grant effectual relief in the 20 context of an Article III case or controversy. 21 circumstances, any decision on the ultimate merits of the 22 dispute would be merely advisory, and the claims at issue 3 In an action such as Under such 1 are moot. I. 2 3 Accordingly, we affirm. BACKGROUND Congress passed the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS 4 Resources Emergency Act of 1990 (the Ryan White Act, or 5 the Act ), Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576, in order to 6 make funding available for the development and 7 administration of cost efficient systems for the delivery 8 of essential services to individuals and families with HIV 9 disease. 42 U.S.C. § 300ff. 1 Part A of the Act, titled 10 Emergency Relief for Areas with Substantial Need for 11 Services, directed HHS to award grants to localities that 12 qualified as Eligible Metropolitan Areas, or EMAs. 13 L. No. 101-381, pt. A, § 2601, 104 Stat. at 576; see also 42 14 U.S.C. § 300ff-11 (1991) (original definition of EMA ). 15 HHS awarded grants to New York s Nassau and Suffolk Counties 16 ( Nassau-Suffolk ) as a single EMA in each year through FY 17 2006. 18 19 Fiscal year 2007 began on October 1, 2006. Pub. Almost three months later, on December 19, 2006, Congress amended 1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to the current version of the U.S. Code. For additional discussion of the amendments to the Ryan White Act and the history of plaintiffs grant funding, see County of Nassau, N.Y. v. Leavitt, 524 F.3d 408, 411-13 (2d Cir. 2008). 4 1 the Ryan White Act by creating a second category of funding- 2 eligible entities, referred to as Transitional Grant Areas 3 or TGAs, which were to receive less funding than EMAs. 4 Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Modernization Act of 2006, 5 Pub. L. No. 109-415, § 107, 120 Stat. 2767, 2781; see also 6 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-19. 7 and contained a sunset provision that repealed the Act 8 effective October 1, 2009. 9 Leavitt, 524 F.3d 408, 416 (2d Cir. 2008). 2 The amendments took effect in FY 2007 See County of Nassau, N.Y. v. 10 HHS typically begins to notify recipients of grants 11 under Part A of the Ryan White Act on March 1 of each fiscal 12 year. 13 Nassau-Suffolk on February 12, 2007 that it would be 14 classified as a TGA, rather than an EMA, based on the 2006 15 amendments to the Act. 16 plaintiffs that included Nassau-Suffolk commenced this 17 action to challenge HHS s decision pursuant to § 702 of the 18 Administrative Procedure Act ( APA ), 5 U.S.C. § 702. 3 With respect to FY 2007, however, the agency informed On February 27, 2007, a group of 2 Congress revived the Ryan White Act grant program on October 31, 2009 by enacting the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-87, 123 Stat. 2885. 3 In addition to Nassau and Suffolk Counties, the plaintiffs in the district court included private entities 5 1 Plaintiffs argued that HHS had incorrectly classified 2 Nassau-Suffolk as a TGA, and sought declaratory and 3 injunctive relief directing the agency to return the entity 4 to the EMA funding category. 5 plaintiffs application for a preliminary injunction on 6 March 1, 2007. 7 Civ. 816, 2007 WL 708321, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2007). The district court denied County of Nassau, N.Y. v. Leavitt, No. 07 8 Following that decision, plaintiffs filed an 9 interlocutory appeal with this Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 10 1292(a)(1), as well as a motion for an injunction pending 11 appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 8. 4 12 injunctive relief on May 4, 2007. 13 however, we reversed the district court and held that 14 plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on the 15 merits of their claims. We denied the motion for Almost a year later, See Leavitt, 524 F.3d at 419. in those counties that use Ryan White Act funds to administer HIV- and AIDS-related services, as well as individuals who utilize those services. Although only Nassau County filed a notice of appeal in this action, we use the plural form, plaintiffs, for purposes of clarity. 4 In plaintiffs motion for an injunction pending their appeal, they did not argue that irreparable harm was threatened by the possibility that HHS would exhaust the appropriations at issue. (See Decl. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Mot. for an Expedited Appeal at 5-10, County of Nassau, N.Y. v. Leavitt, No. 07-0825-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2007).) 6 1 On remand, HHS conceded that Nassau-Suffolk was to be 2 funded as an EMA in FY 2009, but defendants moved to dismiss 3 plaintiffs claims relating to FYs 2007 and 2008 as moot. 4 Defendants argument was simple: 5 because HHS had distributed the funds that were appropriated 6 by Congress for those fiscal years to other EMAs. 7 district court expressed concern about the extreme 8 consequences of holding that Plaintiffs claims for the 2007 9 and 2008 fiscal years are moot, and it denied the motion 10 without prejudice in order to examine whether HHS had, in 11 fact, exhausted the appropriations for FYs 2007 and 2008. 