Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of New York; Metro Fuel LLC. v. City of, No. 09-1553 (2d Cir. 2010)

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09-1553-cv, 09-1571-cv, 09-1554-cv Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. v. City of New York; Metro Fuel LLC. v. City of New York 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F OR THE S ECOND C IRCUIT August Term, 2009 (Argued: November 16, 2009 Decided: February 3, 2010) Docket Nos. 09-1553-cv; 09-1554-cv; 09-1571 (consolidated for disposition) C LEAR C HANNEL O UTDOOR, I NC., A TLANTIC O UTDOOR A DVERTISING, I NC., S CENIC O UTDOOR, I NC., T ROYSTAR C ITY O UTDOOR LLC, and W ILLOW M EDIA, LLC, ConsolidatedPlaintiffs-Appellants, v. C ITY OF N EW Y ORK and P ATRICIA J. L ANCASTER, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Buildings, Defendants-Appellees, E DWARD F ORTIER, Consolidated-DefendantAppellee. M ETRO F UEL LLC, -1- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C ITY OF N EW Y ORK, Defendant-Appellee. Before: P OOLER and W ESLEY, Circuit Judges, and K EENAN, District Judge. * Appeal from an order of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.), entered on March 31, 2009, granting summary judgment to Defendants, and finding that the challenged provisions of the New York City Zoning Resolution do not impose unconstitutional restrictions on Plaintiffs commercial speech rights in violation of the First Amendment or the New York State Constitution. A FFIRMED. V ICTOR A. K OVNER (James Eric Rosenfeld and Linda Jane Steinman, on the brief), Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, New York, New York, for Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. R ICHARD D. E MERY, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP, New York, New York, for Atlantic Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Scenic Outdoor, Inc., Troystar City Outdoor LLC, and Willow Media, LLC. E RIC J. H ECKER, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP, New York, New York, for Metro Fuel. K AREN M. G RIFFIN, New York City Law Department, New * The Honorable John F. Keenan, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. -2- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 York, New York, for The City of New York, Patricia J. Lancaster, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Department of Buildings, and Edward Fortier. W ESLEY, Circuit Judge: I. 8 9 BACKGROUND Plaintiffs, owners of billboards and panel signs in New 10 York City, appeal from an Opinion and Order of the District 11 Court for the Southern District of New York granting summary 12 judgment to Defendants, the City of New York, Patricia J. 13 Lancaster, named in her official capacity as Commissioner of 14 the New York City Department of Buildings, and Edward 15 Fortier, Director of Padlock and Enforcement (collectively 16 the City ). 17 608 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Crotty, J.). 18 district court found that the challenged provisions of New 19 York City s Zoning Resolution did not impose 20 unconstitutional restrictions on Plaintiffs commercial 21 speech rights in violation of the First Amendment or the New 22 York State Constitution. 23 Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of N.Y., The Id. at 481, 508. The district court s opinion applies to two cases, -3- 1 argued in tandem before this Court. 1 2 consolidated action of Plaintiffs Clear Channel Outdoor, 3 Inc., Atlantic Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Scenic Outdoor, 4 Inc., Troystar City Outdoor LLC, and Willow Media, LLC 5 (collectively, the Clear Channel Plaintiffs or Clear 6 Channel ). 7 billboards located near arterial highways in New York City. 2 8 Clear Channel operates an estimated 236 signs throughout New 9 York City; approximately 85 of these signs face arterial The first case is the The Clear Channel Plaintiffs own large 10 highways. 11 this dispute are illuminated and range in size from 315 12 square feet to 11,258 square feet. 13 The Clear Channel signs that form the basis of The Clear Channel Plaintiffs specifically challenge New 14 York City Zoning Resolution §§ 42-55 and 32-662, which ban 15 offsite advertising signs within 200 feet of, and within 16 sight of, arterial highways in manufacturing and commercial 1 The factual background giving rise to these disputes is set out in detail in the district court s opinion. Clear Channel Outdoor, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 481-84. We assume familiarity with that background. 2 The roads designated as arterial highways in New York City include more than 70 expressways, parkways, boulevards, and toll crossings. See N.Y. City Zoning Resolution App x C: Designation of Arterial Highways. -4- 1 districts. 2 regime set forth in New York City Local Law 14 of 2001, 3 Local Law 31 of 2005, and Department of Buildings ( DOB ) 4 Rule 49 (collectively the Regulations ) as applied to their 5 current inventory of arterial signs in New York City. 6 They also challenge the attendant enforcement The second case involves Plaintiff Metro Fuel LLC, 7 which owns smaller panel advertising signs. 3 8 panel signs are internally illuminated poster advertisements 9 that are approximately 24 square feet. Metro Fuel s Metro Fuel s signs 10 are either placed on undeveloped lots, such as parking lots, 11 affixed to the front of businesses, usually at or near 12 ground level, or placed inside parking garages near the 13 means of ingress and egress. Metro Fuel operates an 3 As defined by the New York City regulation, an advertising sign is a sign that directs attention to a business, profession, commodity, service, or entertainment that is conducted, sold, or offered elsewhere than upon the premises where the sign is located. New York City Zoning Resolution § 12-10. A sign is not an advertising sign if it is accessory to a use located on the zoning lot. Id. An accessory sign directs attention to a business or profession conducted on the premises where the sign is located. Id. Accessory signs are permitted in all commercial and manufacturing districts, subject to height, size, illumination, and projection limitations. Id. § 3262. -5- 1 estimated 440 panel signs in New York City. 2 City regulations impact approximately 324 of Metro Fuel s 3 panel signs. 4 The challenged Plaintiff Metro Fuel is not generally affected by the 5 provisions of the Zoning Resolution that address arterial 6 advertising signs. 7 aspects of the Zoning Resolution that control where it may 8 place its panel advertisements, and how it may illuminate 9 them. 10 A. Rather, Metro Fuel challenges those History of the New York City Zoning Resolution 11 Since 1940, New York City s zoning regulations have 12 banned outdoor advertising companies from placing commercial 13 billboards, which do not advertise on-premises businesses, 14 within 200 feet and within view of the City s major parkways 15 and roadways. 16 165 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 17 are defined as business signs in the 1940 Zoning 18 Resolution and as accessory signs in a 1961 revision of 19 the Zoning Resolution. 20 location and illumination restrictions relevant to Metro 21 Fuel s panel signs. See Infinity Outdoor, Inc. v. City of N.Y., On-premises signs The 1961 Zoning Resolution added -6- 1 The basic prohibition contained in the 1940 Zoning 2 Resolution remains in force today in manufacturing and 3 certain commercial districts where advertising signs are 4 permitted. 5 arterial advertising signs were erected and maintained in 6 violation of the Zoning Resolution. 