Caiozzo v. Koreman, No. 05-4002 (2d Cir. 2009)
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05-4002-cv Caiozzo v. Koreman 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2008 4 (Argued: October 24, 2008 Decided: September 22, 2009) 5 Docket No. 05-4002-cv 6 ------------------------------------- 7 8 ANTHONY CAIOZZO, as Administrator of the Estate of Phillip Caiozzo, 9 Plaintiff-Appellant, 10 - v - 11 12 BRIAN KOREMAN, MICHAEL BENEDETTO, ANTHONY CRISORIO, MICHAEL MOFFRE and GORDON C. RIVERS, 13 Defendants-Cross-Claimants, 14 JACK BEVLICOLA and VINAY B. DAS, M.D., 15 Defendants-Cross-Defendants, 16 LINDA CUMMINS, R.N., 17 Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee. 18 ------------------------------------- 19 Before: 20 SACK, KATZMANN and KELLY,* Circuit Judges. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 21 Court for the Northern District of New York (Gary L. Sharpe, 22 Judge). 23 548 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1977), that the standard for analyzing a 24 claim of deliberate indifference to the health or safety of a * We reaffirm our position, stated in Arroyo v. Schaefer, The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. 1 convicted prison inmate held in state custody as a violation of 2 the right of the inmate to be free from cruel and unusual 3 punishment under the Eighth Amendment is also applicable to 4 claims brought by pretrial state detainees under the Due Process 5 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Court's subsequent holding that a subjective standard is to be 7 applied in the Eighth Amendment context, under which a defendant 8 is liable only if he disregards a risk of harm of which he is 9 aware, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), we conclude In light of the Supreme 10 that the subjective standard also applies in the Due Process 11 context. 12 decision, the question of fact before the district court was 13 therefore whether the defendant "kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an 14 excessive risk to inmate health or safety." 15 is no evidence in the record on appeal from which a reasonable 16 juror could conclude in the affirmative. 17 Contrary to our case law prior to the Supreme Court Id. at 837. There Affirmed. 18 19 20 CHAD A. JEROME, The LaFave Law Firm, PLLC (Lawrence J. Zyra, of counsel), Delmar, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 21 22 23 TIMOTHY S. BRENNAN, Phelan, Phelan & Danek, Albany, NY, for Defendant-CrossDefendant-Appellee. 24 25 SACK, Circuit Judge: In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), the 26 Supreme Court held that a subjective test adapted from the 27 criminal law applies to suits against federal prison officials 28 for violating a convicted inmate's right to be free from cruel or 2 1 unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In the wake of 2 Farmer, such a defendant is liable to an injured prisoner only if 3 he "disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware," id. at 837, 4 and that causes the injury. 5 deliberate indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees in 6 state facilities under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 7 Amendment were to be analyzed under the same test as Eighth 8 Amendment claims by inmates who stood convicted. 9 Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1977). Prior to Farmer, we had held that See, e.g., In the pre- 10 Farmer cases, however, the test we employed was objective, that 11 is, it could be met without proof as to the state of mind of the 12 defendant. 13 an evil intent, or recklessness, or at least deliberate 14 indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under 15 his control or dependent upon him." 16 quotation marks omitted). We asked whether there were "circumstances indicating Id. at 49 (internal 17 In light of Farmer, we must decide which of two lines 18 of our case law to follow -- our prior Fourteenth Amendment Due 19 Process Clause jurisprudence, which permitted liability for abuse 20 of pretrial state detainees if the more easily met objective test 21 alone was met, or our prior decisions concluding that Fourteenth 22 Amendment due process cases brought by state pretrial detainees 23 should employ the same standards as Eighth Amendment cruel and 24 unusual punishment cases brought by convicts, now clearly a 3 We adhere to the latter line of authority.1 1 subjective standard. 2 Following the lead of our sister circuits that have addressed 3 this question, we conclude that in Fourteenth Amendment 4 deliberate indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees in 5 state custody, the subjective standard is to be applied. 6 Applying it, we affirm the district court's grant of summary 7 judgment to the defendant. BACKGROUND 8 9 Because summary judgment was granted against the 10 appellant, the administrator of the estate of Phillip Caiozzo 11 ("Caiozzo"), we consider the evidence in the light most favorable 12 to him. 13 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2000). 