12 no relief was available The Defendants then submitted an April 16, 2009 declaration 13 from Douglas H. Morgan, the director of the HHS division 14 that administers the grant program. 15 that, with respect to FYs 2007 and 2008, [n]o remaining . . 16 . funds appropriated by Congress . . . are available for 17 obligation by HHS. 18 court dismissed plaintiffs claims as moot, reasoning that 19 it lack[ed] authority to create . . . special funding or 20 re-organize their scheduled distributions for the upcoming 21 years. The affidavit stated Based on that submission, the district 22 7 II. 1 2 DISCUSSION We review de novo the district court s conclusion that 3 plaintiffs claims are moot. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. 4 Grandeau, 528 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). 5 plaintiffs mount a two-front attack on the lower court s 6 decision. 7 did not absolve the government of its statutory obligations 8 under the Ryan White Act, and that the district court still 9 had the authority and power to enter a judgment declaring On appeal, First, they argue that the absence of funding 10 [defendants] liable for the additional Ryan White [Act] 11 funds that should have been awarded in FYs 2007 and 2008. 12 Second, plaintiffs contend that the district court also 13 erred by holding that they could not seek compensation from 14 the appropriation created by the Judgment Fund, 31 U.S.C. § 15 1304(a). 16 to account for the limitations on this action resulting from 17 the federal government s sovereign immunity and the 18 Appropriations Clause. 19 forth below, we hold that plaintiffs claims are moot. 20 At bottom, however, both of these arguments fail Accordingly, for the reasons set Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts 21 authority that is, our subject matter jurisdiction to 22 disputes involving live cases and controversies. 8 United 1 States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 2005). 2 number of justiciability doctrines govern the contours of 3 this power; pertinent here is mootness, which concerns when 4 and whether a case is live. 5 general rule of mootness, courts subject matter 6 jurisdiction ceases when an event occurs during the course 7 of the proceedings or on appeal that makes it impossible 8 for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a 9 prevailing party. 10 11 A Specifically, under the Id. (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)). 5 An understanding of why plaintiffs claims are moot 12 requires an understanding of the scope of the relief that 13 was available to them in the first instance in this action 14 against HHS and federal employees in their official 15 capacities. 16 waiver, the United States, its agencies, and its employees 17 (when functioning in their official capacities) are immune 18 from suit based on the principle of sovereign immunity. Absent an unequivocally expressed statutory 5 Although there is an exception to this general rule where a dispute is capable of repetition, yet evading review, Quattrone, 402 F.3d at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted), it is inapplicable here in light of, inter alia, HHS s decision to fund Nassau-Suffolk as an EMA during FY 2009. See City of Houston v. Dep t of Housing & Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 9 1 Dep t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260-61 2 (1999). 3 relief, but that is inherent in the doctrine of sovereign 4 immunity. 5 (2d Cir. 2004). 6 This may leave some aggrieved parties without Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 150-51 In this case, plaintiffs escaped this bar by invoking § 7 702 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702, in which Congress enacted a 8 limited waiver of the federal government s sovereign 9 immunity for claims of legal wrong [sustained] because of 10 agency action . . . seeking relief other than money 11 damages. 12 HHS s February 2007 decision to reclassify Nassau-Suffolk as 13 a TGA under the 2006 amendments to the Ryan White Act, and 14 they argue that they are legally entitled to funding as an 15 EMA during FYs 2007 and 2008. 16 understood, § 702 limited the scope of the available relief 17 in such an action from its inception. 18 could only seek relief other than money damages. 19 (emphasis added). 