Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 06-1494 (2d Cir. 2007)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

06-1494 Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 4 5 August Term 2006 (Argued: November 27, 2006 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Decided: May 30, 2007) Docket No. 06-1494-cv -----------------------------------------------------x ANTHONY GAGLIARDO and ADELE GAGLIARDO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, -- v. -ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant. -----------------------------------------------------x B e f o r e : Jacobs, Chief Judge, Walker and Raggi, Circuit Judges. 22 Defendant-appellant Arlington Central School District 23 appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for 24 the Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, Judge) 25 entered March 24, 2006, granting summary judgment in favor of 26 plaintiffs-appellees Anthony and Adele Gagliardo on their claim 27 brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education 28 Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., for reimbursement of tuition 29 expenses incurred in educating their child at a private school of 30 their choosing. 31 REVERSED and REMANDED. 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 JEFFREY J. SCHIRO, Kuntz, Spagnuolo, Scapoli & Schiro, P.C., Bedford Village, New York for defendant-appellant. ROSALEE CHARPENTIER, Attorney, Family Advocates, Inc., Kingston, New York, for plaintiffs-appellees. JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge: This is not the usual lawsuit brought under the Individuals 13 with Disabilities Education Act ( IDEA ), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et 14 seq., in which the parents of a disabled child demand 15 reimbursement for the costs associated with sending their child 16 to a private school while the school district defends its 17 decision to provide the child a public school education. 18 present action, plaintiffs-appellees Anthony and Adele Gagliardo 19 (the Gagliardos or parents ) and defendant-appellant Arlington 20 Central School District (the School District ) agree that the 21 Gagliardos child, S.G., belonged in a private school for his 22 senior year. 23 In the They differ only as to the school. Upon competing motions for summary judgment, the United 24 States District Court for the Southern District of New York 25 (Colleen McMahon, Judge) granted the parents motion. 26 v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 559, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 27 2006). 28 school chosen by the School District in formulating S.G. s 29 individualized education program ( IEP ) would not afford the Gagliardo The district court held principally that the private 2 1 free appropriate public education required by the IDEA and that 2 the parents placement was appropriate; accordingly, it ordered 3 the School District to reimburse the parents for the tuition 4 expenses they incurred in sending S.G. to the private school they 5 chose. 6 reached by an Impartial Hearing Officer ( IHO ) and a State 7 Review Officer ( SRO ) to deny reimbursement. 8 9 In doing so, the district court rejected the conclusions For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court s decision to reject the IHO s determination regarding the 10 appropriateness of the private school chosen by the parents is 11 not supported by the record; we thus reverse the judgment of the 12 district court and remand the case with instructions to enter 13 judgment in favor of the School District. Statutory Background 14 15 This lawsuit is set against the backdrop of the statutory 16 scheme provided in the IDEA and applicable New York laws and 17 regulations as to which we offer this brief overview. 18 The IDEA is the most recent Congressional enactment in an 19 ambitious federal effort to promote the education of handicapped 20 children. 21 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 3 1 176, 179 (1982)).1 2 funds are required to provide all children with disabilities a 3 free appropriate public education. 4 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180-81. 5 district s program must provide special education and related 6 services tailored to meet the unique needs of a particular child, 7 and be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 8 educational benefits. 9 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207) (citation omitted). Under the IDEA, states receiving federal 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); To meet these requirements, a school Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122 (quoting Such services must 10 be administered according to an IEP, which school districts must 11 implement annually. 12 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). To meet these obligations and to implement its own policies 13 regarding the education of disabled children, [New York] has 14 assigned responsibility for developing appropriate IEPs to local 15 Committees on Special Education ( CSE ), the members of which are 16 appointed by school boards or the trustees of school districts. 17 Walczak, 142 F.3d at 123 (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(1)(b)(1) 18 (McKinney Supp. 1997-98) and Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 152 19 (2d Cir. 1992)). 20 is required to consider four factors: (1) academic achievement 21 and learning characteristics, (2) social development, (3) 1 2 3 4 5 In developing a particular child s IEP, a CSE 1 The Supreme court in Rowley interpreted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which was subsequently amended and renamed the IDEA. For consistency and ease of comprehension, we refer to the statute throughout its history as the IDEA. 4 1 physical development, and (4) managerial or behavioral needs. 