United States v. Flaherty, No. 06-3081 (2d Cir. 2008)

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06-3081-cv United States v. Flaherty 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2007 4 (Argued: June 24, 2008 Decided: August 19, 2008) 5 6 Docket No. 06-3081-cv 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. MERGENT SERVICES and JOHN BAL, 24 District Court for the Southern District of New York (Harold 25 Baer, Jr., Judge). The pro se appellant brought a False Claims 26 Act qui tam action. Concluding that qui tam actions cannot be 27 brought pro se, the district court dismissed the complaint. 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 affirm. Plaintiff-Appellants, - v. - MARIE FLAHERTY, Defendant-Appellee. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B e f o r e: WINTER, MINER, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges. Appeal from a dismissal of a complaint in the United States JOHN BAL, pro se. Marie Flaherty, pro se. We 1 2 WINTER, Circuit Judge: John Bal appeals from Judge Baer s dismissal of his 3 complaint. 4 proceeding pro se may bring False Claims Act qui tam actions as 5 relators for the United States. 6 of action are not personal to relators, they are statutorily 7 barred from bringing such actions pro se. 8 affirm. 9 The principal issue is whether private persons 10 Because False Claims Act causes Accordingly, we BACKGROUND We briefly summarize the relevant facts as they pertain to 11 this appeal. On May 23, 2005, Bal, proceeding pro se, filed this 12 action against Marie Flaherty on behalf of the United States, 13 himself, and his company, Mergent Services. 14 complaint alleges that Flaherty failed to pay Bal for air 15 purifying equipment that he provided to her. 16 allegedly submitted a false receipt to New York State s 17 Individual and Family Grant Program (Grant Program) in an effort 18 to be reimbursed for costs she never incurred. 19 Program, funded in part by the Federal Emergency Management 20 Agency (FEMA), assisted New York residents with disaster-related 21 needs following the attack on New York City on September 11, 22 2001. 23 reimbursement to Flaherty as a result of her fraudulent scheme. The amended Flaherty then The Grant The complaint alleges that FEMA provided a $1,750 2 1 Alleging that Flaherty s conduct defrauded the federal 2 government in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 3 et seq., Bal brought this qui tam action as relator for the 4 United States.1 5 including defamation, unlawful retaliation, and deceit. 6 United States elected not to intervene. 7 His complaint also asserts other claims, The See 31 U.S.C. § 3730. Flaherty filed a motion to dismiss all counts, which the 8 district court granted. With respect to Bal s False Claims 9 count, the court concluded that because Bal is not an attorney 10 . . . [he] is not qualified to represent the interests of the 11 United States. 12 without prejudice. 13 Accordingly, the court dismissed Bal s claim On appeal, Bal initially sought review of the dismissal of 14 all of the claims he asserted in the district court. 15 since consented to the dismissal of all claims except the one 16 asserted under False Claims Act. 17 dismissal of his qui tam claim is the sole issue on appeal. 18 He has Thus, the propriety of the DISCUSSION 1 The False Claims Act imposes civil liability upon any person who, inter alia, knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a). A suit brought under the Act may be commenced by either the federal government or by a private person, or relator, who sues for the United States in a qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b)(1). 3 1 We review a district court s grant of a motion to dismiss 2 . . . de novo . . . . 3 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 2005) (reviewing dismissal of a claim for 4 failure to retain counsel); see Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. 5 Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (affording no deference to 6 the district court s dismissal of an action for a litigant s 7 failure to retain counsel). 8 9 Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 Bal first argues that the district court erred because it dismissed his complaint without the consent of the Attorney 10 General. 11 that provides that qui tam actions may be dismissed only if the 12 court and the Attorney General give written consent to the 13 dismissal and their reasons for consenting. 14 3730(b)(1). 15 a district court order that noted that the court would solicit 16 the consent of the United States before approving the dismissal, 17 settlement, or discontinuation of the case. 18 dismissing the complaint, the district court violated the United 19 States notice of election not to intervene, which also 20 requested that the action be dismissed only with the approval of 21 the court and the Attorney General. 22 Bal relies upon the provision of the False Claims Act 31 U.S.C. § Similarly, Bal contends that the dismissal violated Bal s arguments are without merit. Bal argues that by While the False Claims 23 Act appears to bar dismissal of qui tam actions absent the 24 Attorney General s consent, see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), we have 25 previously construed this provision to apply only in cases where 4 1 a plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal of a claim or action 2 brought under the False Claims Act, and not where the court 3 orders dismissal. 4 Cir. 1990). 5 result of a settlement, the district court did not err by 6 neglecting to secure the Attorney General s consent. 7 104. Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Because the dismissal in this case came not as a See id. at 8 As to the claimed violations of the district court s June 22 9 order and the United States notice of election not to intervene, 10 Bal would have us read these literally as prohibiting any 11 dismissal without the Attorney General s consent. 12 contrary, the district court and the United States were 13 contemplating the necessity of obtaining consent for a voluntary 14 dismissal executed as part of settlement, and not for a contested 15 dismissal. 16 intended to prohibit any dismissal in the absence of the Attorney 17 General s consent, the district court was free to modify this 18 requirement because there is no such limitation required by law. 19 See id. 20 To the Even if the district court and the United States Bal next argues that the district court erroneously 21 concluded that pro se litigants cannot bring False Claim Act qui 22 tam actions on behalf of the United States. 23 suggests that courts should consider on a case-by-case basis 24 whether a given layman is capable of pursuing a claim without 25 counsel, taking into account developments in legal research 26 technology that are now available to the general public. 5 Specifically, Bal 1 Although the False Claims Act does not specifically address 2 whether private parties may bring qui tam actions pro se, see 31 3 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33, we have previously suggested that they cannot, 4 albeit in dicta. 5 (2d Cir. 1978) (positing that a litigant cannot prosecute a qui 6 tam action under [the Act] pro se ). 7 proposition is a sound one. 8 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing with approval cases in which 9 other courts of appeals have concluded that a pro se plaintiff See Safir v. Blackwell, 579 F.2d 742, 745 n.4 Nevertheless, the See also Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 10 who is not a lawyer cannot bring a qui tam action under the Act). 11 The circumstances under which civil litigants may appear 12 without counsel are limited by statute. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1654 provides that in federal court, parties may plead and 14 conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules 15 of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct 16 causes therein. 17 plead and conduct their own cases personally, id. (emphasis 18 added), we have held that an individual who is not licensed as 19 an attorney may not appear on another person s behalf in the 20 other s cause. 21 2002) (quoting Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 22 1998)). 23 litigating an interest personal to him. 24 558 (citing Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 25 1997)). Because the statute permits parties only to Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. That is, in order to proceed pro se, [a] person must be 6 Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 1 Decisions adhering to this principle abound in our case law. 2 It is well established that a layman may not represent a 3 corporation even if the sole shareholder. 4 Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distribution Co., 748 5 F.2d 602, 609 (11th Cir. 1984); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. 6 of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting in dicta 7 that [s]ole shareholders of corporations are not allowed to 8 represent such corporations pro se ). 9 partner may not represent the partnership, see Eagle Assocs. v. 10 Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1310 (2d Cir. 1991), and a sole 11 member of a solely-owned limited liability company may not 12 represent it, see Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 13 2007) (per curiam). 14 not appear pro se to pursue a claim that a corporation has 15 assigned to him, see Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d at 16 23, or to bring a shareholder s derivative suit, see Phillips v. 17 Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411-12 (2d Cir. 1976). 18 held that a layman may not appear pro se on behalf of his minor 19 child, see Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61. See Nat l Indep. A non-lawyer general Similarly, we have held that a litigant may Finally, we have 20 These rulings not only are called for by the text of 28 21 U.S.C. § 1654, but also constitute good policy for both litigants 22 and the courts. 23 24 25 26 27 As we have noted, the conduct of litigation by a nonlawyer creates unusual burdens not only for the party he represents but as well for his adversaries and the court. The lay litigant frequently brings pleadings that are 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 awkwardly drafted, motions that are inarticulately presented, proceedings that are needlessly multiplicative. In addition to lacking the professional skills of a lawyer, the lay litigant lacks many of the attorney s ethical responsibilities, e.g., to avoid litigating unfounded or vexatious claims. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d at 22. 10 Turning to the present case, the threshold question is 11 whether the False Claims Act action is Bal s own case or one 12 that belongs to another. 13 Phillips, 548 F.2d at 411 ( The basic question raised by [28 14 U.S.C. § 1654] is whether this stockholder s derivative suit is 15 the plaintiff s own case or is a suit belonging to the 16 corporation. )). 17 may be commenced in one of two ways. 18 government itself may bring a civil action against a defendant. 19 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a). 20 person, or relator may bring a qui tam action for the person 21 and for the United States Government, against the defendant, in 22 the name of the Government. 