14 11, 2001, Caiozzo was arrested by an Albany police officer and 15 charged with first degree harassment.2 16 in Albany City Court, he was committed to the custody of the 17 Albany County Sheriff, who transferred him to the Albany County See, e.g., Konikoff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 234 At approximately 9:49 a.m. on July Following his arraignment 1 Because this decision effectively overrules prior decisions of this Court, it has been circulated to all the active judges of the Court before filing. See, e.g., Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 228 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006). 2 A person is guilty of harassment in the first degree when he or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses another person by following such person in or about a public place or places or by engaging in a course of conduct or by repeatedly committing acts which places such person in reasonable fear of physical injury. N.Y. Penal Law § 240.25. 4 1 Correctional Facility ("ACCF") at around 6:45 p.m. 2 previously been incarcerated at the ACCF on at least twenty-seven 3 separate occasions, and had been treated for chronic alcoholism 4 by the facility's medical staff. 5 booking officer recommended that Caiozzo be placed under 6 intensive observation because he appeared intoxicated. 7 was then sent to the medical department, where the nurse on duty, 8 Defendant-Appellee Linda Cummins, R.N., performed an intake 9 medical assessment at around 7:30 p.m. 10 Caiozzo had On this occasion, the ACCF Caiozzo Vinay B. Das, M.D., was the doctor on call at that time. 11 The ACCF intake assessment consists of obtaining 12 information from the detainee by asking a standardized list of 13 questions. 14 observations, including whether the detainee is conscious, shows 15 signs of injury or illness, or has visible signs of fever. 16 nurse is also required to assess any signs that the detainee is 17 at risk of suicide, assault, or abnormal behavior. 18 The nurse is required to make several specific The In her intake assessment of Caiozzo, Cummins took his 19 vital signs, which were within normal limits. Caiozzo was able 20 to answer her questions and to sign the intake form. 21 noted that Caiozzo exhibited abnormal behavior and smelled of 22 alcohol, and that he stated that he was "possessed." 23 also told Cummins that he wanted to go to sleep because he was 24 tired. 25 preceding year. Cummins Caiozzo He reported that he had been hospitalized during the Caiozzo had a history of psychiatric treatment 5 1 and mental problems that the appellant asserts were related to 2 alcohol abuse. 3 Caiozzo told Cummins that he consumed alcohol daily. 4 Cummins then asked when he had had his last drink. Cummins' 5 notes indicate her understanding, based on Caiozzo's response, 6 that his last drink had been in the early evening of that very 7 day, July 11. 8 that Caiozzo meant to refer to the previous evening. 9 understanding corresponded with the booking officer's It now appears that this was not the case, and Cummins' 10 observation, of which Cummins was aware, that Caiozzo appeared 11 intoxicated when he was booked at 6:45 p.m.; it also corresponded 12 with her own observation that his breath smelled of alcohol. 13 appellant argues that Cummins should have realized that it was 14 not possible for Caiozzo to have consumed alcohol earlier that 15 same evening, since he had been arrested that morning and had 16 been in custody ever since. 17 that Cummins was unaware of this chronology, he asserts that with 18 proper diligence, Cummins would have uncovered this information. 19 The timing of a detainee's last drink is important in assessing 20 the need for and timing of alcohol withdrawal treatment. 21 The While the appellant acknowledges At the end of her assessment, Cummins concluded -- 22 erroneously, as it turns out -- that Caiozzo was under the 23 influence of alcohol. 24 observation, which was consistent with the booking officer's 25 recommendation. She placed him under continual 6 1 That evening, two corrections officers were assigned to 2 monitor five inmates, including Caiozzo. The officers kept the 3 inmates under continual observation and recorded their 4 observations in a log book at approximately 15 minute intervals. 5 At about 10:15 p.m., Cummins received a call from the officer 6 monitoring Caiozzo, who stated that Caiozzo was yelling and 7 acting irrationally. 8 told her that he was going to go through alcohol withdrawal. 9 Cummins noted in her medical chart: Cummins came to his cell, where Caiozzo "[S]tates will be having 10 withdrawal from alcohol." 11 examine the decedent, or ask him any questions, any or all of 12 which might have led her to observe alcohol withdrawal signs and 13 symptoms such as incoherence, tremors, or sweating. 14 Cummins did not enter the cell, Cummins called Dr. Das and reported Caiozzo's signs and 15 symptoms as she had observed them. 16 misinterpretation of Caiozzo's statement, she told Das that 17 Caiozzo's most recent drink had been earlier that evening. 