2 See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. [hereinafter N.Y.C.C.R.R. ] tit. 3 8, § 200.1(ww)(3)(i). 4 In formulating an appropriate IEP, the CSE must also be 5 mindful of the IDEA s strong preference for mainstreaming, or 6 educating children with disabilities [t]o the maximum extent 7 appropriate alongside their non-disabled peers. 8 1412(a)(5); see Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132. 9 least restrictive environment as one that (1) provides the 20 U.S.C. § New York defines this 10 special education needed by the student (2) to the maximum extent 11 appropriate with other students who do not have handicapping 12 conditions, and (3) is as proximate as possible to the student s 13 place of residence. 14 N.Y.C.C.R.R. tit. 8, § 200.1(cc). New York parents who disagree with their child s IEP may 15 challenge it in an impartial due process hearing, 20 U.S.C. § 16 1415(f), before an IHO appointed by the local board of education, 17 see N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). 18 appealed to an SRO, see N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(2); see also 20 19 U.S.C. § 1415(g), and the SRO s decision in turn may be 20 challenged in either state or federal court, see 20 U.S.C. § 21 1415(i)(2)(A). 22 23 24 The resulting decision may be Factual and Procedural Background With regard to the academic year at issue, 2002 to 2003, S.G. was a high school senior who was eligible for special 5 1 educational services on account of his classification as a 2 student with an emotional disturbance; specifically, he suffered 3 from depression and social anxiety. 4 the parents request for tuition reimbursement for that period, 5 the relevant history of S.G. s emotional disturbance begins 6 several years earlier. While this lawsuit involves 7 S.G. first exhibited symptoms of depression in the fifth 8 grade and began seeing a therapist on a weekly basis in the sixth 9 grade school year from 1996 to 1997. By April 1999, S.G. was 10 receiving more advanced treatment for his depression, including 11 antidepressants. 12 High School as a ninth grader and started the school year 13 performing quite well. 14 student in October of that year, he began to experience anxiety 15 about attending school. 16 skipping classes, and as a result, his grades declined. 17 In the fall of 1999, S.G. attended Arlington But after being threatened by another Feeling overwhelmed, he found himself S.G. returned to Arlington High School for tenth grade, but 18 as the year passed, his anxiety mounted. In February of 2001, he 19 refused to attend school. 20 him to the Adolescent Intensive Outpatient Program at St. Francis 21 Hospital where he underwent a mental status examination and 22 problem appraisal. 23 recognizing that the goal was to get S.G. back in school, opined 24 that he would need a structured educational setting before Soon thereafter, his parents admitted The social worker at St. Francis, while 6 1 transitioning back. 2 tutoring; the School District began providing it in early March 3 2001. 4 The social worker recommended extended home On March 16, 2001, the Gagliardos referred S.G. to the CSE. 5 In April 2001, they consented to an evaluation of their son and 6 completed a social history that indicated he had been teased and 7 bullied by other students, had a history of depression, and did 8 not want to attend school. 9 administered a set of standard intelligence tests, which revealed The School District s psychologist 10 that S.G. had an IQ in the high average range, average 11 achievement in reading and writing, and superior achievement in 12 mathematics. 13 depression, and exclusion from social interaction. 14 Additional testing confirmed S.G. s anxiety, In June 2001, the CSE convened for an initial examination 15 into S.G. s situation. 16 the CSE classified S.G. as having an emotional disturbance. 17 Consistent with that classification, the CSE developed an IEP for 18 S.G. s 2001 to 2002 school year, his junior year in high school. 19 It recommended that he receive resource room services one period 20 each day, individualized counseling once a month, and various 21 testing modifications. 22 After reviewing all of the evaluations, The parents consented to the IEP. S.G. returned to Arlington High School for his junior year, 23 but by September 20, 2001 he refused to attend classes. 24 October 16, his treating psychiatrist concluded that S.G. could 7 On 1 not attend school due to his severe anxiety and depression. 2 School District thereupon arranged for home schooling. 3 The In November 2001, the Gagliardos arranged for a psychiatric 4 evaluation of their son by Dr. Keith Ditkowsky, Director of 5 Clinical Services at New York University s Child Study Center. 6 Also in that month, they withdrew their consent to S.G. s IEP on 7 the basis that his needs had changed since the IEP had been 8 developed six months earlier. 9 meeting and an extension of home instruction. 10 The parents requested a CSE Dr. Ditkowsky transmitted his evaluation and recommendation 11 to the Gagliardos in a letter dated December 5, 2001. 12 In the letter, Dr. Ditkowsky recommended that: 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Dr. Ditkowsky further emphasized the urgency with which S.G. 25 needed to reintegrate into a school setting and that prolonged 26 home instruction would aggravate his problems. 