7 the City were rare. 8 9 During the periods between 1940 and 1979 Enforcement efforts by In 1965, Congress enacted the Highway Beautification Act to protect the public investment in highways, to 10 promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, 11 and to preserve natural beauty. 4 12 order to comply with the Highway Beautification Act, New 13 York City granted legal non-conforming status to existing 14 advertising signs that failed to comply with Zoning 15 Resolution provisions, but which complied with state and 16 federal standards. 17 and federal standards remained illegal. 18 23 U.S.C. § 131(a). In The signs that did not comply with state The City Council amended the Administrative Code in 4 States that did not comply with the requirements of the Act would be in jeopardy of losing up to ten percent of their annual federal aid highway funds. See 23 U.S.C. § 131(b). -7- 1 2001 by adopting Local Law 14, which sought to enhance the 2 City s ability to enforce the arterial advertising 3 regulations. 5 4 the President of the New York Outdoor Advertising Group (a 5 then-existing industry group comprised of several outdoor 6 advertising companies) submitted written materials admitting 7 that the outdoor advertising industry unquestionably 8 employed creative methods to obtain building permits for In a public hearing regarding the amendment, 5 Local Law 14 established a permitting scheme for all arterial signs, N.Y. Admin. Code §§ 26-253 to 26-255, created a registration system for outdoor advertising companies, id. § 26-260. The law also imposed a requirement that each outdoor advertising company provide the New York City Department of Buildings ( DOB ) with an inventory of all of its signs, including a certification that all signs are in compliance with the Zoning Resolution. Id. §§ 26-260 to 26-261. In addition, Local Law 14 provided the DOB with the authority to revoke, suspend or refuse to renew the registration of an outdoor advertising company or impose fines or other penalties where it is determined by the Commissioner, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, that an outdoor advertising company made statements that it knew or should have known [we]re false in any application or certification filed with the DOB, failed to provide an inventory of its signs, or otherwise violated the DOB s rules pertaining to outdoor advertising. N.Y. Admin. Code § 26-260(d). Finally, Local Law 14 provided for civil and criminal penalties, and provided a mechanism for the DOB to bring a nuisance abatement action for noncompliance. Id. §§ 26-256, 26-262. -8- 1 arterial highway signs. 2 (emphasis added). 3 Neufeld Decl. ¶ 21, May 12, 2008 The President of the Outdoor Advertising Group did not 4 dispute that the industry routinely claimed that advertising 5 signs would be used for permissible on-premises accessory 6 business purposes in order to obtain permits from the DOB. 7 Despite these representations made to the DOB, the signs 8 were in fact used for offsite advertising purposes, which 9 were proscribed under the applicable regulations. Some 10 outdoor advertising companies, including the Plaintiffs, 11 also erected billboards without obtaining permits of any 12 kind. 13 In 2005, the City Council adopted Local Law 31 that 14 revised Local Law 14 in various ways, but preserved the main 15 requirements and provisions of Local Law 14 at issue in this 16 case. 17 until the DOB promulgated Rule 49 on July 26, 2006. 6 Neither Local Law went into effect in material part 6 Rule 49 requires that outdoor advertising companies submit an inventory of their signs and structures located within 900 feet, and within view, of an arterial highway. Rules of the City of New York § 49-15(a). When applicable, documentation must also be submitted that establishes that a sign has been granted non-conforming use status. Id. § 4915(d)(15). -9- 1 B. 2 The Current Controversy Plaintiffs do not dispute the City s authority to enact 3 and enforce regulations tailored to address outdoor 4 commercial advertising. 5 and inconsistencies in the regulatory regime prevent the 6 regulations from advancing a substantial government 7 interest, rendering it invalid under the First Amendment. 8 1. 9 However, they argue that loopholes The Clear Channel Plaintiffs The Clear Channel Plaintiffs first contend that the 10 City s sporadic enforcement of its regulatory regime from 11 1940 to 2001 undermines its validity. 12 great number of . . . signs were built abutting the arterial 13 highways from 1940 through 2001. 14 issued permits for large accessory signs along the arterial 15 highways, and, without permission, the sign owners converted 16 the signs to advertising signs. 17 the City has sought to newly enforce its ban on arterial 18 advertising signs on private property while permitting 19 offsite advertising signs on government property, including 20 on billboards, bus shelters, subway[] entrances and phone 21 kiosks, several hundred of which are within 200 feet of an -10- They state that a In general, the City Plaintiffs maintain that 1 arterial highway. 7 2 Plaintiffs allege that there are currently between 1,400 3 and 1,600 advertising signs on government or public property 4 on billboards, bus shelters, phone kiosks and subway[] 5 panels on roadways designated as arterial highways or blocks 6 intersecting with arterial highways. 7 In support of this assertion, Plaintiffs next draw our attention to a few specific 8 inconsistencies in the applicable regulations, which the 9 City subsequently remedied. First, two Clear Channel signs, 10 both measuring 960 square feet and located within 200 feet 11 and in view of the Belt Parkway in Brooklyn. 12 commencement of these lawsuits, the City declined to renew 13 Clear Channel s lease to maintain these signs and requested 14 that the signs be taken down. 15 signs on City-owned property located within 200 feet, and 16 within view of, the West Side Highway. 17 acknowledge that the company that operates these signs has Following the Second, arterial advertising 7 Plaintiffs Essentially, Plaintiffs have benefitted from their own misconduct and now suggest to this Court that the City should be precluded from enforcing its zoning scheme because it has not always enforced its regulations in a manner that would allow it to achieve full compliance. That cannot be the law. -11- 1 entered into an agreement with the City to remove these 2 signs. 3 the alleged purposes of the Zoning Resolution and render it 4 an unconstitutional restraint on commercial speech. 5 Yet, Plaintiffs maintain that these signs undermine The Clear Channel Plaintiffs maintain that [o]ne of 6 the most glaring inconsistencies in the regulatory scheme is 7 the exemption for Arterial Advertising Signs on Transit 8 Authority Property. 9 parties disagree over the City s reasons for not enforcing As the district court noted, the 10 its laws on [the property controlled by the Metropolitan 11 Transit Authority ( MTA ), the Port Authority of New York 12 and New Jersey (the Port Authority ), and Amtrak,] and the 13 City s good faith in prospectively enforcing the Zoning 14 Resolution. 15 officials claim that they did not enforce the Zoning 16 Resolution against the MTA, the Port Authority, or Amtrak 17 because they believed that they did not have the authority 18 to do so. 19 authority to enforce the Zoning Resolution against 20 properties owned or controlled by the MTA, including the 21 Long Island Railroad ( LIRR ) and the Metro North Railroad. Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 489. City The City now concedes that it has the legal -12- 1 Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 489. 