6 Id. The agency action plaintiffs challenge is And, as the district court 6 Plaintiffs therefore Id. Although there are, of course, additional instances in which Congress has waived the federal government s sovereign immunity for other types of claims, plaintiffs have not invoked any of them. 10 1 In this regard, careful attention must be paid to the 2 meaning of money damages in § 702. The fact that a 3 judicial remedy may require one party to pay money to 4 another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the 5 relief as money damages. 6 U.S. 879, 893 (1988) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). 7 this context, the term money damages refers to 8 compensatory relief that functions as a substitute for lost 9 property. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 Rather, in See id. at 895; see also Ward v. Brown, 22 F.3d 10 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1994). 11 [plaintiffs] from seeking [monetary] compensation under § 12 702. 13 2008). 14 of the government s sovereign immunity to the extent that 15 plaintiffs seek to force HHS to return property to Nassau- 16 Suffolk, where the res at issue is the funds appropriated by 17 Congress for this grant program for FYs 2007 and 2008. 18 Thus, sovereign immunity bars Diaz v. United States, 517 F.3d 608, 612 (2d Cir. As such, § 702 only functions as an effective waiver Analytically speaking, the fungibility often associated 19 with money obscures, to some extent, the distinction 20 between: 21 for a harm by providing a substitute for the loss, which is 22 unavailable in an action under § 702; and (2) relief that (1) relief that seeks to compensate a plaintiff 11 1 requires a defendant to transfer a specific res to the 2 plaintiff. 3 of a plaintiff s claims is the public fisc, the 4 Appropriations Clause of the Constitution puts things in 5 perspective: 6 but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. 7 Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 8 be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated 9 by an act of Congress. See Diaz, 517 F.3d at 612. But where the object No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, U.S. In other words, no money can Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 10 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990) (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. 11 United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937)). 12 challenging an agency s expenditure of funds, the res at 13 issue is identified by reference to the congressional 14 appropriation that authorized the agency s challenged 15 expenditure. 16 compensation rather than the specific property the plaintiff 17 aims to recover. 18 falls outside the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity 19 arising from § 702 of the APA. 20 Thus, in cases To seek funds from another source is to seek A claim seeking the former type of relief To our knowledge, our sister Circuit in the District of 21 Columbia is the only federal appellate court that has 22 confronted this juxtaposition of sovereign immunity and the 12 1 Appropriations Clause under the circumstances presented by 2 this case. 7 3 Urban Development, 24 F.3d 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Houston 4 challenged the decision of the Department of Housing and 5 Urban Development ( HUD ) to reduce its FY 1986 community 6 development block grant. 7 action, however, two events occurred: 8 funds at issue to other grant recipients, thereby exhausting In City of Houston v. Department of Housing & Before Houston commenced the 7 (1) HUD awarded the Contrary to plaintiffs assertion, we did not address these issues in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 71 F.3d 475 (2d Cir. 1995). In Aetna, we simply held that it would not have been futile for the plaintiffappellant to amend its pleading in the district court to add a claim pursuant to § 702 of the APA. See id. at 478-79. Although the government asserted that the plaintiff s claims relating to a tax refund were moot because it had paid the refund to another entity, we were in no position to address as the district court did in this case the factual issue of whether the relevant appropriation had been exhausted. Moreover, our statement in Aetna that the government s duty to pay the tax refund did not disappear simply because the money was paid in error to the wrong person, id. at 479, is not inconsistent with the notion, which is applicable here, that a federal court may lack authority to adjudicate the requirements of a duty in a given case. Finally, as discussed infra, unlike the judgment that plaintiffs seek in this case, it appears that there was an available, unexhausted appropriation for the judgment the plaintiff sought: [t]ax refund judgments are payable from the permanent, indefinite appropriation codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1324. See Gov t Accountability Office, 3 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (hereinafter, GAO, Principles ), at 14-40 (3d ed. Sept. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d08978sp.pdf. 13 1 the relevant FY 1986 appropriation; and (2) the FY 1986 2 appropriation authorizing the grants expired and therefore 3 lapsed. 8 4 events served as two independent grounds for dismissing 5 Houston s claims. 6 mooted, a plaintiff must both file its suit before the 7 relevant appropriation lapses and seek a preliminary 8 injunction preventing the agency from disbursing those 9 funds. See id. at 1425. The D.C. Circuit held that these Id. at 1427. [T]o avoid having its case Id. (emphasis in original). The court reasoned 10 that, when a litigant fails to take either step, federal 11 courts are without authority to provide monetary relief 12 because the Appropriations Clause prevents additional funds 13 from being paid out of the Treasury. 14 reasoned further that awarding funds available from sources 8 Id. at 1428. It In City of Houston, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged a narrow exception that, under some circumstances, permits a court to award funds based on an appropriation even after the date when the appropriation lapses, so long as the lawsuit was instituted on or before that date. City of Houston, 24 F.3d at 1426 (first emphasis added) (quoting W. Va. Ass n of Cmty. Health Ctrs. v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Importantly, however, [a]pplication of this equitable doctrine . . . assumes that funds remain after the statutory lapse date. W. Va. Ass n of Cmty. Health Ctrs., 734 F.2d at 1577. In any event, because this appeal does not require us to consider the implications of lapsed as opposed to exhausted appropriations, we do not now pass on the availability of the exception referenced in City of Houston. 14 1 other than the 1986 appropriation would contravene the 2 fundamental requirement of § 702 of the APA that a 3 plaintiff seek relief other than money damages. 4 (emphasis in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). 5 Id. Under City of Houston, which we now follow, plaintiffs 6 claims are moot. In so holding, we are mindful that, unlike 7 in City of Houston, plaintiffs in this case sought to enjoin 8 HHS s expenditure of the funds for FYs 2007 and 2008 before 9 HHS exhausted the relevant appropriations. Thus, whereas 10 the City of Houston plaintiff could be faulted for failing 11 to act, plaintiffs here took action but were unable to 12 preserve the status quo. 13 City of Houston were moot at the time they were filed, 14 plaintiffs claims became moot, despite their efforts, 15 during the course of this litigation. 16 however, these are distinctions without a difference for 17 purposes of the mootness doctrine. 18 Houston court indicated that a plaintiff must seek a 19 preliminary injunction, id. at 1427, its analysis applies 20 with equal force where a plaintiff attempts, but ultimately 21 fails, to enjoin an agency s expenditures. 22 turns on the fact that, irrespective of the status of these As a result, while the claims in 15 Unfortunately, Although the City of Our analysis 1 appropriations when the action was commenced, HHS had 2 exhausted them by the time the proceedings were remanded. 9 3 After this was verified by the district court, the only 4 option remaining to the court [was] that of announcing the 5 fact and dismissing the cause. 6 (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). 7 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. Plaintiffs seek to evade the holding of City of Houston 8 by arguing that, notwithstanding HHS s exhaustion of the 9 appropriations at issue, their claims are not moot because 10 they could collect on a judgment from the appropriation in 11 the Judgment Fund, 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a). 12 is a permanent, indefinite appropriation for the payment of 13 judgments. 14 the availability of this appropriation has limits. 15 constitutes an appropriation of amounts sufficient to pay 16 final judgments . . . and interest and costs, id. at 14- The Judgment Fund GAO, 3 Principles, supra note 7, at 14-31. 9 But It This holding is no broader than the facts of the case before us. There is no indication in the record that HHS distributed Ryan White Act grant funding to other entities that were wrongly classified as EMAs, or that the agency disregarded any legal obligation to avoid dispensing the funds at issue. Nor are we in a position to pass on the veracity of plaintiffs assertion that HHS clearly had time and opportunity to issue or hold back funds. At this point, that is a matter that can only be addressed by resort to the political branches. 16 1 32, only when the sought-after payment is: 2 otherwise provided for by law; (2) certified by the 3 Secretary of the Treasury ; and (3) payable under, inter 4 alia, 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (relating to final judgments entered 5 by federal district courts). 