Meadows vs. Oklahoma City, No. 07-6140 (10th Cir. 2007)

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FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS September 5, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court CO RTEZ N ATH ANIEL M EA DOW S, Petitioner-A ppellant, v. O K LA H OMA C ITY M U N IC IPAL CO UR T, No. 07-6140 (D.C. No. CIV-07-345-W ) (W .D. Ok.) Respondent-Appellee. OR DER AND JUDGM ENT * Before L UC ER O, HA RTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. M r. M eadows, a pro se litigant, appears before us now 1 concerning alleged constitutional violations arising from his 1999 conviction, in O klahoma state court, for driving under the influence of alcohol. W e find certain aspects of M r. * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant M r. M eadows s request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 M r. M eadows has, in 2006 and 2007, previously appealed the dismissal of claims arising out of a separate driving under the influence incident, M eadows v. Whetsel, 227 Fed. Appx. 769 (10th Cir. 2007), as well as claims for damages from various Oklahoma County Sheriff s personnel, M eadows v. Whetsel, No. 076034 (10th Cir. filed June 22, 2006). M eadows s appeal untimely and others barred by Rooker-Feldman. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal, and we also find it appropriate, as did the district court, to deny his motion to proceed in form a pauperis. *** M r. M eadows was convicted in Oklahoma City M unicipal Court of driving under the influence of alcohol in January 1999. Eight years later, in M arch 2007, he filed in the W estern District of Oklahoma w hat he labeled a M otion for Leave to File M otion to Vacate Judgment Out of Time, asking the federal district court, in substance, to vacate his 1999 state court conviction. 2 M r. M eadows alleged that newly discovered evidence the results of blood tests showing no alcohol in his system w as illegally withheld at the time of his trial. This evidence, he said, proved that he was innocent of the crime charged. He alleged due process violations and asked that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere and that the judgment and sentence be vacated. The district court dismissed M r. M eadows s action. The court reasoned that M r. M eadows s attempt to vacate his municipal court conviction constituted a collateral attack on, and/or an appeal of, the final judgment arising from that conviction, and that, as such, it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibiting federal suits appealing state court judgments. 2 M r. M eadows previously sought post-conviction relief from the Oklahoma state courts, which was denied. -2- M r. M eadows moved to reconsider, again charging that the state trial court violated his due process rights and adding that he received ineffective legal assistance. The district court declined to reconsider its ruling, and M r. M eadow s appealed. The district court subsequently denied M r. M eadows s application for leave to proceed in form a pauperis on appeal. *** W e construe M r. M eadows s pro se filings liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, --- U .S. ----, ----, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); Van Deelen v. Johnson, --- F.3d --, 2007 W L 2309778, *1 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we credit M r. M eadows w ith appealing both the dismissal of (1) his lawsuit and (2) his subsequent motion to reconsider. M r. M eadows also (3) renews his request to proceed in form a pauperis. W e address each of M r. M eadows s submissions in turn. 1. W e cannot help but find M r. M eadows s appeal of the dismissal of his law suit to be untimely. M r. M eadows s M otion to Reconsider was not filed until 29 days after the initial judgment, and his notice of appeal was not filed until 67 days after the initial judgment. Generally, M r. M eadows would have had only 30 days to file the notice of appeal, in order to timely appeal dismissal of the underlying motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A ). To be sure, it was possible for him to toll that time period by filing a motion to reconsider, id. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), but in order for that motion to have tolled the 30-day window, M r. M eadows -3- would have had to file it w ithin 10 days of the initial judgment. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). This he simply did not do. W hile we construe pro se pleadings with special solicitude, under our precedents M r. M eadows s pro se status may not excuse his obligation to comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, including filing a timely notice of appeal. See Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994); Senjuro v. M urray, 943 F.2d 36, 38 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Filing a timely notice of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 439 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006). As such, we find ourselves compelled to dismiss M r M eadows s appeal of the underlying motion for lack of jurisdiction. See Senjuro, 943 F.2d at 38. 2. W hile M r. M eadows s appeal of the district court s denial of his motion to reconsider was timely filed, that document still seeks, in essence, to overturn a conviction from the Oklahoma City M unicipal Court system. This amounts, as the district court found, to an appeal from, or collateral attack on, the state court s judgment, and it is not allowed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir. 2006) ( The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal suits that amount to appeals of state-court judgments. ). Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional limit on federal district and appellate courts, and it prohibits us from reviewing state court decisions. See W right, M iller & Cooper, 18B Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 4469.1 ( The -4- general statutes that establish original federal subject-matter jurisdiction in the district courts do not extend to an appeal from a state-court judgment. ). Accordingly, we have no choice but to dismiss M r. M eadows s appeal of the district court s ruling on his motion to reconsider for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming that the proper remedy for claims brought in contravention of RookerFeldman is dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). 3. Finally, we deny M r. M eadows s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. In doing the same, the district court certified that M r. M eadows s appeal w as not taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Given the complete lack of legal authority to sustain his appeal, we are forced to agree. *** For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court s judgment dismissing the motion to reconsider, and we deny M r. M eadows s motion to proceed in form a pauperis. ENTERED FOR THE COURT Neil M . Gorsuch Circuit Judge -5-

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