2 The Clear Channel Plaintiffs take the position that 3 New York City viewed increased revenues for mass transit 4 not aesthetics or traffic safety as the paramount concern 5 in actively supporting an exemption for Transit Authority 6 signs from its zoning regulations. 7 the City has made a concerted effort over several decades . 8 . . not to enforce the Arterial Advertising Ban against 9 billboards on any railroad property, including billboards on Plaintiffs contend that 10 the MTA, LIRR, Conrail, Amtrak and other railroad or Port 11 Authority property. 12 Finally, Plaintiffs dispute the validity of the City s 13 proffered justification for its regulatory scheme the 14 desire to promote traffic safety and aesthetics. 15 assert that there is no credible evidence that these signs, 16 which have stood [illegally] for years and often decades, 17 have created any traffic problems. 18 Inc., Second Am. Compl. ¶ 3. 19 2. 20 21 They Clear Channel Outdoor, Metro Fuel: The Street Furniture Franchise In 2006, the City entered into a 20-year non-exclusive franchise contract (the Street Furniture Franchise ) with a -13- 1 private company, Cemusa, Inc. ( Cemusa ), for the 2 installation, operation, and maintenance of bus shelters, 3 automatic public toilets, newsstands, and other public 4 service structures. 5 shares in revenue generated by advertisements located on the 6 street furniture structures. 7 panels, which are mounted on the railings of sidewalk 8 subway entrances near roads that have been designated by the 9 City as arterial highways and an additional 24 urban panels 10 on subways entrances on blocks that intersect with arterial 11 highways. 12 Pursuant to this contract, the City There are allegedly 128 urban Metro Fuel argues that the City s street furniture 13 franchise allows Cemusa to place advertisements on bus 14 shelters that are similar to their advertisements, but which 15 are not subject to the Zoning Resolution. 16 Fuel alleges that the City expressly amended its 17 Administrative Code to permit advertising on the exterior of 18 newsstands in conjunction with its contract with Cemusa. 19 Metro Fuel maintains that this exception is evidence of the 20 regulation s asserted constitutional infirmity. 21 Indeed, Metro With respect to Metro Fuel, the City concedes that -14- 1 Metro Fuel s panel signs are signs of approximately the 2 same size as, and sited in approximately the same manner as, 3 the advertisements on the City s bus stop shelters. 4 the City maintains that the provisions of the Zoning 5 Resolution which restrict the permissible locations of 6 panels signs, as well as the size, height, and illumination 7 of such signs, are generally designed to protect 8 neighborhood character, consistent with zoning designations, 9 and to address aesthetic concerns. But, Essentially, the City 10 argues that Metro Fuel s panel signs can be permissibly 11 distinguished from the permissible coordinated street 12 furniture. II. 13 14 15 PROCEDURAL HISTORY Clear Channel filed its complaint against Defendants on October 6, 2006. 8 The City moved for summary judgment 8 Subsequent to the filing of Clear Channel s complaint, Atlantic Outdoor, Scenic Outdoor, Troystar City Outdoor, and Willow Media all filed complaints against the City, which were consolidated with the Clear Channel action on October 20, 2006, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). The consolidated Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the arterial advertising restrictions, Local Law 14, Local Law 31, and DOB Rule 49. In response, the City stayed enforcement of the challenged regulations until the -15- 1 against the Clear Channel Plaintiffs on May 12, 2008. On 2 June 23, 2008, the Clear Channel Plaintiffs cross-moved for 3 summary judgment. 4 Defendants on September 21, 2007. 5 for summary judgment or, alternatively, for a preliminary 6 injunction on July 28, 2008. 7 summary judgment against Metro Fuel on August 25, 2008. 8 In a well-reasoned opinion, the district court 9 concluded that there were no issues of material fact in Metro Fuel filed its complaint against Metro Fuel filed a motion The City cross-moved for 10 either of the cases. 11 515. 12 essential, and do not materially affect the outcome of the 13 cases. 14 favor of the City appropriate because the City s zoning 15 regulations . . . satisfy the constitutional test for 16 commercial speech restriction and are not unconstitutionally 17 underinclusive. 18 Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at It held that [a]ny factual disputes are trivial, non- Id. The court found a grant of summary judgment in Id. In reaching its conclusion that the City s zoning 19 regulations pass constitutional muster, the court determined 20 that the City has substantial interests in restricting resolution of this litigation. -16- 1 outdoor advertising signs near highways, its zoning 2 ordinance will directly advance those interests, and the 3 regulations are not more extensive than necessary. 4 The district court found that the few exceptions to the ban 5 on off-site commercial arterial advertising that remain 6 along the City s roads do not undermine the 7 constitutionality of the Zoning Resolution. 8 further noted that the City is permitted to value one type 9 of commercial speech over another. 10 Id. Id. The court Id. at 500. The district court also concluded that the registration 11 and documentation requirements challenged by Plaintiffs 12 also pass constitutional muster. 13 that the provisions of Rule 49 directly advance the City s 14 interests in traffic safety and aesthetics and [that] . . . 15 the regulations are narrowly tailored to meet the City s 16 goals. 17 Id. at 515. It ruled Id. at 507. Finally, the district court rejected Plaintiffs 18 challenge based on the New York State Constitution. See 19 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8. 20 the case law or in the parties arguments that the New York 21 State courts impose a stricter test for commercial speech It found no indication either in -17- 1 regulation. Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 508. III. 2 3 A. DISCUSSION Standard of Review 4 It is well settled that summary judgment may be granted 5 only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). 7 court s grant of summary judgment. 8 v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 9 2009). We review de novo the district N.Y. State Rest. Ass n The scope of our review . . . does not change 10 where, as here, summary judgment was granted to one party 11 and denied to the other in the procedural context of cross- 12 motions. 13 each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment. 14 N.Y. State Ass n of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 15 838 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations, quotation marks, and 16 alteration omitted). 17 claims are raised under the First Amendment, we have an 18 obligation to make an independent examination of the whole 19 record. 20 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 B. Indeed, cross-motions are no more than a claim by In cases such as this one, in which Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 The Central Hudson Test -18- 1 It is clear that the advertisements in question involve 2 commercial speech. 3 Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1998). 4 Hudson, the Supreme Court articulated the current test for 5 assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on 6 commercial speech. 