27 In light of the continued symptoms of his anxiety disorder, coupled with his history of recurrent depression, it appears that [S.G.] would benefit from an alternative placement. Such a setting should have a smaller teacher to student ratio, and be in a more supportive or therapeutic environment. Hopefully this will allow [S.G.] to re-integrate into a school setting. It is also important that the academic curriculum be at an appropriate level given [S.G.] s clear ability. The CSE met a week later to review the December 5, 2001 28 letter from Dr. Ditkowsky. Based on the information before it, 29 the CSE described to the parents several alternative high school 30 programs, including that of the Karafin School, a small day 8 1 school in Mt. Kisco, New York. 2 later date to review further information. 3 The CSE agreed to reconvene at a In January 2002, S.G. and his parents began visiting the 4 various alternative high school programs. 5 parents sought independent advice from a private organization 6 regarding other private schools. 7 Oakwood Friends School, a Quaker school in Poughkeepsie, New 8 York, that was not approved for the provision of special 9 education services by the New York State Department of Education. 10 Dr. Ditkowsky submitted his final report to the CSE on 11 February 7, 2002. 12 At the same time, the This organization recommended description of S.G. s disorder: 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 In it, Dr. Ditkowsky provided a more detailed [S.G. has] a history of recurrent symptoms of depression and anxiety, which have interfered in his ability to function well in school. The persistent pattern of symptoms with occasional exacerbations is consistent with a diagnosis of Dysthymia with intermittent Major Depressive Episodes. . . . [H]is school refusal, coupled with his numerous concerns about running into peers in the school, and social withdrawal is suggestive of social anxiety, most likely consistent with Social Phobia. Largely echoing his December 5, 2001 recommendations, Dr. 25 Ditkowsky stated that academically S.G. did not appear ready to 26 return to Arlington High School and that he would benefit from 27 placement into a smaller, therapeutic or more supportive program 28 with a good academic component in order to help him again 29 function in a school setting. 30 [t]his is especially important, as [S.G.] needs not only the Dr. Ditkowsky explained that 9 1 credit, but also the social interaction. 2 On February 11, 2002, the CSE reconvened, with Dr. Ditkowsky 3 participating by telephone. In response to questions regarding 4 how much psychological support S.G. needed during the school day, 5 Dr. Ditkowsky explained that the environment he recommended would 6 include staff with expertise in anxiety disorders that would be 7 able to work with S.G. should issues associated with his 8 emotional disturbance manifest themselves in the course of the 9 school day. At the same CSE meeting, the parents authorized the 10 release of S.G. s file to Karafin and the other schools that had 11 been discussed at the previous CSE meeting. 12 The following month, S.G. and his parents visited Karafin 13 and met with the school s associate director, Dr. Bart Donow. 14 According to the Gagliardos, the visit went poorly. 15 after the visit to Karafin, the parents hired counsel to assist 16 them in their dealings with the School District. 17 recommended that neuropsychologist Dr. Marian Rissenberg evaluate 18 S.G. 19 Shortly Counsel On April 29, 2002, the parents asked for another CSE 20 meeting. In a letter to the School District, they represented 21 that they had visited the various schools discussed in the 22 February 2002 meeting and considered all of them inappropriate 23 for their son. 24 S.G. s admission to Oakwood and authorized the release of his At about the same time, the parents applied for 10 1 information to that school. 2 Oakwood to the School District earlier and did not notify the 3 School District that they were taking this step; they did, 4 however, tell Dr. Rissenberg that they hoped their son would 5 attend Oakwood. 6 The parents had not mentioned In a letter dated May 16, the parents notified the School 7 District that its evaluations of [their] son are not correct in 8 diagnosing his disability, [and] therefore not correct in 9 educating or treating him. 10 11 The parents also requested that Dr. Rissenberg evaluate S.G., and the School District agreed. The CSE met on June 7, 2002 to conduct S.G. s annual review. 12 They reviewed the Gagliardos letter explaining their 13 dissatisfaction with the schools they had visited, including 14 Karafin. 15 none. 16 academic skills testing, but they refused because the same 17 testing was to be administered by Dr. Rissenberg. 18 On July 8, 2002, Oakwood accepted S.G. The parents were asked for suggestions but provided The parents were also asked to consent to additional Three days later the 19 CSE met to finalize S.G. s placement for his senior year. At 20 this meeting, the CSE recommended that S.G. be placed at Karafin, 21 with various program modifications, testing accommodations, and 22 once a week counseling. 23 academic skills testing, and the parents consented. 24 and again on July 23, 2002, S.G. s father wrote to the School The CSE continued to request additional 11 On July 18 1 District demanding an IEP based on the discussions at the July 11 2 meeting, which the School District furnished on July 29. 3 On August 15, 2002, the parents requested an impartial due 4 process hearing, asserting that Karafin was an inappropriate 5 setting for S.G. 6 2002. 