18 also told Das that Caiozzo was intoxicated, noting that he was 19 speaking irrationally to himself, and was behaving erratically 20 and apparently had mental health problems. 21 Caiozzo should be kept under constant observation, that Das would 22 follow up first thing in the morning, and that Das would start an 23 alcohol withdrawal protocol at that time, if necessary. 24 Based on her earlier She Das indicated that Cummins did not receive any further calls from the 25 observing officer between 10:15 p.m. and 2:45 a.m. 26 time period, the officer assigned to monitor Caiozzo, defendant 7 During that 1 Koreman, did not notice Caiozzo shaking, trembling or sweating. 2 Neither did he observe any unusual behavior by Caiozzo, who 3 appeared to be awake on and off. 4 toilet, but aside from that, he did not seem to Koreman to be in 5 medical distress. 6 Caiozzo vomited once in his At approximately 2:50 a.m., Caiozzo appeared to Koreman 7 to have "some sort of spasm," after which Caiozzo rolled out of 8 bed. 9 respond. Koreman asked Caiozzo if he was all right. He did not Koreman yelled to the other officer to summon medical 10 help and opened the cell to check on Caiozzo, who appeared to be 11 breathing. 12 The ACCF medical unit was informed that Caiozzo had 13 fallen out of bed and was not moving. 14 Michael Benedetto, entered the cell and found that Caiozzo was 15 breathing and had a pulse. 16 until a nurse, Ann Curtis, arrived shortly thereafter. Curtis 17 examined Caiozzo and found that he was not breathing. Cardio- 18 pulmonary resuscitation procedures were begun. 19 called to assist. 20 equipment. 21 Medical Service at 3:15 a.m. 22 At the time, Caiozzo had a pulse of 60 beats per minute and blood 23 pressure of 70 over 30. 24 Another officer, defendant The officers continued to monitor him Cummins was She furnished oxygen and other emergency CPR was applied pending the arrival of the Emergency EMS then took over the treatment. He was taken to Albany Medical Center. Later that day, having been removed from life support, 25 Caiozzo died. His death was ascribed to seizure due to acute and 26 chronic alcoholism. 8 1 On March 12, 2003, Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Caiozzo, 2 as administrator of Caiozzo's estate, instituted this action in 3 the United States District Court for the Northern District of New 4 York pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various 5 constitutional violations by various defendants. 6 discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. 7 time, the plaintiff voluntarily withdrew his claims against all 8 of the defendants except for Cummins and Das, and withdrew 9 certain of his constitutional claims as against them. At the close of At that The 10 remaining claims against Cummins and Das were for deliberate 11 indifference to Caiozzo's medical needs in violation of his 12 rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 13 At the conclusion of oral argument, the district court 14 (Gary L. Sharpe, Judge) granted Das' motion for summary judgment, 15 but reserved judgment on Cummins' motion and requested further 16 briefing on the question of whether an "objective" or 17 "subjective" standard should be applied. 18 additional briefing and further oral argument, the court applied 19 the subjective test, under which a defendant is liable only if he 20 "disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware," Farmer, 511 21 U.S. at 836-37, and granted summary judgment dismissing the 22 plaintiff's claims against Cummins. 23 believe this decision is generated from the decision as to what 24 standard applies, the objective one or the subjective one." 25 Hearing Tr., May 19, 2005 ("May Tr."), at 11. 9 Following the The court stated: "I 1 The plaintiff does not contest the grant of summary 2 judgment to Das. 3 court's decision to grant Cummins' motion for summary judgment on 4 the claim of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a 5 pretrial detainee. 6 should be applied, and that even under the subjective test, 7 summary judgment should not have been granted. 8 9 The sole issue on appeal is the district The plaintiff argues that the objective test We agree with the district court that the subjective test applies and that no reasonable juror could conclude that 10 Cummins' behavior met that test. 11 We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. DISCUSSION 12 13 I. Standard of Review 14 We review the district court's grant of summary 15 judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most 16 favorable to the nonmoving party. Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 17 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). "[W]e are 'required to resolve 18 all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in 19 favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.'" 20 Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003). 21 apply the subjective or objective standard is a legal question 22 that we also review de novo. 23 Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 323-24 (2d Cir. 2006). Whether to See Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. 