9 7 Serv. Comm n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980); see also Thompson 8 v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002) 9 (reaffirming application of Central Hudson test in 10 11 See Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. State In Central Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. commercial speech cases). As a threshold matter, in order to warrant First 12 Amendment protection under the Central Hudson framework, the 13 communication must be neither misleading nor related to 14 unlawful activity. 15 speech at issue in this case is lawful and not misleading, 16 and therefore entitled to First Amendment protection, is not 17 in dispute. 18 19 447 U.S. at 564. That the commercial See Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 494 n.21. A governmental entity that wishes to regulate protected commercial speech must assert a substantial interest to be 9 For a brief recitation of the development of the commercial speech doctrine, see, for example, United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993). -19- 1 achieved by the restrictions. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 2 564. 3 appearance of a city and maintaining traffic safety are 4 substantial government goals. 10 5 of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981); see also 6 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001); 7 Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 8 U.S. 789, 806-07 (1984); Long Island Bd. of Realtors, Inc. 9 v. Vill. of Massapequa Park, 277 F.3d 622, 627-28 (2d Cir. The twin goals of protecting the aesthetic Metromedia, Inc. v. City 10 2002). 11 interests in this case are substantial. 12 Plaintiffs do not disagree that the City s asserted In order to satisfy constitutional requirements, as set 13 out in Central Hudson, the restriction must satisfy two 14 further criteria. First, the restriction must directly 10 Additionally, we have held that a governmental entity need not rely on the justifications offered . . . when the [regulation] was enacted, since any insufficiency in the original motivation does not diminish other interests that the restriction may now serve. Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 461 n.5 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiffs assert that the City s proffered justifications for the Zoning Resolution were not raised at the time of its enactment, such complaints do not further their position in this litigation. -20- 1 advance the state interest involved ; and second, it must 2 not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that 3 interest. 4 bears the burden of establishing a reasonable fit between 5 the [regulatory scheme s] ends and the means chosen to 6 accomplish those ends. 7 Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 414 (1993) (internal quotation 8 marks omitted). Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 566. The City City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 9 10 11 12 C. The City is Not Required to Adopt the Least Restrictive Means of Regulating Outdoor Commercial Advertising 13 to adopt the least restrictive means of advancing its 14 asserted interests. 15 v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). 16 made clear, commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure 17 of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in 18 the scale of First Amendment values, and is subject to 19 modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the 20 realm of noncommercial expression. 11 The dictates of Central Hudson do not require the City Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. 11 As the Supreme Court has Id. (quoting Ohralik Commercial speech requires less robust protection than other forms of speech that must be more carefully guarded, such as political or religious speech. This is so because commercial speech is more durable than other types -21- 1 2 v. Ohio State Bar Ass n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). In declining to require that the government employ the 3 least restrictive means in regulating commercial speech, the 4 Supreme Court has explained that this means that we have 5 not insisted that there be no conceivable alternative, but 6 only that the regulation not burden substantially more 7 speech than is necessary to further the government s 8 legitimate interests. 9 guess the [g]overnment s judgment to that effect. And we have been loath to secondFox, 492 10 U.S. at 478 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); 11 see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass n, Inc. v. United 12 States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999). 13 is a fit between the legislature s ends and the means chosen 14 to accomplish those ends a fit that is not necessarily 15 perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the Thus, what is require[d] of speech, since it is the offspring of economic selfinterest. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). And, commercial speech is also understood as less central to the interests of the First Amendment than other forms of speech. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 n.5 (1985). The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. -22- 1 single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion 2 to the interest served. 3 citations and quotation marks omitted). 4 Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (internal Supreme Court precedent instructs that, if the City s 5 determination about how to regulate outdoor commercial 6 advertising is reasonable and we find that it is in this 7 case then we should defer to that determination. 8 v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989); see also 9 Riel v. City of Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 753-54 (3d Cir. See Ward 10 2007) (stating that government should not be left with a 11 choice of enacting a regulation banning [or burdening] all 12 signs in a particular geographic area or none (internal 13 quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). 14 considering the validity of the City s zoning scheme, we 15 must examine the regulations in relation to the overall 16 problem the government seeks to correct. 17 801. 18 And, in Ward, 491 U.S. at In this case, Metro Fuel characterizes the City s 19 regulatory scheme as premised on a radical urban design 20 theory. 21 guess the City s urban planning decisions. However, it is not this Court s role to second -23- Similarly, the 1 Clear Channel Plaintiffs contend that the City should have 2 adopted a size and spacing regulatory regime. 3 rejection of an alternative model does not invalidate the 4 regime selected by the City. 5 478; Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 398 F.3d 814, 6 820-21 (6th Cir. 2005); Treadwell, 294 F.3d at 463. 7 However, the City is afforded considerable leeway . . . in 8 determining the appropriate means to further a legitimate 9 governmental interest, even when enactments incidentally The City s See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 10 limit commercial speech. Vill. of Massapequa Park, 277 11 F.3d at 627-28; see also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 12 815-16; Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, 513 F.3d 13 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2008). That the City considered, and 14 rejected, an alternative scheme is of no constitutional 15 moment. 16 D. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797-98. Underinclusivity 17 In this case, Plaintiffs challenge to the zoning 18 regime under the final two prongs of Central Hudson centers 19 primarily on their contention that the regulations are 20 unconstitutionally underinclusive. 