7 He commenced attendance at Oakwood in September In October 2002, while the due process proceedings were 8 pending, Dr. Rissenberg completed her report on S.G. s 9 evaluation. Her report, in substance, was consistent with that 10 of Dr. Ditkowsky. She found evidence in S.G. of superior 11 intellectual ability, social anxiety, inflexibility, poor social 12 perception, and depressed mood. 13 was consistent with a diagnoses of Asperger s syndrome a mild 14 autistic spectrum disorder in the context of very superior 15 intellectual capacity. 16 academic placement with small classes and an individualized 17 approach, instruction at a high level of conceptual complexity 18 with students whose intellectual capacity was similar to S.G. s, 19 and discussion-based learning and group participation. 20 recommended that S.G. be protected from bullying and ostracizing 21 by peers. 22 consistent with an attention deficit disorder, including extended 23 time for tests, preferential seating, help with planning and 24 organization, and individual instruction as needed. She opined that his situation Dr. Rissenberg recommended an alternative She also Dr. Rissenberg further recommended various supports 12 Last, she 1 2 recommended both individual and group therapy. After a total of nine days of hearings, the IHO rendered a 3 final decision dated June 19, 2003. It found that (1) the 4 proposed IEP was reasonably calculated to enable S.G. to receive 5 educational benefits and therefore appropriate; (2) the parents 6 did not meet their burden of demonstrating that Oakwood was an 7 appropriate placement; and (3) equitable considerations weighed 8 against granting the parents reimbursement request. 9 Accordingly, the IHO denied the parents request for tuition 10 reimbursement. 11 IHO s conclusion that the IEP was appropriate to S.G. s needs. 12 Because this conclusion was sufficient to affirm the IHO, the SRO 13 did not address findings (2) and (3). 14 The SRO affirmed the IHO s decision based on the The parents filed this reimbursement action pursuant to 20 15 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). Both parties moved for summary judgment on 16 the amended complaint. 17 Gagliardos motion. 18 district court found, based on its own review of the 19 administrative record and certain additional evidence, that the 20 proposed IEP that specified Karafin was not appropriate 21 principally because Karafin was not the least restrictive 22 environment in which to educate S.G. 23 further found that Oakwood was an appropriate placement, id. at 24 575-76, and that the parents were equitably entitled to The district court granted the Gagliardo, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 578. 13 See id. at 572-75. The It 1 reimbursement, id. at 576-78. 2 awarded the parents tuition reimbursement. 3 was entered on March 24, 2006, and this appeal followed. Id. at 578. Judgment DISCUSSION 4 5 Accordingly, the district court As we have noted earlier, in order to receive federal 6 funding under the IDEA, a state must provide to all children with 7 disabilities a free appropriate public education. 8 1412(a)(1)(A); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180-81. 9 that the state has failed their child in this regard, they may, 20 U.S.C. § If parents believe 10 at their own financial risk, enroll the child in a private school 11 and seek retroactive reimbursement for the cost of the private 12 school from the state. 13 v. Dep t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985); M.S. ex rel. S.S. v. 14 Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2000). 15 whether parents are entitled to reimbursement, the Supreme Court 16 has established a two part test: (1) was the IEP proposed by the 17 school district inappropriate; (2) was the private placement 18 appropriate to the child s needs. 19 370; Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 364 (2d Cir. 2006). 20 The party who commences an impartial hearing in this case, the 21 parents bears the burden of persuasion on both Burlington 22 factors. 23 parents meet their burden, the district court enjoys broad 24 discretion in considering equitable factors relevant to See Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington In determining See Burlington, 471 U.S. at See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57-58 (2005). 14 If 1 fashioning relief. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. 2 Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993). 3 In this case, the question of whether the Gagliardos carried 4 their burden of demonstrating that the IEP proposed by the School 5 District was inappropriate is a close one. 6 it, however, because this case is easily disposed of under part 7 two of the Burlington test. 8 9 We need not answer Parents who seek reimbursement bear the burden of demonstrating that their private placement was appropriate, even 10 if the IEP was inappropriate. 11 Subject to certain limited exceptions, the same considerations 12 and criteria that apply in determining whether the [s]chool 13 [d]istrict s placement is appropriate should be considered in 14 determining the appropriateness of the parents placement. . . . 15 [T]he issue turns on whether a placement public or private is 16 reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 17 benefits. 18 at 207 and identifying certain exceptions). 19 meeting this standard is one that is likely to produce progress, 20 not regression. 21 marks omitted). 22 23 24 25 26 27 See M.S., 231 F.3d at 104. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. A private placement Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 (internal quotation In Frank G., we explained: No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining whether parents unilateral placement is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement may constitute evidence that a child is receiving educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether that placement reasonably serves a child s individual needs. To qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need not show that a private placement furnishes every special service necessary to maximize their child s potential. They need only demonstrate that the placement provides educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from instruction. 459 F.3d at 364-65 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting our de novo review of the district court s 17 holding, we are mindful that the role of the federal courts in 18 reviewing state educational decisions under the IDEA is 19 circumscribed. 20 101 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 21 427 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 2005) ( In reviewing the 22 administrative proceedings, it is critical to recall that IDEA s 23 statutory scheme requires substantial deference to state 24 administrative bodies on matters of educational policy. ). 25 Although the district court must engage in an independent review 26 of the administrative record and make a determination based on a 27 preponderance of the evidence, 28 Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997), the Supreme Court has 29 cautioned that such review is by no means an invitation to the 30 courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational 31 policy for those of the school authorities which they review, Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 16 Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of 1 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. 2 reviewing administrative decisions must give due weight to 3 these proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally lack[s] 4 the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve 5 persistent and difficult questions of educational policy. 6 at 206, 208 (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 To the contrary, federal courts Id. We applied the Rowley deference standard in Walczak, in 8 which we overturned a district court s reversal of an SRO s 9 decision under the IDEA. We noted that, in order for the 10 district court to conduct an independent review of the 11 sufficiency of an IEP under the IDEA that does not impermissibly 12 meddl[e] in state educational methodology, it must examine the 13 record for objective evidence that indicates whether the child 14 is likely to make progress or regress under the proposed plan. 15 Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 (quoting Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1121). 16 And in Frank G., we recently noted that the district court is 17 required to employ the same objective evidence standard when 18 ascertaining the appropriateness of a parent s private placement, 19 see 459 F.3d at 364, always being mindful, of course, that 20 deference to the administrative proceedings is particularly 21 warranted when the district court s decision is based solely on 22 the administrative record, see id. at 367. 23 In the present case, the district court identified several 24 reasons why it believed that Oakwood was a proper placement for 17 1 S.G. Gagliardo, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 575-76. The district court 2 pointed out that Oakwood provided S.G. small classes, with twelve 3 to fifteen students; that Oakwood was supportive of his 4 emotional needs because, in addition to the Quaker values of 5 tolerance and respect that it promoted, the school did not allow 6 teasing, bullying, or ostracism; that the traditional classroom 7 setting at Oakwood allowed S.G. to benefit from the sort of group 8 activities and discussions that Dr. Ditkowsky and others who 9 evaluated S.G. deemed crucial to both his academic success and 10 his development of social skills; and that S.G. achieved 11 promising grades while at Oakwood. 12 Id. The district court reached its conclusion despite the fact 13 that the IHO, confronted with the same evidence, found that 14 Oakwood was not an appropriate placement for S.G.2 15 explained that the testimony of the parents own experts showed 16 that S.G. required a therapeutic setting in order to reasonably 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 2 The IHO The district court afforded the IHO s findings on Oakwood no weight, evidently because the SRO discussed only the School District s proposed placement at Karafin. If a final state determination conflicts with an earlier decision, the earlier decision may be afforded diminished weight. See Karl v. Bd. of Educ., 736 F.2d 873, 877 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that courts owe deference to the final agency determination where the review officer disagrees with the hearing officer); Heather S. v. State, 125 F.3d 1045, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding the same and noting that the due weight which the court must give to the hearings below is . . . to the decision of the hearing officers . . . [which] is an easier task where . . . the hearing officers are in accord ). Here, however, the SRO did not reject the IHO s findings or analysis. To the contrary, the SRO s decision explicitly noted that the IHO s findings were supported by the record. 18 1 assure that he would receive educational benefits as required by 2 Rowley. 3 in dealing with the special needs attributable to S.G. on account 4 of his emotional disorder. 