23 circumstances, the government may elect to intervene, and if it 24 recovers a judgment, the relator receives a percentage of the 25 award. 26 intervene, the relator may pursue the action and may receive as 27 much as 30 percent of any judgment rendered. 28 3730(d)(2). Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 558 (citing An action brought under the False Claims Act First, the federal Second, as is the case here, a private See id. § 3730(d)(1). Id. § 3730(b)(1). Under such If the government declines to 29 8 See id. § 1 While relators indisputably have a stake in the outcome of 2 False Claims Act qui tam cases that they initiate, the 3 Government remains the real party in interest in any such 4 action. 5 Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1154 6 (2d Cir. 1993). Minotti, 895 F.2d at 104; see United States ex rel. As we have explained: 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 All of the acts that make a person liable under [the False Claims Act] focus on the use of fraud to secure payment from the government. It is the government that has been injured by the presentation of such claims; it is in the government s name that the action must be brought; it is the government s injury that provides the measure for the damages that are to be trebled; and it is the government that must receive the lion s share - at least 70% - of any recovery. United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 162 21 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998), rev d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 22 765 (2000). 23 Supreme Court determined that a relator s interest in a qui tam 24 suit is one as the partial assignee of the claims of the United 25 States but observed that the injury, and therefore, the right to 26 bring the claim belongs to the United States. 27 of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-75 28 (2000). 29 control the False Claims Act litigation, the claim itself belongs 30 to the United States. 31 (providing that as an alternative to bringing a civil suit, the In considering the issue of relator standing, the See Vermont Agency In short, while the False Claims Act permits relators to See id; cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) 9 1 Government may elect to pursue its claim through any alternate 2 remedy available to the Government ) (emphasis added). 3 Accordingly, as the United States remains the real party in 4 interest in qui tam actions, Minotti, 895 F.2d at 104, the case, 5 albeit controlled and litigated by the relator, is not the 6 relator s own case as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, nor one in 7 which he has an interest personal to him. 8 at 558. 9 Claims Act qui tam actions, we conclude that they are not 10 11 Iannaccone, 142 F.3d Because relators lack a personal interest in False entitled to proceed pro se. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Our holding is in accord with all of the circuits that have 12 considered the issue. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873- 13 74 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Stoner v. Santa Clara County 14 Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126-28 (9th Cir. 2007); United 15 States ex rel. Lu v. Ou, 368 F.3d 773, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2004); 16 United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1951).2 17 we reach this conclusion as a matter of statutory construction, 18 we are also sympathetic to some of the other concerns voiced by 19 these courts, in particular that the United States might become 2 While The Supreme Court s recent decision in Winkelman v. Parm City School District, 127 S.Ct. 1994 (2007) (permitting parents to bring suit pro se under the IDEA) is not to the contrary. Winkelman reaffirmed the rights of parents, who have rights under the IDEA distinct from those afforded their children, to assert their own interest pro se. See Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1127 (rejecting the application of Winkelman to the FCA s qui tam provision). As we noted above, Bal does not have a personal interest in this suit. 10 1 bound by res judicata or collateral estoppel as a result of the 2 actions of a pro se in bringing and losing a qui tam action. 3 Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126-27. 4 our belief that Congress could [not] have intended to authorize 5 a layman to carry on such suit as attorney for the United States 6 but must have had in mind that such a suit would be carried on in 7 accordance with the established procedure which requires that 8 only one licensed to practice law may conduct proceedings in 9 court for anyone other than himself. 10 CONCLUSION 11 See This concern serves only to bolster Onan, 190 F.2d at 6.3 For the reasons discussed above, we affirm. 12 3 Bal also argues that because the Government failed to object to Bal s bringing this case and has explicitly stated that it is not a party to this action, the United States has constructively consented to Bal prosecuting this claim pro se. We fail to see how either the United States consent or its status as a non-party is material. The general rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is that pro se litigants can only bring claims personal to them. See Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 558. The statute contains no exception for instances in which a real party in interest either consents to representation by a layman or fails to join an action as a party. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Bal s argument is therefore without merit. 11

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