21 Zoning Resolution does not fit with the City s stated -24- They argue that the 1 2 objectives. See Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 427-28. The Supreme Court has explained that a regulation may 3 be unconstitutional if it in effect restricts too little 4 speech because its exemptions discriminate on the basis of 5 the signs messages. 6 50-51 (1994). 7 content-based discrimination in this case. 12 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, There is no basis for finding this form of 12 Cf. Linmark There is also no basis for a finding that the City s Zoning Resolution impermissibly favors government speech over private speech. It is well established that, [i]n the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). However, the zoning regulations at issue cannot be said to function as an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people. Ladue, 512 U.S. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the zoning scheme is an attempt to control the location of outdoor commercial advertising. See Field Day, LLC v. County of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2006). While the City may not discriminate between speakers or viewpoints, it may value one category of commercial speech over another where it has valid reasons for doing so. Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511-12). Thus, the City is free to value a controlled and harmonious streetscape without compromising its ability to restrict uncontrolled and obtrusive advertising on the City s arterial road network. Id. And, [t]he City has stated that it will enforce the Zoning Resolution against all billboards on City and government property, where it is -25- 1 Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-98 2 (1977); Nat l Adver. Co. v. Town of Niagra, 942 F.2d 145, 3 147-48 (2d Cir. 1991). 4 A related form of impermissible underinclusivity is 5 presented by a regulation that draws arbitrary distinctions, 6 or that draws distinctions that bear[] no relationship 7 whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has 8 asserted. 9 contend the Zoning Resolution is underinclusive because no 10 meaningful distinctions exist between their regulated signs 11 and billboards, and legally permissible advertising. 12 regulation may also be deemed constitutionally problematic 13 if it contains exceptions that undermine and counteract 14 the government s asserted interest. 15 Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995). 16 underinclusivity are at the heart of Plaintiffs challenge. 17 1. 18 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 424. Plaintiffs A Rubin v. Coors Brewing These two forms of Metromedia Governs Plaintiffs Challenge The Supreme Court s decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. 19 City of San Diego is controlling. 20 relevant portion of the ordinance at issue in Metromedia empowered and authorized to do so. -26- 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Id. The 1 banned offsite commercial advertising signs, but not onsite 2 signs. 13 3 exception for signs falling within 12 specified 4 categories. 14 5 argued that the city denigrates its interest in traffic 6 safety and beauty and defeats its own case by permitting 7 onsite advertising and other specified signs. 8 11. 9 Id. at 493 n.1. Id. at 494. The ordinance also provided an In Metromedia, the plaintiffs Id. at 510- The Court rejected the Metromedia plaintiffs 10 underinclusivity argument. It held that even though the 11 ordinance did not apply to onsite advertising, it still 12 directly advanced the City of San Diego s interests in 13 The ordinance at issue in Metromedia also banned noncommercial signage. A majority of the Court upheld the regulation only as it pertained to commercial speech. See 453 U.S. at 512-13. In this appeal, we are only concerned with the City s regulation of outdoor advertising of billboards and signs containing commercial speech. 14 The specified categories exempted from the City of San Diego s sign ordinance included: government signs; signs located at public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported or stored within the city, if not used for advertising purposes; signs within malls, courts, and arcades; for sale and for lease signs; signs on public and commercial vehicles; signs depicting time, temperature, and news; signs on public transportation, including buses and taxis; and signs on commercial vehicles. 453 U.S. at 494-95. -27- 1 traffic safety and aesthetics. 2 concluded that the city could permissibly distinguish 3 between different forms of advertisements. 4 Lastly, the Supreme Court held that it did not offend the 5 Constitution for San Diego to distinguish between the 6 relative value of different categories of commercial 7 speech. 8 9 Id. at 511. The Court Id. at 511-12. Id. at 514. Plaintiffs in this case argue that the City violates the protections afforded commercial speech when it 10 distinguishes between their signs or billboards and those 11 located on government property. 12 already rejected the argument that a prohibition against 13 the use of unattractive signs cannot be justified on 14 [a]esthetic grounds if it fails to apply to all equally 15 unattractive signs wherever they might be located. 16 Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810. 17 despite its exceptions, New York City s Zoning Resolution 18 directly advances its interests in traffic safety and 19 aesthetics. 20 P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 342 (1986). 21 Court made explicit reference to the exceptions to the ban But, the Supreme Court has It is clear that, See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of -28- Indeed, in Metromedia, the 1 of offsite advertising, but did not find the exemptions 2 constitutionally problematic. 3 453 U.S. at 495. Plaintiffs argument hinges, in part, on the assertion 4 that the City s regulatory regime runs afoul of the First 5 Amendment because it does not fully accomplish the 6 articulated objectives. 7 contentions, the Supreme Court has previously rejected that 8 argument. 9 Metromedia, the Court rejected the same contention raised However, contrary to Plaintiffs Of particular relevance to this case, in 10 here: that the ban on offsite advertising was 11 unconstitutionally underinclusive because it did not extend 12 to onsite advertising. 13 U.S. at 342 (rejecting the claim that a ban on promotional 14 advertising of casino gambling aimed at Puerto Rican 15 residents was invalid because other types of gambling were 16 permitted to be advertised to local residents). 17 Id. at 511; see also Posadas, 478 Plaintiffs next argue that the City s contract to 18 permit coordinated advertising on street furniture makes the 19 Zoning Resolution unconstitutionally underinclusive. 20 this point, we find persuasive the Ninth Circuit s decision 21 in Metro Lights, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898 -29- On 1 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, No. 09-259, S. Ct. , 2009 2 WL 2761319 (Dec. 14, 2009). 3 Circuit considered the question of whether a city violates 4 the First Amendment by prohibiting most offsite commercial 5 advertising while simultaneously contracting with a private 6 party to permit sale of such advertising at city-owned 7 transit stops. 8 to the one presented here. 9 contracted with Cemusa for the installation, operation, and In Metro Lights, the Ninth 551 F.3d at 900. This scenario is similar In this case, the City 10 maintenance of bus shelters, automatic public toilets, 11 newsstands, and other public service structures. 