24 II. 25 A convicted prisoner's claim of deliberate indifference 26 Applicable Substantive Standard to his medical needs by those overseeing his care is analyzed 10 1 under the Eighth Amendment2 because the right the plaintiff seeks 2 to vindicate arises from the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 3 "cruel and unusual punishment." 4 856 (2d Cir. 1996). 5 trial, however, "the 'cruel and unusual punishment' proscription 6 of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply," 7 because "as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being 8 'punished,'" 9 2000); see also Weyant, 101 F.3d at 856. Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, In the case of a person being held prior to Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. Instead, a person 10 detained prior to conviction receives protection against 11 mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due 12 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the pretrial detainee is 13 held in federal custody, or the Due Process Clause of the 14 Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. 15 222 F.3d at 103, 106 (applying Fifth Amendment to a federal 16 detainee), with Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 275-76 (2d Cir. 17 1990) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to a state detainee). 18 the plaintiff identified causes of action for deliberate 19 indifference under the Eighth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 20 the district court correctly concluded that a claim for 21 indifference to the medical needs of Caiozzo, as a pretrial 22 detainee in state custody, was properly brought under the Due 23 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Compare Cuoco, While See May Tr. at 3. In the case of a state prisoner, it is the Eighth Amendment as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Olivier v. Robert L. Yeager Mental Health Ctr., 398 F.3d 183, 191 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005). 11 1 In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme 2 Court addressed the question of whether to use a "subjective" or 3 an "objective" standard in determining deliberate indifference in 4 the context of a convicted prisoner's rights under the Eighth 5 Amendment, see id. at 837-38. 6 deliberate indifference lying somewhere between the poles of 7 negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other, the 8 Courts of Appeals have routinely equated deliberate indifference 9 with recklessness." The Court noted that "[w]ith Id. at 836. But this did not resolve the 10 question, because there are two legal tests for recklessness: the 11 civil-law objective test, under which a defendant is liable if he 12 "fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm 13 that is either known or so obvious that it should be known," and 14 the criminal-law subjective test, under which a defendant is 15 liable if he "disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware." 16 Id. at 836-37. 17 should apply under the Eighth Amendment because it prohibits 18 cruel and unusual punishment, and a prison official's action or 19 inaction cannot properly be termed "punishment" of the detainee 20 if the official was not actually aware of an excessive risk to an 21 inmate's health or safety. 22 The Court concluded that the subjective test See id. at 837-38. We have not decided which standard to use when a claim 23 of deliberate indifference in violation of the Due Process Clause 24 of the Fourteenth Amendment is brought by a pretrial detainee in 25 state custody. 26 2003), we noted that "in a challenge by pretrial detainees In Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 12 1 asserting a protracted failure to provide safe prison conditions, 2 the deliberate indifference standard does not require the 3 detainees to show anything more than actual or imminent 4 substantial harm," id. at 51 (emphasis in original). 5 observed by way of footnote that "[i]n other types of challenges 6 - for example, when pretrial detainees challenge discrete 7 judgments of state officials - meeting the deliberate 8 indifference standard may require a further showing." 9 n.18 (emphasis added). 10 But we Id. at 51, Before Farmer was decided, in Liscio v. Warren, 901 11 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1990), we applied the objective standard in a 12 case somewhat similar to this one. 13 detainee brought a claim of deliberate indifference, asserting 14 that his alcohol withdrawal was not properly treated due in part 15 to an initial misdiagnosis made at a state detention center. 16 id. at 275-76. 17 defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that "[s]ince the 18 medical records indicated that Liscio was a 'poor historian' of 19 his own condition, [the defendant] was on notice that Liscio 20 might be suffering from ailments other than" the ones the 21 plaintiff himself had identified. 