6 (1) not 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a). Moreover, the Judgment Fund does not waive the 7 government s sovereign immunity, and the legal basis for a 8 judgment or award must be found elsewhere in the law. 9 3 Principles, at 14-34. GAO, As noted above, because plaintiffs 10 rely on the government s waiver of its sovereign immunity in 11 § 702 of the APA, the only available remedy is an injunction 12 directing HHS to fund Nassau-Suffolk as an EMA in FYs 2007 13 and 2008 from the appropriations that were authorized by 14 Congress for those years. 15 contrast, would function as a substitute remedy to 16 compensate plaintiffs for losses they suffered during FYs 17 2007 and 2008. 18 damages within the meaning of that term in § 702 of the 19 APA, and the government has not waived its sovereign 20 immunity with respect to such claims. 10 Money from the Judgment Fund, by Such a remedy would constitute money 10 In light of this The GAO has previously taken the position that monetary awards made under the APA and other equitable authorities should be treated no differently than other 17 1 immunity, the district court lacked authority to grant 2 relief based on the Judgment Fund. 3 Finally, even if defendants had waived their immunity, 4 the Judgment Fund s appropriation would not be available 5 because the statute s first requirement that the payment 6 sought must not be otherwise provided for, 31 U.S.C. § 7 1304(a)(1) is not satisfied. 8 source of funds in any given case. 9 14-40. There is only one proper GAO, 3 Principles, at In this case, that source is the congressional 10 appropriations for FYs 2007 and 2008 relating to Part A of 11 the Ryan White Act. 12 particular judgment is otherwise provided for as a matter of Where, as here, payment of a monetary awards when being considered for payment from . . . the Judgment Fund. GAO, 3 Principles, at 14-20 n.47 (citing GAO, In re Judgment Fund & Law Enforcement Seizure Claims, B-259065 (Dec. 21, 1995)). We look to the GAO for authority given its role as the investigative arm of Congress. Med. Soc y of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 976 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Kate Stith, Congress Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1390 (1988) ( While the judicial branch is not bound by the GAO determinations . . . these determinations have been accorded significant deference by courts. ). However, this authority (understandably) offers no view on what are antecedent questions relating to when and whether a court has authority to make monetary awards under the APA in the first place. In fact, in the same publication the GAO acknowledged that [t]he Judgment Fund is not itself a waiver of sovereign immunity. GAO, 3 Principles, at 14-34. Therefore, our sovereign immunity analysis does not conflict in any way with the GAO s position. 18 1 law, the fact that the defendant agency has insufficient 2 funds at that particular time does not operate to make the 3 Judgment Fund available. 4 by the GAO s construction of the operative statutory phrase, 5 and therefore conclude that the appropriations relating to 6 the funds plaintiffs seek are otherwise provided for, 31 7 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1). 8 Fund is concerned, defendants are entitled to sovereign 9 immunity and the statutory prerequisites for access to this Id. at 14-39. We are persuaded Consequently, insofar as the Judgment 10 appropriation are not satisfied. 11 this alternative appropriation is unavailable as a funding 12 source for the remedy plaintiffs seek. III. 13 14 Therefore, we hold that CONCLUSION Defendants acknowledge that, based on our prior 15 interpretation of the statute, see Leavitt, 524 F.3d at 414, 16 HHS misapplied the Ryan White Act s 2006 amendments to 17 Nassau-Suffolk. 18 now been properly funded as an EMA during FY 2009. 19 also no dispute that, by the time this action was remanded 20 to the district court, HHS had exhausted the congressional 21 appropriations relating to FYs 2007 and 2008 of the Ryan 22 White Act grant program. There is no dispute that Nassau-Suffolk has There is However, in light of defendants 19 1 sovereign immunity and the Appropriations Clause, resort to 2 those appropriations was the only remedy available to 3 plaintiffs for their claims. 4 plaintiffs claims relating to FYs 2007 and 2008 are moot 5 because no effectual relief may be granted. 6 We therefore hold that Like the district court, we too are aware of the 7 consequences of the result that we now announce. The 8 principles that govern this appeal, however, stem from the 9 very foundation of our institutional authority. As a court 10 of limited jurisdiction, we are not free to exceed the 11 bounds of the legal framework that governs our operation. 12 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court 13 dismissing plaintiffs claims. 20

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