12 plaintiff in Metro Lights, like Plaintiffs here, made the 13 alleged underinclusivity of the zoning regime the 14 centerpiece of its First Amendment challenge on appeal. 15 551 F.3d at 904. 16 plaintiff s underinclusivity challenge. 17 conclude that the same result is appropriate here. 18 In Metro Lights, Los Angeles argued that the The The Metro Lights court rejected See id. at 911. We 19 proliferation of offsite advertising by numerous and 20 disparate private parties creates more distracting ugliness 21 than a single, controlled series of advertisements on city -30- 1 property over which the City wields contractual 2 supervision. 3 the city s argument, based on the reasoning and holding of 4 Metromedia. 5 that the controlled advertising regime established by its 6 contract with Cemusa is sufficiently distinct from 7 Plaintiffs advertising that is subject to the zoning 8 restrictions. 9 defer to the City s judgment in controlling the placement of Id. at 910. Id. The Metro Lights court accepted We similarly accept the City s argument And, as in Metromedia and Metro Lights, we 10 outdoor advertising. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512; Metro 11 Lights, 551 F.3d at 910-11. 12 13 14 15 2. 16 applies to their challenge to the New York City Zoning 17 Resolution. 18 However, they contend that more recent Supreme Court cases, 19 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 20 (1993), Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), and 21 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass n, Inc. v. United States, 527 22 U.S. 173 (1999) require that we strike down the City s 23 zoning regime. Discovery Network, Rubin and Greater New Orleans Dictate the Same Result as Metromedia Plaintiffs do not explicitly dispute that Metromedia Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 495. We reject Plaintiffs argument; we are -31- 1 persuaded that the exceptions to the Zoning Resolution do 2 not undermine [or] counteract its effects, Rubin, 514 U.S. 3 at 489, and that the regulations directly and materially 4 advance[] [the City s] aim. 5 at 193. 6 Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. In resolving disputes, we should follow the case which 7 directly controls. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 8 Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 9 discussed, the Supreme Court s decision in Metromedia is As already 10 most directly on point. It is particularly significant, in 11 the First Amendment context, that the Supreme Court has 12 pointed out that [e]ach method of communicating ideas is a 13 law unto itself and that law must reflect the differing 14 natures, values, abuses and dangers of each method. 15 Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501. 16 here with the law of billboards. 17 has held, signs pose distinctive problems that are subject 18 to municipalities police powers. 19 This is so because signs take up space and may obstruct 20 views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for 21 land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for As in Metromedia, [w]e deal -32- Id. And, as the Court Ladue, 512 U.S. at 48. 1 regulation. 2 are distinguished below, must be evaluated in light of this 3 distinct First Amendment factual and legal context. 4 Id. The cases relied on by Plaintiffs, which First, Discovery Network is distinguishable from our 5 case. In that case, the City of Cincinnati drew a 6 distinction between news racks containing commercial 7 publications and news racks containing newspapers. 8 distinction bore no relationship whatsoever to the 9 particular interests that [Cincinnati] ha[d] asserted. The 507 10 U.S. at 424 (emphasis in original). By contrast, there is 11 clearly a relationship between the City s Zoning Resolution, 12 which regulates the placement of outdoor commercial 13 advertising, and its interest in aesthetics and traffic 14 safety. 15 conclude that the regulations are part of a substantial 16 effort to advance a valid state interest. 17 Brewery, 134 F.3d at 100. Evaluating the zoning scheme as a whole, we Bad Frog 18 Second, in Discovery Network, the city asserted an 19 interest in [a]esthetics, but the regulated news racks were 20 no greater an eyesore than those left unregulated. 21 425. Id. at Indeed, the regulated and unregulated news racks were -33- 1 identical. 2 regardless of their contents. 15 3 we defer to the City s judgment that unregulated signage and 4 billboards are a greater eyesore than coordinated street 5 furniture bearing advertisements. 6 Discovery Network ran afoul of the principles articulated in 7 Central Hudson because there was no logical connection 8 between the interests asserted by Cincinnati and the 9 regulatory scheme. 10 11 Therefore, they were all equally at fault, Id. at 426. In this case, The regulation in Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 905. The same cannot be said of New York City s Zoning Resolution. Third, the benefit from the regulation in Discovery 12 Network was deemed to be minute or paltry. 507 U.S. at 13 441 (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 a sufficient basis to believe that the impact of the 15 zoning regulations will substantially advance its proffered 16 interests. 17 Media, LLC v. City of Houston, 584 F.3d 220, 226-27 (5th 18 Cir. 2009). Here, the City has See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508; see also RTM Finally, the City of Cincinnati enacted a 15 There was an additional concern in Discovery Network that the regulated commercial speech was not sufficiently distinguishable from unregulated non-commercial speech. 507 U.S. at 419. No similar concern is implicated on the facts of the cases presently before this Court. -34- 1 sweeping ban that bar[red] from its sidewalks a whole class 2 of constitutionally protected speech. 3 507 U.S. at 430. 4 action. 5 control the placement of outdoor advertising. 6 Discovery Network, The City of New York has taken no such Rather, it has simply enacted regulations that In Rubin, the Supreme Court found that a provision of 7 the Federal Alcohol Administration Act ( FAAA ) that 8 prohibited disclosure of the alcohol content of beer on 9 labels or in advertising violated the First Amendment. 514 10 U.S. at 478. 11 curbing strength wars by beer brewers who might seek to 12 compete for customers on the basis of alcohol content. 13 at 483. 14 Firearms simultaneously required disclosure of alcohol 15 content on the labels of wine and spirits. 16 Court held that the portion of the FAAA at issue failed to 17 advance the interest in suppressing strength wars 18 sufficiently to justify the ban. 19 The government s asserted interest was in Id. However, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Id. at 484. The Id. at 486. Rubin is easily distinguishable from our case; Rubin 20 involved an attempt to suppress[] the free flow of factual 21 information. Id. at 484. Here, the City makes no attempt -35- 1 to limit the free flow of factual commercial information, 2 which the Supreme Court has deemed indispensable to the 3 proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system . 4 . . [and] indispensable to the formation of intelligent 5 opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or 6 altered. 7 Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). 8 Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Rubin is further distinguishable from the factual 9 scenario presented by these appeals because the relevant 10 provision of the FAAA could not directly and materially 11 advance [the government s] asserted interest because of the 12 overall irrationality of the . . . regulatory scheme. 