22 that several facts had been elicited that could have led a 23 reasonable juror to find that the defendant should have been 24 aware that Liscio was suffering from alcohol withdrawal. 25 at 277. There, the state pretrial See We reversed the district court's grant of the Id. at 276. We also noted See id. The plaintiff argues that Liscio requires us to apply 13 1 the objective standard to the case at hand. 2 good law, the plaintiff's argument might well be persuasive. 3 If Liscio were still Also prior to Farmer, however, we held that the 4 standard for deliberate indifference is the same under the Due 5 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it is under the 6 Eighth Amendment. 7 (2d Cir. 1977). 8 Amendment may not, strictly speaking, be applicable to pretrial 9 detainees," Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 49-50 & n.3 In Arroyo we concluded that "[w]hile the Eighth id. at 50, in the context of a claim for deliberate 10 indifference to the medical needs of a state pretrial detainee, 11 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires no 12 more" than the Eighth Amendment does in the case of a convicted 13 prisoner, id. (citation omitted). 14 official in this context is liable for an Eighth Amendment 15 violation only if he "disregards a risk of harm [to a prisoner] 16 of which he is aware" under the Eighth Amendment, Farmer, 511 17 U.S. at 837, it would seem to follow that a defendant prison 18 official also is liable for a Fourteenth Amendment violation only 19 if he disregards a risk of harm to a detainee of which he is 20 aware. 21 And if a defendant prison In the wake of Farmer, we have assumed that our 22 practice of applying the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 23 test in cases involving claims brought under the Fourteenth 24 Amendment continues. 25 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We have often applied the Eighth Amendment 26 deliberate indifference test to pre-trial detainees bringing See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 14 1 actions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 2 Amendment."). 3 deliberate indifference brought under the Fifth Amendment by a 4 pretrial detainee in federal custody. 5 a standard for due process claims brought by state detainees 6 under the Fourteenth Amendment that is different from the one 7 that we employ for due process claims brought by federal 8 detainees under the Fifth Amendment. 9 ("We see no reason why the analysis should be different under the Cuoco applied the Farmer standard to a claim of We see no reason to apply See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 106 10 Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment [than under the Due 11 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment]."); see also Malinski 12 v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., 13 concurring) ("To suppose that 'due process of law' meant one 14 thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too 15 frivolous to require elaborate rejection."). 16 We think, then, that it is a logical extension of the 17 principles recognized in Farmer that an injured state pretrial 18 detainee, to establish a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 19 due process rights, must prove, inter alia, that the government- 20 employed defendant disregarded a risk of harm to the plaintiff of 21 which the defendant was aware. 22 23 Cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Our sister circuits that have examined this question after Farmer have all reached a similar conclusion.3 3 As the See Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (holding that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee asserting a claim of deliberate indifference to serious 15 1 Fifth Circuit reasoned in its post-Farmer decision in Hare v. medical needs must demonstrate both "the existence of a 'sufficiently serious' medical need" and that "'the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk,'" reasoning that this approach "'is meant to prevent the constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims'"); Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344-46 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding "that deliberate indifference [which has both an objective and subjective component] is the appropriate standard of culpability for all claims that prison officials failed to provide pretrial detainees with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety"), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 917 (2007); Surprenant v. Rivas 424 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding, in the context of a claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, "the parameters of [a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment interests] are coextensive with those of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment" and that "[i]n order to establish a constitutional violation, a plaintiff's claim must meet both objective and subjective criteria"); Whiting v. Marathon County Sheriff's Dept., 382 F.3d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the question