5 order for the parent s private placement to be appropriate under 6 Rowley, it must provide educational instruction specially 7 designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, 8 supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 9 to benefit from instruction. ). Such a setting, the IHO noted, required a staff trained See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364 (In Because Oakwood lacked such a 10 therapeutic setting, the IHO found that it was an inappropriate 11 placement for S.G. 12 The district court s grounds for disturbing the IHO s 13 reasoned conclusion are not supported by the record. 14 rejecting the IHO s conclusion, the district court emphasized 15 that, according to Dr. Ditkowsky, S.G. did not require a school 16 with a therapeutic setting; instead, he needed a school with an 17 environment that was either therapeutic or supportive. 18 Gagliardo, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 576. 19 latter notion, the district court found that a supportive 20 environment was achieved at Oakwood through a combination of its 21 Quaker values and S.G. s private therapy. 22 In Importing its own view on the See id. The district court s reasoning ignores the substance of Dr. 23 Ditkowsky s recommendations. In the February 11, 2002 CSE 24 meeting, Dr. Ditkowsky clarified what he meant by a supportive 19 1 or therapeutic environment when responding to a CSE member s 2 question regarding how much psychological support S.G. needed 3 during the school day. 4 recommendation did not hinge on any clinical meaning ascribed to 5 the words therapeutic or supportive; the thrust of his 6 recommendation, rather, was that S.G. be placed in a school where 7 trained professionals could work closely with him and assist him 8 as issues associated with his disorder surfaced throughout the 9 day. Dr. Ditkowsky explained that his At the due process hearing, Dr. Ditkowsky reiterated these 10 comments. He testified that S.G. needed to be placed in a school 11 that had staff trained in dealing with anxiety disorders so as to 12 help him . . . survive through the day if he really was 13 struggling or suffering. 14 that Oakwood did not have a staff of such professionals, and 15 while his private therapy may have been able to help him after 16 school, it was not available throughout the school day. The record shows, as the IJ noted, 17 The district court also found that the IHO was incorrect in 18 stating that Oakwood did not have any special education services 19 because literature from the school explains that Oakwood provides 20 students in S.G. s position with certain forms of academic 21 support. 22 further observed that teachers certified in special education are 23 not required for a parental placement to qualify as an 24 appropriate placement for tuition reimbursement. Gagliardo, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 576. 20 The district court Id. (citing 1 Carter, 510 U.S. at 14). 2 this issue demonstrates, however, that he was not suggesting 3 Oakwood did not provide special education services as a general 4 matter, but instead that Oakwood did not provide the special 5 education services specifically needed by S.G. namely, an 6 educational setting consistent with Dr. Ditkowsky s 7 recommendation. 8 finding in her testimony at the due process hearing to the effect 9 that Oakwood does not provide the kind of special education 10 11 The context of the IHO s discussion of Oakwood s own Upper School Head supported this services that S.G. s condition required. In sum, the IHO s finding that Oakwood was not an 12 appropriate placement for S.G. is reasoned and supported by the 13 record, including the history of S.G. s struggle with his 14 emotional disturbance and his resulting inability to attend 15 school. 16 disturbed it. 17 for an appropriate private school placement, we reverse the 18 district court s judgment ordering the School District to 19 reimburse the parents for the cost of S.G. s tuition at Oakwood. 20 We see no reason for the district court to have Because tuition reimbursement is available only We finally add a word about the position a district court 21 finds itself in where, as here, it is called upon to review a 22 case in which parents have enrolled their disabled child in a 23 private school, believing it to be the best thing for the child, 24 and can point to their child s record of success at the school 21 1 they chose. It is understandable that a district court would be 2 receptive to parents under these circumstances; a child s 3 progress is relevant to the court s review. 4 does not itself demonstrate that a private placement was 5 appropriate. 6 522 (6th Cir. 2003) ( [E]vidence of academic progress at a 7 private school does not itself establish that the private 8 placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the 9 IDEA. ); Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 26-27 But such progress See Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (same). 11 success, courts should not disturb a state s denial of IDEA 12 reimbursement where, as here, the chief benefits of the chosen 13 school are the kind of educational and environmental advantages 14 and amenities that might be preferred by parents of any child, 15 disabled or not. 16 appropriate if it provides education instruction specifically 17 designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child. 18 G., 459 F.3d at 365 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89) 19 (emphasis added). 20 21 Indeed, even where there is evidence of A unilateral private placement is only Frank CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the 22 district court and REMAND with instructions to enter judgment in 23 favor of the School District. 22

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.