13 U.S. at 488. 14 framework ensure[d] that the labeling ban [would] fail to 15 achieve the government s asserted interest. 16 This was so because other provisions of the same Act 17 directly undermine and counteract its effects. 18 Irrespective of its exceptions, it simply cannot be said 19 that the Zoning Resolution at issue undermines and 20 counteracts its stated ends. 21 challenged by Plaintiffs present an integrated effort by the 514 Indeed, the unique and puzzling regulatory Id. at 489. Id. Rather, the zoning regulations -36- 1 City to reduce visual clutter, to improve the overall 2 aesthetic appearance of the City, and to regulate traffic 3 safety. 4 types of commercial speech over others, Metromedia, 453 U.S. 5 at 512, does not make the regulation irrational. 6 The fact that the City has chosen to value some In Greater New Orleans, the Supreme Court struck down a 7 law that banned broadcast advertising for most private 8 casinos but exempted, among others, advertising for Indian 9 tribal casinos. Metro Lights, 551 F.3d at 905 (citing 527 10 U.S. 195-96). 11 broadcasting ban directly advanced its interest in 12 alleviating the social costs of casino gambling by limiting 13 demand. 14 the Court found the regulation failed to pass constitutional 15 scrutiny under Central Hudson because forbidding advertising 16 of some casinos but not others merely channel[s] gamblers 17 to one casino rather than another. 18 regulation was entirely self-defeating. 19 551 F.3d at 906. 20 21 The government maintained that the Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 189. Id. However, Thus, the See Metro Lights, The distinctions drawn by the Zoning Resolution between permissible and impermissible locations for outdoor -37- 1 commercial advertising are meaningful and do not defeat the 2 purpose of the City s regulatory scheme. 3 legitimately allow limited and controlled advertising on 4 street furniture, while also reducing clutter on City 5 sidewalks. 6 require a city to allow all similar signs. 7 scheme does not result in a mere channeling effect. 8 City s interests in aesthetics, preservation of neighborhood 9 character, and traffic safety continue to be advanced, even The City may Allowing some signs does not constitutionally The zoning The 10 though limited and controlled advertising is permitted on 11 street furniture. 12 As we have previously noted, the Supreme Court has 13 made clear that underinclusiveness will not necessarily 14 defeat a claim that a state interest has been materially 15 advanced. 16 U.S. at 343; Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511). 17 exceptions to the Zoning Resolution do not render the scheme 18 unconstitutional. 19 E. 20 21 Treadwell, 294 F.3d at 463 (citing Posadas, 478 Here, the Plaintiffs Inverse Mootness Argument Must Fail Plaintiffs maintain that post-litigation actions taken by the City are insufficient to cure the alleged -38- 1 constitutional violation or to render the examples of 2 infringement inapplicable to their challenge. 3 objects to Plaintiffs characterization of its efforts to 4 enforce its zoning regulations as litigation inspired. 5 the City does not argue that Plaintiffs First Amendment 6 challenge is moot, and rightly so. 7 who argue that this Court should apply a principle used in 8 analyzing questions of mootness to this case. 9 in effect, that recent enforcement actions taken by the City The City But, Rather, it is Plaintiffs They contend, 10 should be disregarded by this Court when considering the 11 import of their examples of exceptions to the Zoning 12 Resolution. 13 doctrine on which Plaintiffs seek to rely are inapposite 14 here. 15 However, the principles of the mootness In analyzing a mootness challenge, factual changes 16 made by a defendant after litigation has commenced cannot 17 render a case moot unless it is absolutely clear the 18 defendant cannot resume the allegedly offending conduct. 19 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 20 Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). 21 this case, nothing prevents the City from resuming the -39- Plaintiffs contend that, in 1 offending conduct. 2 burden of persua[ding] the court that the challenged conduct 3 cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with 4 the City. 5 alteration in original). 6 They further assert that the heavy Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted and The voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activity 7 may render a case moot if the defendant can demonstrate 8 that (1) there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged 9 violation will recur and (2) interim relief or events have 10 completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the 11 alleged violation. 12 706 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 Here, however, it is Plaintiffs who have erected signs and 14 billboards in contravention of City zoning regulations. 15 Essentially, Plaintiffs complain of a self-inflicted wound. 16 They violated the City s duly enacted zoning ordinance and 17 seek to justify continued violation by citing a prior 18 history of lax enforcement. 19 enforcement are not the stuff of economic expectations. 20 Governments generally are not estopped by the misdeeds of 21 their agents or employees. Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, Meager past efforts at zoning See, e.g., Petrelli v. City of -40- 1 Mount Vernon, 9 F.3d 250, 256-57 (2d Cir. 1993). 2 [P]rinciples of laches or estoppel do not bar a 3 municipality from enforcing ordinances that have been 4 allowed to lie fallow. 5 Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994). 6 LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret Inc. v. In other words, Plaintiffs suggest that the City will 7 simply revert to a pattern of non-enforcement after the 8 resolution of this litigation. 9 unpersuasive. This argument is First, the record demonstrates that the 10 City s current efforts to remove signs from government 11 property began well before this litigation was instituted. 12 Second, Plaintiffs speculation that the City will fail to 13 enforce its regulations is insufficient. 14 Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 310 15 (2d Cir. 2008). 16 will exhibit bad faith in failing to enforce its regulations 17 in an evenhanded manner in the future is similarly 18 unavailing. 19 accorded to a [governmental entity s] representations that 20 certain conduct has been discontinued, Lamar Adver. of 21 Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 376 (2d See Major League Plaintiffs bare allegation that the City Indeed, just as [s]ome deference must be -41- 1 Cir. 2004), the City is entitled to deference with respect 2 to its assurances that it has undertaken a good-faith 3 enforcement effort. 4 In order to demonstrate that the Zoning Resolution is 5 tailored to serve a substantial interest, the City must 6 continue its enforcement efforts. 7 Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 16-17 (2d Cir. 8 1999). 9 defeat the City s asserted interest by violating the See Lisa s Party City, However, this does not mean that Plaintiffs can 10 regulation. Plaintiffs argument that we should disregard 11 the City s recent enforcement efforts in our analysis 12 confuses two concepts. 13 City is entitled to deference in crafting its zoning 14 regulations. 15 But, the requirement that a municipality enforce its zoning 16 ordinance does not bear on the permissibility or 17 impermissibility of exceptions that are part of the 18 regulatory scheme. 