of whether the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim was based on the Eighth Amendment as a prisoner or the Fourteenth Amendment as a pretrial detainee was "immaterial" since "the legal standard . . . is the same under either"); Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1315 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted) ("Although '[p]retrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, . . . this Court applies an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases brought pursuant to [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.'"); Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e need not resolve whether [the decedent] was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner because the standard in either case is the same."); Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that "the minimum standard for providing medical care to a pre-trial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as the minimum standard required by the Eighth Amendment for a convicted prisoner" and that the standard is "violated by a government official's deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 649 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("Though Farmer dealt specifically with a prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment to provide a convicted inmate with humane conditions of confinement, we conclude that its subjective definition of deliberate indifference provides the appropriate standard for measuring the duty owed to pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause."). 16 1 City of Corinth, Mississippi, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996) (en 2 banc): 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 [D]espite the distinct constitutional sources of the rights of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates, state jail and prison officials owe the same duty to provide the same quantum of basic human needs and humane conditions of confinement to both groups. . . . That pretrial detainees may have more protections or rights in general . . . does not mean that they are entitled to greater protection of rights shared in common with convicted inmates. For purposes of measuring constitutional duties, our case law and the teachings of the Supreme Court indicate that there is no legally significant situation in which a failure to provide an incarcerated individual with medical care or protection from violence is punishment yet is not cruel and unusual. The fact of conviction ought not make one more amenable under the Constitution to unnecessary random violence or suffering, or to a greater denial of basic human needs. Id. at 649 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 26 We thus reaffirm the position that we expressed in 27 Arroyo: Claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical 28 condition or other serious threat to the health or safety of a 29 person in custody should be analyzed under the same standard 30 irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or 31 Fourteenth Amendment. 32 articulated the proper standard for analyzing such claims under 33 the Eighth Amendment -- a standard that we have already applied 34 in Cuoco to a Fifth Amendment due process case -- we adopt that 35 standard in this case under the Due Process Clause of the 36 Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Supreme Court in Farmer 17 1 III. The Standard Applied 2 There are two elements to a claim of deliberate 3 indifference to a serious medical condition: "[The plaintiff] 4 must show that she [or he] had a 'serious medical condition' and 5 that it was met with 'deliberate indifference.'" 6 at 106. 7 medical condition. 8 reasonable juror could show that Cummins was deliberately 9 indifferent to that condition, which, under the Farmer test, Cuoco, 222 F.3d Here, there is no dispute that Caiozzo had a serious The question is therefore whether a 10 means that she "kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to 11 [Caiozzo's] health or safety" and that she was "both . . . aware 12 of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 13 substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . also dr[e]w 14 the inference." 15 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Most of the evidence offered by the plaintiff was in 16 support of the argument that Cummins should have been aware that 17 Caiozzo was in immediate danger of alcohol withdrawal. 18 reasonable juror might have concluded that this was the case. 19 There is virtually no evidence, however, to support a conclusion 20 by a reasonable juror that Cummins was actually aware of that 21 immediate danger. 22 wrongly it turned out, that Caiozzo was intoxicated and therefore 23 not in danger of an imminent severe alcohol withdrawal reaction. 24 No reasonable juror could conclude that the Farmer test has been 25 met. A The evidence is clear that she thought, 18 CONCLUSION 1 2 3 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 19
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