19 existence of the challenged exceptions, here, the Zoning 20 Resolution constitutes an appropriate fit with the City s 21 asserted ends. In regulating commercial speech, the Vill. of Massapequa Park, 277 F.3d at 627-28. As articulated above, assuming the Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486. -42- 1 Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting 2 to create a material issue of disputed fact based on their 3 claim that the City did little or nothing to enforce the 4 Arterial Advertising Ban for decades, this is insufficient 5 to defeat the City s motion for summary judgment. 6 Ave. Tower Assocs. v. City of N.Y., 746 F.2d 135, 141 (2d 7 Cir. 1984). 8 forward with admissible evidence that the City will fail to 9 enforce its zoning regulations in the future. See Park Plaintiffs have not met their burden to come To the 10 contrary, the evidence suggests that the City is now 11 undertaking a concerted effort to enforce the Zoning 12 Resolution. 13 14 15 16 17 F. 18 documentation and registration requirements set out in Local 19 Laws 14 and 31, and Department of Buildings ( DOB ) Rule 49 20 are unconstitutional under the standards established by 21 Central Hudson. 22 satisfied by an outdoor advertising company that seeks to 23 demonstrate that one of its signs should be accorded non- New York City s Registration and Documentation Scheme is a Constitutionally Permissible Regulation of Commercial Speech The Clear Channel Plaintiffs argue that the Rule 49 lays out the criteria that must be -43- 1 conforming use status. Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 2 504. 3 to the Zoning Resolution and may carry offsite arterial 4 advertising. A sign with non-conforming use status is not subject Id. 5 Plaintiffs maintain that the documentation and 6 registration requirements do not materially advance the 7 City s interests. 8 commercial copy on existing signs with non-commercial copy. 9 Plaintiffs also argue that the requirements are unduly 10 onerous because much of the documentary evidence is now 11 unavailable. 12 industry s history of non-compliance with zoning 13 regulations, the registration and documentation requirements 14 are narrowly tailored and not more extensive than necessary 15 to aid the City in its enforcement efforts. 16 Plaintiffs insist that they will replace We disagree. Given the outdoor advertising The City s decision to place the onus on outdoor 17 advertising companies to demonstrate that signs and 18 billboards are entitled to non-conforming use status is a 19 reasonable regulatory choice. 16 16 The fact that the Clear To the extent that DOB Rule 49 simply requires disclosure of factual information that allows the City to determine whether outdoor advertising billboards comply with -44- 1 Channel Plaintiffs have not preserved documents that would 2 allow them to obtain non-conforming use status does not make 3 DOB Rule 49, or the attendant local laws, constitutionally 4 troubling. 17 5 Plaintiffs argument that DOB Rule 49 does not pass 6 constitutional scrutiny because they will simply convert 7 their signs into signs bearing non-commercial copy is 8 unavailing. 9 every front before it can make progress on any front. The City is not required to make progress on Edge 10 Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 434. Therefore, the City is not 11 required to show that the operation of the local laws and 12 DOB Rule 49 will result in the elimination of every sign 13 improperly claiming non-conforming use status. 14 Outdoor, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d at 417-19. 15 and documentation provisions present a solution that is a 16 reasonable fit with the City s substantial interest in See Infinity The registration the applicable zoning regulations, our review is more lenient than our review of regulations that restrict accurate commercial speech. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009). 17 Some signs and billboards most assuredly will not have any documentation. None was ever submitted for those signs erected illegally. -45- 1 achieving compliance with the Zoning Resolution. See 2 Treadwell, 294 F.3d at 461-62. 3 required. 4 5 6 7 G. 8 of Appeals has construed the provision of the New York State 9 Constitution that pertains to freedom of speech, N.Y. Const. That is all that is Plaintiffs New York State Constitutional Challenge was Properly Rejected by the District Court As recognized by the district court, the New York Court 10 art. I, § 8, as containing language that may be read more 11 expansively than the First Amendment. 18 12 v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 529 n.3 (1988) 13 ( The protection afforded by the guarantees of free press 14 and speech in the New York Constitution is often broader 15 than the minimum required by the First Amendment. ). 16 result, the New York Court of Appeals has, at times, 17 interpreted Article I, § 8 in a manner that is distinct or 18 more protective of free expression than the safeguards 19 afforded by the First Amendment to the federal Constitution. 18 See, e.g., O Neill As a In relevant part, Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution states: Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press. -46- 1 See Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 248-49 2 (1991) (Kaye, J.); see also People v. Ferber, 57 N.Y.2d 256, 3 259 (1982) (per curiam). 4 [f]reedom of expression in books, movies and the arts, the 5 New York Court of Appeals has held that the minimal 6 national standard established by the Supreme Court for First 7 Amendment rights cannot be considered dispositive in 8 determining the scope of [New York s] constitutional 9 guarantee of freedom of expression. 10 For example, in discussing People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557-58 (1986). 11 We affirm the district court s holding with respect to 12 the Clear Channel Plaintiffs state law claim to the extent 13 that the court determined that, under the circumstances 14 presented by this case, the New York Court of Appeals has 15 not articulated a stricter standard for regulation of 16 commercial speech than that imposed by the federal 17 Constitution. 19 See Clear Channel, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 508- 19 Even if the category of commercial speech is more narrowly circumscribed under New York law, see, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Ins. Info. Inst., 554 N.Y.S.2d 590, 592 (1st Dep t 1990), no party disputes that the speech at issue in this litigation is properly defined as commercial speech. -47- 1 09. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals has explicitly 2 invoked the Central Hudson test in evaluating restrictions 3 on commercial speech. 4 172-73 (1984); Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 5 147 (1980). 6 holding that the City s zoning regulations do not offend the 7 New York State Constitution. Therefore, we affirm the district court s IV. 8 9 See In re von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 10 challenged provisions of the New York City Zoning Resolution 11 do not impose unconstitutional restrictions on Plaintiffs 12 commercial speech rights in violation of the First Amendment 13 or the New York State Constitution. 14 Plaintiffs remaining arguments, and find them to be without 15 merit. 16 summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and its order of 17 March 31, 2009 is hereby A FFIRMED. We have considered Accordingly, the district court properly granted -48-

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